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Abstract 
 
This study examines the distinctly ecclesial dimensions of Orthodox thinking 
on Islam and Muslim-Christian encounters within the context of the modern 
theological renewal in the Orthodox Church over the past few decades.  It shows how 
by building on the patristic, ecclesial, and liturgical revival over the past half-century 
– inspired by figures such as Afanassieff,  Bulgakov, Florovsky, Lossky, Schmemann, 
Staniloae, and Zizioulas – Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Metropolitan Georges 
(Khodr), Dr. Tarek Mitri, Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos), and others have 
reframed the discussion within the Church, and within ecumenical circles, about 
Christian-Muslim relations.  By creatively applying traditional concepts of christology 
and pneumatology, they have posited Islam as part of the divine economy for 
salvation and have publicly endorsed (and directly participated in) Muslim-Christian 
dialogue.   The study surveys these interactions between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims and analyzes their significance in the broader context of their collective and 
independent attempts to redefine their identity during the years 1975-2008.  The study 
concludes that it is now possible to speak of an Orthodox ‘position’ on Islam and 
relations with Muslims.  It also suggests that in their interactions with each other, 
Orthodox Christians and Muslim are putting forth new paradigms for addressing some 
of the world’s pressing concerns.   
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1 
Introduction  
 
  
It has been said that Eastern Christians form the last surviving bridge between 
Islam and Western Christianity.1  In an era when Christianity and Islam are at the 
forefront of the continuing debate about an apparent “clash of civilizations,” it is 
unfortunate that this important “bridge” is so rarely explored.  Orthodox Christians 
themselves – because of the cultural and historical contacts with Muslims, as well as 
certain aspects of their theology and religious practices – are in a unique position to 
be peacemakers and a link between the West and the Muslim world.  Though a 
growing number of Orthodox theologians and hierarchs have shown interest in the 
topic, to date no comprehensive study has been attempted to systematically examine 
the theological basis for the relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in 
the current global situation and to survey their interactions with each other over the 
past few decades.  This study is an attempt to fill that void.  It is hoped that it will help 
to illuminate what might be considered a distinctive Eastern Orthodox approach on 
Islam and Muslim-Christian relations, from the perspective of Orthodox Christians 
themselves, while also conveying the variety of attitudes and nuances on these and 
related matters within the broader Orthodox tradition. 
The emphasis of this inquiry will be to examine the distinctive ecclesial 
dimensions of Orthodox thinking on Islam and Muslim-Christian encounters within 
the context of the modern theological renewal in the Orthodox Church over the past 
few decades.   In doing so, it will establish a common canon of theological thought – 
from within this broader ecclesial context – that provides the authority from which to 
comment and evaluate the religious other, and specifically Islam.  Special attention 
will be given to certain essential figures in this re-articulation of timeless aspects of 
Orthodox thought in order to establish a new theological and ecclesial context through 
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which to open a space for a positive assessment of Islam and to support harmonious 
relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the present age.  For example, 
it will examine how by building on the patristic, ecclesial, and liturgical renewal over 
the past half-century – inspired by figures such as Nicolas Afanassieff,  Sergius 
Bulgakov, Georges Florovsky, Vladimir Lossky, Alexander Schmemann, Dimitru 
Staniloae, and John Zizioulas – Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Metropolitan 
Georges (Khodr), Dr. Tarek Mitri, Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos), and others 
have reframed the discussion within the Church, and within ecumenical circles, about 
Christian-Muslim relations.  It will also analyze the degree to which they, and those 
sympathetic to their views, have attempted to transform this new thinking into action 
through dialogue and common work with Muslims in a variety of contexts across the 
globe.  Consideration will be given as well to the re-claimed authority and 
international significance of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in recent 
years as a leader in the area of inter-religious relations and the pressing ecological and 
humanitarian issues of concern to many of the world’s religious leaders.   
Such a study is important in part because it can encourage Orthodox Christians 
to more accurately assess their own history.  On this point, several aspects will be 
explored: 1) whether, and if so why, in the process of forming nation-states after the 
dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, certain Orthodox societies have suffered from a 
collective identity crisis that has affected their perspective of Islam and relations with 
Muslims; 2) the degree to which those living in these societies, including even 
esteemed leaders within the Church, have used Islam as a convenient scapegoat for 
problems faced by Orthodox Christians in their respective nations or regions; and      
3) the ways in which, though no one would deny that “tradition” is central to the 
Orthodox religious ethos, there has been an unhealthy idealizing of the past.  It will be 
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argued that developing a better understanding of Islam and a more accurate vision of 
the common ground of Orthodox Christians and Muslims as they face similar realities 
in the current age can greatly assist Orthodox Christians to find a more sure footing in 
the ever-changing world around them and in their quest to apply the fullness of their 
tradition in the present day.   
It would be prudent before going much further to define what is meant in this 
study by “Eastern Orthodox” or “Orthodox Christianity,” terms used often and 
interchangeably.  This would be any of the Eastern Christian churches that affirm the 
Seven Ecumenical Councils and, outside of unusual and temporary circumstances, are 
in communion with the Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and 
Jerusalem.  These are significant as they represent four of the five ancient 
patriarchates known in Byzantine times as the “pentarchy.” (Rome completes the 
pentarchy, but has been separated from the other ancient sees since the time of the 
formal split between the Latin and the Eastern Orthodox Churches.2  However, there 
have been several unprecedented conciliatory gestures in recent years between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches that have raised hopes that the 
five ancient sees of Christendom may one day return to full communion.)  The term, 
“Eastern Christian,” which is used with less frequency in this study, generally means 
a member of any of the Eastern or Oriental Orthodox Churches (the latter being the 
Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopian, and Syrian Orthodox) and sometimes also the Church of 
the East and the Eastern Catholic Churches.  In order to make this study manageable 
in terms of the sheer volume of sources to be addressed, its focus was limited in the 
main to Orthodox Christian figures and documents.  Broadening it to include all 
branches of Eastern Christianity would have presented certain challenges that would 
have required significant adjustment to the methodology and organization of the 
4 
 
study, which would have extended its size dramatically and possibly altered the 
outcomes.  Despite its limited scope, it is highly plausible that Oriental Orthodox and 
other Eastern Christians will find many aspects of this study in line with their own 
thoughts, circumstances, and experiences with Islam and their Muslim neighbors.  
Having defined the various terms used for the Christians referenced in this 
study, there are a few more points to be made about what is implied in its title.  This is 
primarily a work about the attitudes and actions of Orthodox Christians in relation to 
Islam and Muslims.  Though a portion of one chapter focuses specifically on attitudes 
and actions of Muslims, it is essentially a summary of commonly held views in the 
fields of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, as they relate to and parallel that 
experienced by Orthodox Christians during relatively the same time period.  In this 
sense, the present study argues nothing necessarily new, particularly in the field of 
Islamic Studies.  What is new is the way in which the experiences of Muslims and 
Orthodox Christians are connected and, perhaps, derive from or are in response to the 
same realities that they have collectively faced over the past few centuries.   
A further point of clarification is that, though this study will draw from 
sources and personalities from all parts of the Orthodox world including to a lesser 
extent even the Oriental Orthodox, its primary focus will be on those regions in which 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims have historically had the most contact, living often 
as neighbors.  That said, one must also keep in mind the ‘scattering’ (diaspora in 
Greek) throughout the globe of Orthodox Christians composing a variety of ethnic 
and cultural identities, a trend which greatly increased during the modern period 
(particularly during the 19th century through the two World Wars of the 20th century).  
The same trend can be noted within the worldwide Muslim community, though the 
emigration from traditional lands in some cases took place at different times and for 
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different reasons.  One result of this new mobility of people is that it is not uncommon 
to have noteworthy communities of Muslims and Orthodox Christians living side-by-
side in the “diaspora,” which can be virtually any part of the world, though especially 
in Europe, Australia, and the Americas. 
One final point relates to the time period that was chosen with regard to the 
primary source materials covered in this study: 1975-2008.  Though the study will 
begin at a much earlier point (the 15th century of common era with the fall of 
Constantinople to Muslim invaders) in order to establish the broader context for the 
themes and issues examined during the period under consideration, 1975 is when one 
can begin to detect the effort to re-articulate the Orthodox theological tradition 
specifically as it relates to Islam and Muslim-Christian relations in today’s world.  
The story of the renewal of Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations continues to the 
present moment and will go on for at least the next generation.  However, the autumn 
of 2008 is a convenient place to end this present study, because it was at that time that 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew convened a Synaxis of the Orthodox patriarchs 
and their representatives from across the globe, who collectively re-affirmed their 
commitment to, among other things, the “participation of the Orthodox Church in 
theological dialogues with the non-Orthodox” (including Muslims).  This was a 
watershed moment within the Church in terms of its commitment to interreligious 
dialogue with and common action with those of other faiths, and Islam in particular 
because of the historic connection between Orthodox Christianity and Islam.   
This study in many ways builds upon and takes as models similar general 
works and surveys in the area of Muslim-Christian studies covering the same period.3  
One thinks, for example, of Kate Zebiri’s, Muslims and Christians Face to Face 
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997), a significant portion of which is devoted to 
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modern Christian writings on Islam during the second half of 20th century.  Though it 
is a useful book in many respects, the Eastern Christian perspective is nearly non-
existent in both the presentation and conclusions.  Another important book that takes a 
serious look at Christians attitudes on Islam, and vice versa, along with Muslim-
Christian dialogue in recent years (and throughout the entire period from the advent of 
Islam to the present) is Hugh Goddard’s, A History of Muslim-Christian Relations 
(Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2000).  Though excellent in its method, analysis, 
and presentation, it is lacking in quantity of material about Eastern Christians during 
the period under consideration in this study.  Another work that should be mentioned 
is Jutta Sperber’s, Christians and Muslims: The Dialogue Activities of the World 
Council of Churches and the Theological Foundation (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
2000).  This is one of the best treatments to date on the activities sponsored by the 
World Council of Churches (WCC) on Islam and Muslim-Christian dialogue through 
the end of the 20th century.  Sperber covers to some extent the Orthodox involvement 
in WCC in interfaith dialogue and charitably speaks about its significance.  However, 
the book is not exhaustive and mostly discusses the Orthodox contributions in relation 
to the comments and actions of their Protestant counterparts within the Council.  Paul 
Riddell’s book, Christians and Muslims: Pressures and potential in a post-9/11 world 
(Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004), also gives some limited attention to the 
engagement of the Orthodox with Islam, but again the sources are few and confined to 
a relatively short period of time.  Finally, Risto Jukko’s work, Trinity in Unity in 
Christian-Muslim Relations: The Work of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious 
Dialogue (Leiden: Brill, 2007), though quite exhaustive, is limited almost exclusively 
to Roman Catholic theology on religions.   
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 There have been a number of articles written by Orthodox theologians and 
scholars on Islam and Muslim-Christian relations over the past few decades, found in 
a variety of places and contexts and serving a wide range of purposes.  Often these 
writings can be located in academic journals or in compilations of WCC sponsored 
events.  Among the latter, most worthy of mention is the series of writings and 
speeches by Catholicos Aram I in, For a Church Beyond its Walls (Antelias, Lebanon: 
Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia, 2007), as well as a collection of the key works of 
Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos) in, Facing the World: Orthodox Christian 
Essays on Global Concerns (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2003).  One can also find a 
few compilations from conferences sponsored by academic and theological 
institutions in which the Orthodox leaders and scholars have contributed on the topics 
of Muslim-Christian relations and dialogue.  Three key examples would be: Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims, N.M. Vaporis, ed. (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox 
Press, 1986); Christian-Muslim Encounters, Y.Y. Haddad and W.Z. Haddad, eds. 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995); and Paths to the Heart: Sufism and 
the Christian East, James Cutsinger, ed., (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, Inc., 
2002).   
One exciting development in recent years has been the work on this topic, 
along with a number of others relating generally to Orthodox theology, through the 
Academy of Theological Studies in Volos, Greece.  Papers from a “roundtable” lecture 
series that took place in November 2001 were published in a volume titled, Islam & 
Fundamentalism – Orthodox Christianity and Globalization (in Greek), Pantelis 
Kalaitzidis and Nikos Ntontos, eds. (Athens: Indiktos Publications, 2004).  Also, the 
“winter academic term” at the academy from late autumn 2006 to spring 2007 was 
devoted to the topic, “Orthodox Christianity and Islam – Islam in Europe,” and 
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consisted of a series of lectures involving scholars and religious leaders from several 
countries. (This will be discussed in detail in one of the chapters of this study.)  The 
work at Volos further indicates not only a growing interest among Orthodox 
Christians in the study of Islam and an openness (at least in some circles) to Muslim-
Christian dialogue, but also the need for a comprehensive survey of the thought and 
work of the Orthodox in this area in recent years.   
Many of these articles and others from a variety of sources are brought 
together in the following chapters.  The methodology essentially consists of an 
analytical survey of such articles as well as the following sources: scripture, patristic 
literature, synodal decrees, official statements, speeches and published works by 
Orthodox theologians and hierarchs, historical writings, and major works on 
modernity and postmodernity (by Orthodox and non-Orthodox alike).   The first four 
are relevant as they are sources of authority within the Orthodox Church and the other 
sources are important as well as they frame the key questions in this area of inquiry 
and provide a context through which to present many of the major themes on the 
topic.  As it would be impossible to include in this study every source germane to the 
topic at hand, the included materials are representative contributions in sufficient 
number to be able to form some basic and general conclusions.  It is hoped that by 
pulling these key sources together in one volume one can begin to tell a story or rather 
construct a mosaic that can serve as a window into the ‘mind of the Church’ on the 
matter of Islam and Muslim-Christian relations today.  In doing so, it will be 
important to note whether there has been an attempt on the part of Orthodox 
Christians to continue a tradition of understanding about the relationship between the 
Church and those of other religions and/or to break new ground, either in continuity 
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with timeless dogmatic principles or by re-evaluating those principles in order to find 
Muslims within the divine economy. 
In order to place this work in context, considering the long and complex 
history of relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, chapter one is devoted 
to identifying some of the defining moments in Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations 
from the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in the mid-15th century to the present day.  
This background information is essential in order to examine through the rest of the 
study the full limitations and potential of Muslim-Christian relations in the 
postmodern age.  Chapter two gives an introduction to Orthodox theological 
perspectives on other religions generally and Islam in particular.  It highlights the 
scriptural foundations and patristic example from which one can derive a distinctive 
Orthodox understanding of the source and purpose of the religions and how they 
relate to the mission and place of the Church in the world.  Chapter three presents 
various statements, in numerous contexts, by Orthodox hierarchs and leaders on the 
topics of Islam and Muslim-Christian relations.  It also outlines and analyzes 
Orthodox participation in dialogue with Muslims in a variety of contexts and locations 
throughout the world.  Special attention will be given to the role of Orthodox 
Christians in dialogue efforts by the World Council of Churches and the Orthodox 
Center for the Ecumenical Patriarch.  Chapter four examines the ways in which 
Orthodox Christians have attempted over the past several decades to define and refine 
their identity in the postmodern age.  It will also look at ways in which Muslims have 
gone through a parallel process with similar responses and comparable results.   Finally, it 
will argue that an honest assessment of the relationship (past and present) with Islam and 
Muslims will be essential for Orthodox Christians in their quest for their identity for 
today and for future generations.  Chapter five will consider the potential effects of the 
terrorist attacks in the United States in the autumn of 2001, and elsewhere in the years 
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following, on Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations around the globe.  It will discuss how 
the events, statements, and dialogues in the months and years after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th might have challenged the Orthodox, in particular, to examine anew their 
identity, history, and religious convictions and whether Orthodox Christian-Muslim 
dialogue entered into a new phase after 9/11 that was different in substance from the 
previous period.  Finally, the very end of the study will present a few of this author’s 
conclusions about what was discovered through this study, some new questions it may 
have raised, and some general projections about what to expect with Orthodox Christian-
Muslim relations in the coming years. 
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Chapter 1: Historical Background  
 
 
It is a great pity that, though the two religions [Christianity and Islam] 
have emerged and developed in neighboring countries, they have not as 
yet come to really know each other…. Muslims and Christians are called 
today to ask themselves about the different aspects of their common 
course through a turbulent history of fourteen successive centuries…. 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims are called to know each other better.  
They are called to examine more deeply their faith and their religious 
beliefs, to search diligently for God’s will, and to try to bring man back 
to God, who calls everyone, who forgives everyone, who transforms 
everyone.4  
 
                  ~ Metropolitan Constantine of Derkon 
 
William Dalrymple made two important historical observations while traveling 
throughout the Middle East several years ago visiting the remaining Christian 
communities, which prior to Islam, had formed the cradle of Christianity.  First, he 
noted when visiting ancient cells of monks near the Monastery of Mar Saba in Israeli-
Occupied West Bank, that each of them had a prayer niche almost identical to the 
mihrab, which is a basic feature of all mosques today.  He concluded that, “…the 
prayer niche must be another of those features of the early Christian world which has 
been lost to modern Western Christianity, yet which is still preserved in Islam.”5  
Dalrymple’s second noteworthy observation, related to the first, was that Islam and 
Christianity have a deep connection with each other.  Comparing the religious views 
and practices of John Moschos, a six century Christian whose journey Dalrymple was 
retracing, with those of modern Muslims, he made the following statement: 
Certainly if John Moschos were to come back today it is likely that he would 
find much more that was familiar in the practices of a modern Muslim Sufi 
than he would with those of, say, a contemporary American Evangelical.  Yet 
this simple truth has been lost by our tendency to think of Christianity as a 
Western religion rather than the Oriental faith it actually is….[Today] few are 
aware of, or indeed wish to be aware of, the profound kinship of Christianity 
and Islam.6   
 
12 
 
Dalrymple’s observations attest to a truth that Orthodox Christians and Muslims have 
known instinctively for centuries – that they originally came from one civilization and 
share the same ancestry.   
Though in modern times, particularly after some painful memories from the 
past two centuries, they may have forgotten this fact to some extent, Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims share a great deal in common with each other.  Just as with 
any family lineage, there are aspects of which to be proud and other things that one 
would like to forget and the relationships between the various branches of the family 
tree become increasingly complex over time.  In order to understand the rich heritage 
of this shared ancestry between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, it is essential to 
peel back each generation one layer at a time and to understand the circumstances and 
events that helped define those who lived in each age.  The hope is that by examining 
certain defining moments in the family history of Orthodox Christians and Muslims, it 
will be possible to capture the full limitations and potential of Muslim-Christian 
relations today. 
MID-15TH C. – LATE 18TH C. 
 To begin to understand relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in 
the postmodern age, one must start with a pivotal event from the middle of the 
fifteenth century.  Twenty-nine May in 1453 of the Common Era stands out as the day 
that Constantinople finally fell to the Muslim Turks, after nearly two months of 
resistance and following many years potential threat.7  The fall of Constantinople, the 
beloved capital of the Byzantine Empire, marked the end of one age and the 
beginning of another.  In many ways, it marked the final key event in the transfer of 
ultimate power and influence in the oikoumene from Christendom to Islamdom.8 
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 Though Constantinople had been in decline for many years, in comparison 
with its former glory in centuries past, when it finally fell into Muslim hands it 
seemed to some to be the end of the world.  As the capital of what remained of the 
Roman Empire and the symbolic center of Christendom, at least outside of Western 
Europe, Constantinople was a world class city.  It was hard to imagine that, from the 
point of view of some if its inhabitants, it could ever fall to infidels.  According to the 
Byzantine calendar, the fall of the city was dated at approximately 7,000 years after 
the creation of the world.  Among the Byzantines, with their biblical worldview and 
known penchant for symbolism and metaphor, there were those who argued that the 
fall of the city would usher in the period of rule by the Antichrist that would be 
followed by Armageddon and the end of the world.9    Others believed that the world 
would go on and that the best hope for the future was for Orthodox Christians, 
especially Greeks, to unite under Turkish rule, with the hope that at some point in the 
future Byzantium would rise again.   
 The world did go on for both Christians and Muslims after the fall of 
Constantinople, despite the apocalyptic predictions of some, but Muslim rule of the 
city and the former Byzantine Empire did cause changes of broad significance for 
Muslim-Christian relations.  It caused somewhat of an identity crisis for Christians 
who no longer were part of a Christian empire, nor had as their leader an emperor 
around whom to base a universal Christian civilization.  In practical terms, however, 
the impact of Muslim rule on the daily lives of Christians was not as extreme as one 
might imagine.10  Many areas of everyday life did not change, in fact, and this was in 
large part due to the policies of the new ruler, Mehmed II. 
 Sultan Mehmet II, who had worked diligently to conquer much of what was 
once the heartland of the Byzantium empire, saw Constantinople as his greatest prize.  
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It possessed many riches, which he and his army could enjoy as the spoils of war, but 
it held an even greater symbolic value to him.  Mehmet had much respect for the great 
civilization the Byzantines had cultivated for many centuries and he was proud to 
inherit it.  Conquering Constantinople meant that he had arrived as a world-class 
leader, and as such he had increased his prestige throughout Islamdom.  He saw 
himself as the new leader of the empire and even called himself Kaysar-i-Rum (the 
Caesar of Rome).11 Therefore, the Greeks of Constantinople were very important to 
him.  Mehmed continued the custom of Muslim conquerors from the time of Umar 
that allowed Christian subjects to continue with their religious practices and most of 
their traditions.  There were no forced conversions to Islam and Christians remained 
in many important positions within the expanding Ottoman Empire.  Mehmed made 
sure that it was clear, however, that this was a Muslim not a Christian empire.  The 
religion of the Christians had to be relatively low key under Ottoman rule and the 
crescent would always be shown above the cross.  
 One of the biggest changes with regard to relations between Christians and 
Muslims under Ottoman rule, was the introduction of the “millet system.”  Millet, 
from its Persian root, means “nation” and, since for centuries in the East religion was 
equated with nationality, the millet system was the modus operandi for Muslims to 
govern religious minorities.12  Mehmed II followed the Islamic practice of tolerating 
the ahl al-kitab, or people of the book, namely those religions with divinely inspired 
scriptures. He gave them the status of ahl al-dhimmi or dhimmis, the protected people, 
allowing them to practice their religious traditions as long as they paid taxes and 
stayed in their proper place in society.13  Initially, there were only two recognized 
religious communities or millets in the Ottoman Empire, one for the Christians and 
one for the Jews.14   
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Through the sultan’s berat of investiture, or ‘seal of approval,’ the Patriarch of 
Constantinople (a.k.a. Ecumenical Patriarch) took on a new role as ethnarch (afthentēs 
kai despotēs, Lord and Despot) of all Christians.15  By imperial decree, the 
Ecumenical Patriarch became, in addition to the head religious leader, the temporal 
administrator of the Ottomans’ Christian subjects.  He was arbiter in matters of 
clerical discipline, the sale and transfer of property, marriage and divorce, and civil 
disputes within the millet.  He was also responsible to administer many educational 
institutions, courts, and churches for the dhimmis throughout the Ottoman Empire.  So 
long as a matter did not involve what may have been considered treason against the 
empire, it was handled for the most part by the Patriarchate.   
This arrangement worked well in many respects for both Muslims and 
Christians.  From the time of Mehmet II until the rise of the modern nation-states, 
Christians served as important functionaries within the Ottoman government.  Also, 
the empire was able to expand in part, both territorially and in prestige, through the 
success of Christian merchants.  The Phanariots for example, Greeks from the Phanar 
region of Istanbul, became particularly wealthy and influential as key traders in the 
empire.  They along with Christian merchants from the Levant played an important 
role as an essential bridge between the Ottoman rulers and Western powers.16  Over 
time, the relative autonomy afforded to the Christians would adversely impact 
Ottoman rule, as it gave Christian communal groupings the opportunity to expand 
their power to the point where they were able to win independence from the empire 
itself.  Christianity was preserved in a sense under Muslim rule and Christians and 
Muslims lived together and tolerated each other within the Ottoman Empire while it 
lasted for several centuries.   
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There were, however, negative consequences for Christians, who did not enjoy 
all of the privileges granted to Muslim subjects in the empire.  Two of the most 
difficult challenges were a lack of Christian schools and the institution of devshirme 
(Turkish), or paidomazoma (Greek).  Steven Runciman has said that under Ottoman 
rule, “It was in the sphere of education that the Greek Church was to feel the effects 
of servitude most profoundly and most disasterouly.”17  Many schools were destroyed 
during the Turkish conquests in the former Byzantine Empire, and under Ottoman 
rule the patriarchate had little money or ability to keep many schools open.  There was 
a decline in literacy among Christians generally and Christian education among clergy 
and laity alike was minimal.  This was truly a shift from the Byzantine world with its 
highly educated citizenry, which was preoccupied with religion and theology.  The 
elite among the Christians would travel to schools in Europe for their education and a 
fair number of priests and bishops received their theological training outside of the 
empire.   The devshirme was the practice within the Ottoman Empire of taking one 
male child from a Christian family and raising him as a Sufi Muslim so as to build up 
the elite Ottoman military troupe known as the Jannisaries.18  The sons of many 
Christian families were forced to convert to Islam and serve in the sultan’s corps of 
Jannisaries though the devshirme.  Outside of this practice, however, there were very 
few examples of forcible conversion of Christians to Islam during the Ottoman 
period. 
Ottoman rule and the often second-class status of Christians in the empire also 
had negative long-term consequences for Orthodox Christians in the region.  First, 
though the centralization of Christian leadership in the patriarchate afforded a level of 
freedom to Christians in the empire, it also led to the rise of Greek hegemony within 
the Orthodox Church.  Though canonically the ancient patriarchates of Alexandria, 
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Antioch, and Jerusalem retained their independent status, in practice they had to defer 
to the Patriarch of Constantinople in many ways, particularly since he was the one 
who submitted names to the sultan for all patriarchal appointments.  Furthermore, 
religious leaders among the Serbs, Bulgarians, and other nationalities ultimately all 
submitted to the Ecumenical Patriarch because of his role as head of the Greek 
Orthodox millet.  Though the Greek language and Hellenism had always played an 
important role during the Byzantine period, the Orthodox Church in the Roman 
Empire was considered a universal body that encompassed many peoples with a 
variety of languages, customs, and liturgical traditions.  The influence of the 
Ecumenical Patriarch over the churches led not only to an increased emphasis on all 
things Greek, but also to an disproportionate number of Greeks to positions of 
leadership in the Church as it manifested itself in the Ottoman Empire.   
The second consequence for Orthodox Christians, which was closely related 
and a contributing factor to Greek hegemony, was the rise in influence among the 
Phanariots of Istanbul who over time gained much control over the Ecumenical 
Patriarch.19  One factor that led to this situation was corruption that stemmed from the 
custom of giving a peshkesh (Turkish, “gift”) to the Ottoman authorities for the berat 
of investiture each time the sultan appointed a new patriarch.  The peshkesh enabled 
the Greeks, particularly the Phanariots of Istanbul, to tightly control the patriarchate 
based on what would benefit their political and commercial needs.  The result was 
that from 1495-1595 CE there were 19 changes to the patriarchal throne, from 1596-
1695 there were 61 changes among 31 individual patriarchs, and from 1696-1795 
there were 31 appointments from 23 different patriarchs.  In addition to their political 
and economic motivations, the Phanariots also wanted to emphasize the patriarch’s 
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role in preserving and strengthening Hellenism over and above more universal 
religious traditions and theological and spiritual treasures of Orthodox Christianity.20   
Though in many ways the continuity of the Orthodox Christianity was 
preserved and maintained during the Ottoman period by the faithful who gathered 
regularly to pray and partake of the richness of the church’s liturgical tradition, there 
were also important intellectual contributions from a handful of theologians.  
Historians have noted, however, that theological and intellectual life among Christians 
of the Near East was influenced to a greater degree by the changes that were taking 
place in the West than the developments that were occurring in the Ottoman Empire.  
In particular, Orthodox thought developed largely in response to ideas from the 
Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in Europe.  By the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, Orthodox theologians seemed to be preoccupied with 
defending themselves against these developments by using, “Roman arguments 
against the Protestants and Protestant arguments against the Roman Catholics.”21  
With Christian thinkers having lost touch with their own authentic tradition and 
having even less interest in engaging in dialogue with Muslim religious leaders, 
Orthodox Christianity in the Ottoman Empire during this period was marked by the 
trends of traditionalism and westernization.22  There was a sense in which Christians 
wanted desperately to preserve their Byzantine past, so they often uncritically copied 
the traditions and practices of previous generations without attempting to apply the 
timeless principles of the past to the realities of life under Ottoman rule.  
Concurrently, they began to employ western terminology and thought patterns in their 
attempts to articulate Orthodox views on the issues with which Christians occupied 
themselves during this period.23 
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The fall of Constantinople to the Muslim Turks did not mark the end of the 
world for Orthodox Christians, but the way that Christianity would be worked out in 
society did change dramatically during the first few centuries of Ottoman rule.  Under 
the Ottomans, Christianity was able to survive, but there were important 
consequences.  Overall, one could say that the most significant change occurred in the 
way Orthodox Christians thought about themselves.  Though the Ottomans graced 
them with relative freedom to continue with their religious and cultural traditions, the 
period marked the initial stages of an identity crisis for Orthodox Christians that in 
many ways has continued to the present day.  Losing their beloved city to the Muslim 
Turks and living for several centuries under Muslim rule have been bitter pills for 
Orthodox Christians to swallow, in light of their assertion that they are the only ones 
to preserve the fullness of the Christian faith from the time of the apostles.  Some 
have resolved this tension through introspection, questioning in what ways to redirect 
the sinful ways of Christians, which led God to allow the Muslims a measure of 
success in the first place.24  At the same time, others have endeavored to at least 
preserve Byzantine culture and theology, so that the spirit of Byzantium would never 
die.25  In either case, the Ottoman period marked a significant paradigm shift in the 
relations between Christians and Muslims, the effects of which continue to the present 
day. 
 
LATE 18TH C. – END OF THE 19TH C. 
A far greater challenge for Orthodox Christians than the impact of Ottoman 
rule began to emerge during the last half of the eighteenth century.  The advent of the 
“modern technical age” brought about significant challenges and opportunities for 
Orthodox Christians, as it did for all peoples of living faiths.  From the broad 
perspective of human history the sudden and decisive rise of Western Europe as the 
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dominant social and political force was an “event” that changed the world.26  It had a 
drastic impact on the Ottoman Empire, and was of great significance for both the 
Muslims and non-Muslims who lived within it.  For this reason and in order to fully 
appreciate the context for Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations in the modern and 
postmodern periods, the following several pages will consider the consequences of 
modernization for Muslims, as well as Orthodox Christians. 
To understand the changes from outside the Ottoman Empire during this 
period, one has to appreciate the massive shift in power that was taking place on the 
world stage.  It was not just the rise of a political or military power, caused by an 
advance in one area that led one society to have an advantage over others for a period 
of time.  The transition from what has been termed ‘traditional’ society to ‘modern’ 
society, with its emphasis on reason and the cultural values of the West, has proved to 
be more lasting, far-reaching, and decisive than anyone could have predicted when it 
started at the end of the eighteenth century.27   
Two events symbolize the shift in worldview that was beginning to take place 
then and continue to the present day to be the foundation of all modern societies.  The 
first was the French Revolution of 1789 with its rallying cry of “liberté, égalité, and 
fraternité” and the second was the Industrial Revolution, “when specialized technical 
development decisively transformed the presuppositions of human product.”28  These 
two events embodied both the philosophical principles of the new civilization: 
modernity, and the methods that would be used to translate them into substantive 
change: modernization.  The new way of thinking about the world emphasized: 1) the 
rights of the individual and equal opportunity for everyone to achieve his or her full 
potential, 2) the interconnectedness of human beings, 3) a faith in science to solve 
life’s problems, 4) the notion that perpetual change is necessary and good, and 5) the 
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belief that economic production is the key to happiness.  These concepts were applied 
by the increasingly dominant Western European powers through: 1) the development 
of world markets to facilitate the extraction of natural resources needed to produce 
material goods, 2) the institution of nation-states, with centralized and 
representational governments, 3) the establishment of businesses, organizations, and 
universities to support all manner of scientific research and rational, intellectual 
inquiry, and 4) the exertion of direct and indirect hegemony over nearly all non-
Western cultures and political groupings.29   
It was an exhilarating time for those who benefited most from the transitions 
that were occurring, first and foremost in the West, but eventually in all corners of the 
globe.  R.T. Robertson has characterized it this way: 
Industrialization in the nineteenth century transformed the social and political 
structures of Europe and provided its states with an all-encompassing power 
that only a century before would have seemed unimaginable.  Clearly a new 
age had dawned for mankind, or so many middle class Europeans believed.  
With Europe’s expansion unchallengeable and the applications of science 
unlimited, the future of the world seemed bright and assured.30 
 
Europeans so often saw it as their duty to spread the new values of modernity, no 
matter what the cost.  Students who today are eager to judge the moral hypocrisies 
and cultural arrogance of the western colonialists fail to appreciate the sense of 
optimism and drive that characterized this period in the West.31  One cannot 
underestimate, however, the impact of modernity and modernization upon religion.  
The figure of Napoleon perhaps best represents the modern man in the age of the 
Enlightenment, in that he, “believed in reason rather than dogma and exalted not 
God’s law and God’s rights but human rights and the ideals of secularism, equality 
and democracy.”32  Modern secular civilization presented a clear challenge to 
Muslims and Christians alike – as well as Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews – because it 
disengaged the primary human enterprises from pursuing the ultimate questions of 
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life.  It pushed the distinction between the sacred and the profane that had developed 
in the Middle Ages among European theologians to its logical extreme.  Religion at 
best was relegated to the realm of the individual and for the true scientist it was 
considered to be totally irrelevant to modern man and the unstoppable march of 
progress. 
 Despite the predictions of many philosophers and social scientists of the 
Enlightenment, religion did not die.  In fact, technology and the rise of international 
trade paved the way for the great expansion of Western Christianity.  Vigorous 
missionary campaigns were born in nearly every major center of Western Europe and 
were launched upon the successes of their nation’s colonial enterprises.  The zeal of 
these missionaries and the faith that inspired them to endeavor to convert the world to 
Christianity deserves a great amount of respect.  Muslims, as well as indigenous 
Christians of the Near East, cannot deny that their ancestors benefited from the 
schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions established in their lands by the 
European, and later to some extent American, missionaries.  Ironically, though the 
ultimate purpose of the missionary efforts of the Protestants and Catholics (and even 
Jews) was a religious one, they served as a primary vehicle for the spread of modern 
secular values throughout the world.33   
Karen Armstrong has said, describing Western missionaries who were part of 
what she calls the “New Crusaders in the West,” that: 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Romantic movement had 
stressed religious themes like redemption and salvation and there is no doubt 
that the Westerners presented themselves as bringing salvation and liberation 
of sorts.  It was a message that was underlined by the influx of missions and 
missionary schools into the area.  These inevitably tended to undermine 
Middle Eastern culture at the same time as they offered “salvation.”34 
 
In other words, even the most well intended missionary who sought to share the 
redeeming qualities of his religious tradition to the Muslims, Jews, and heterodox 
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Christians of the Middle East, had difficulty separating this purely religious message 
from the forces of modernization that had become so powerful.  In fact, Western 
Christianity had itself been so influenced by the philosophical principles of 
modernity, that one could make the case that the Christian missionary enterprise had 
become one of the most effective vehicles for modernization.   
The missionaries used and were used by those who controlled international 
trade and the emerging technologies.  They were willing to accept this symbiotic 
relationship with merchants, politicians, traders, and scientists because it enabled 
them to spread their gospel in an unprecedented way throughout every corner of the 
globe.  They did not recognize, however, the degree to which the modern notion of 
“progress” had influenced the way they had come to measure success.  Where once 
Christians of the West had relied on figures such as Thomas Aquinas and Martin 
Luther to translate the lofty ideals of their religion into the realities of everyday life, 
modern Christians turned more and more to men such as Immanuel Kant and Victor 
Hugo.   
Modernity and modernization changed the way Christians and Muslims 
related to each other.  Muslims of the Near East encountered a new kind of 
Christianity and an increasingly powerful Western Civilization.  In some ways, both 
knowingly and unknowingly, they embraced the new ideas and opportunities that 
presented themselves through this encounter.  In other ways, though, Muslims more 
and more viewed the West and Christianity generally as a challenge to their religious 
ideals and a corroding influence on the treasures of their once glorious civilization.  
Where Muslims and Eastern Christians had lived together in relative peace and 
mutual respect in the Near East for centuries, new rivalries and suspicions began to 
emerge on both sides.  Both individually and in their communal groupings, they had 
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to decide how to respond to modernity.  They could not ignore the modernization that 
was taking place all around them and this affected the way they viewed each other’s 
religion.    
Though the origin and source of many of the significant developments that 
influenced Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations in the Near East from the late 
eighteenth through the end of the nineteenth century can be located outside the 
Ottoman Empire, there were also important factors that emerged from changes that 
took place within the empire.  Structural changes to the millet system led to the 
weakening of the Ottoman Empire and paved the way to its disintegration and 
ultimate dismemberment following World War I.  Kemal Karpat has identified at least 
three structural changes and has argued persuasively that, “the rise of rural notables to 
power…, the birth of new entrepreneurial-commercial elites in towns, and…the rise 
of a secular intelligentsia,” within the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries greatly impacted the way Muslims and Christians related to each 
other.35  Karpat argues that these internal changes, “altered the land tenure system, the 
army, the social arrangement, the communal organization and ultimately the social 
structure and leadership of the millets,” leading to increased friction between Muslims 
and Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire.36  Muslims increasingly 
identified themselves, both culturally and religiously, with the central government, 
whereas Orthodox Christians turned toward the ethnic cultures of their communities, 
which they merged with their religious traditions.37  This trend was a direct challenge 
to the essence of the millet system, because of its tendency to fracture the unified 
Orthodox Christian millet into component parts based on linguistic differentiation.   
The emphasis on language over religion led to anti-clerical attitudes within the 
new Christian merchant class, the rise of independence movements, and further 
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polarization between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  Among the Greeks, for 
example, the Phanariots of Istanbul greatly criticized the Ecumenical Patriarchs for 
claiming, “to be modern while clinging to their medieval traditions and to their 
Turkish titles.”38  These successful Christian merchants were emboldened to make 
such statements against the powerful head of the Orthodox millet because of their 
protégé status from Western rulers, as a result of establishing themselves, along with 
Christians of the Levant, as the brokers of trade between the Ottomans and 
Europeans.39  Figures such as Rigas Velestinlis and Adamantios Korais emphasizing 
the glories of the Greeks’ classical past, as opposed to the medieval Byzantine focus 
of the Patriarchal Court, championed the notion of Greek independence from the 
Ottoman Empire.40  The fact that one could see among Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire both a tendency toward nationalist sentiments, as well as the desired to 
preserve the rights and privileges of the old millets, did not sit well with Muslims.  
They could not, like their Orthodox Christian neighbors, seek protection from 
European powers.  As they perceived their position in the increasingly modernized 
world to be diminishing, Muslims began to blame the Christians in their midst, along 
with the West, for their plight.41  Over time, the resentment was mutual between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, and only increased as the 
Christians edged closer to declaring their independence from Ottoman rule.  
The French and the American revolutions of the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century set the stage for a new way of envisioning power and governance.  In addition 
to the lofty ideals such as liberty, equality, brotherhood, democracy, and freedom, 
these modern “revolutions” inspired a whole new way of thinking about political 
organization and governance.  The “nation-state” was born and became over time, 
perhaps, the most important vehicle for the propagation of the new modern, Western 
26 
 
way of life.  It could be said that nationalism broke the mold for the world, then 
reformed it, so that the traditional relationships and assumptions no longer applied.  
Robert Palmer put it this way: 
The idea of the nation-state has served both to bring people together into 
larger units and to break them apart into smaller ones…for many in the 
nineteenth century, nationalism, the winning of national unity and 
independence and the creation of the nation-state, became a kind of secular 
faith.  A nation state may be thought of as one in which supreme political 
authority somehow rests upon and represents the will and feeling of its 
inhabitants.  There must be a people, not merely a swarm of human beings.  
They must sense that they belong – that they are members of a community, 
participating somehow in a common life, that the government is their 
government, and that outsiders are “foreign.”42 
 
The grouping of human beings into “peoples” shifted the point of reference away 
from empires that relied heavily on a dominant religion as a unifying political force.  
In fact, as Palmer asserts, one could make the case that at least for some the concept 
of nation surpassed religion in terms of its significance for modern man.   
Though religion, language, territory, and culture played a role in the 
development of many nation-states, the nations that emerged in Western Europe and 
North America formed primarily by the grouping of a “people” on the basis of a 
shared language.  This Western model of the nation-state was not always duplicated in 
the nations that eventually declared independence from the Ottoman Empire.  In the 
East, both Christians and Muslims historically have shown a reluctance to separate 
religion from politics.  This has been the subject of numerous studies and has been 
identified as one of the primary factors in the apparent, “clash of civilizations.”43  
Kemal Karpat has studied this trend in the East and has concluded that: 
In effect, the political, social and cultural crises which have buffeted the 
national states in the Balkans and the Middle East since their emergence can 
be attributed in large measure to the incompatibility of the secular idea of state 
with the religious concept of nation rooted in the millet philosophy.44 
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Karpat emphasizes the important consequences of the millet system even upon those 
political groupings that eventually demanded independence from the Ottoman 
Empire.  Despite the fact that rise of independent nations out of the Ottoman Empire, 
was a result of European backed national revolutions and a substantial degree of 
Westernization, particularly among non-Muslims, these new nation-states also 
embodied many of the concepts derived from the millet system.    
The first national independence movements came from the non-Muslims of 
the Balkans that were part of the Orthodox millet, but these were soon followed by 
similar drives from the primarily Muslim Turks and Arabs.  Among the Christians of 
the Balkans, from which the first nations were derived, there were different views 
about what freedom from the yoke of the Ottomans might mean.  Some envisioned a 
revival of Byzantium, in which Orthodox Christianity, or at least Hellenism, would 
play a decisive unifying role.45  Others pushed the nation-state model embraced by the 
West, though ironically, this secular approach was most successful in Turkey where 
the majority of citizens were Muslim by creed.  For the most part, however, the 
successor states to the Ottoman Empire maintained a careful distinction between the 
old millet system concept of nation, meaning primarily a religious community, and 
state, referring in the main to territory, and established “nations” on the basis of the 
former.  They were unwilling to secularize completely, as was so common in the 
West, in order to merge the competing notions of nation and state.46   
In almost every case, as non-Muslims fought for independence from Ottoman 
rule, the result was a nation in which a national church served as one of the primary 
institutions of the new state.47  Starting with Greece in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the peoples of the Balkans won their independence from the Ottoman Empire 
and formed their own nations.  In doing so, they established for themselves national 
28 
 
churches that were separate from the Orthodox millet and the control of the 
Ecumenical Patriarch.  The Patriarchate resisted in every case but eventually had to 
accept the changes as the national churches became a reality: the Church of Greece 
in1833 (recognized in 1850 by the Ecumenical Patriarch), the Church of Romania in 
1864 (recognized by the Patriarch in 1885), the Church of Bulgaria in 1871 
(recognized officially by the Patriarch on in 1945); and the Church of Serbia in 
1879.48  These new nations, with their nation churches, have played a decisive role for 
the Christians within them in terms of their self-concept, their relationship to their 
Muslim neighbors, and their perspectives on the West and Western values.  This 
notion will be further developed in later chapters of this work. 
Before turning to the eventual partitioning into nations in the twentieth century 
of the areas outside of the Balkans that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, there is 
one more important development to address from the late eighteenth century to the 
end of the nineteenth century: the rise of the Arabs.  Despite their auspicious 
beginning during the age of Muhammad and subsequent world dominance at the same 
time that Western Europe was going through its dark ages, by the later part of the 
eighteenth century the Arabs were more culturally depressed that perhaps anyone else 
in the Ottoman Empire, or even in all of Islamdom.49  Turkish had nearly replaced 
Arabic entirely as the spoken language in the region and most Arabs had completely 
lost touch with their literary and theological heritage, as well as their cultural 
traditions.  Though Christians, both Arabs and non-Arabs, and Jews dominated 
commerce in the Levant, the Ottomans still ruled Muslim, Christians, and Jew alike.   
Increasingly, Arab Christians were being influenced by the culture and ideas 
of the modern West, separating them further from their Muslim neighbors and their 
cultural heritage as Arabs.  Despite this tendency, and ironically since Christians were 
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much fewer in number when compared with Muslims in the region, Christian Arabs 
were among the first to rediscover the treasures of their Arabic language and the 
glories of their historical past.  They helped revive, along with their Muslim 
neighbors, the memory and cultivate the notion of an Arab heritage, which was so 
essential for bringing the Arabs into the modern world.50  The result was what is 
known as the Arab Renaissance, or Nahdah, which emphasized the unity of the Arab 
nation and role of its language to transform a people in the modern age, while at the 
same time evaluating modern civilization from a specifically Arab perspective.51   
The early pioneers of the Arab renaissance had a relatively positive view of 
modernity and the West.  As Albert Hourani described it, they believed that, “they 
could adopt institutions and laws from the outside without being untrue to 
themselves.”52  However, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, this began to 
change as Arab authors and leaders grew more cautious of the intentions of the West.  
The new focus was on how they could become modern while still holding onto the 
important elements of the past that had enriched the Arabs throughout the centuries.  
For both Muslims and Christians, the heritage was closely associated with the 
historical civilization that was inspired and shaped by Islam.   
At the close of the nineteenth century, relations between Eastern Christians 
and Muslims were dominated by the transition that was taking place in almost all 
regions of the world from traditional society to modern civilization.  This trend was 
characterized by the emergence of nations, the boundaries and form of which were at 
least influenced to some degree by the dominant powers of the West.  Muslims and 
Orthodox Christians of the Balkans and the Near East found themselves pulled in 
many directions.  More and more they discovered that they were in competition with 
each other as they scrambled to find their place in the modern world.  The patterns 
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established by the millet system continued to influence relations between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims, even when they were not aware of it.  At the same time, they 
began to focus less frequently on religion as the primary source of identity, choosing 
rather to define themselves by language, culture, and adherence to modern secular 
values.  This trend both opened new opportunities for mutual respect and 
understanding between them and presented new barriers to their ability to live 
together in peace.   
 
EARLY 20th C. AND THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 
 The first half of the twentieth century was marked by the impressive growth of 
European power and imperialism throughout the world.  This had important 
consequences for both Muslims and Orthodox Christians in the Balkans and the 
Middle East.  The First World War brought the end of the last Islamic Empire and 
with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the stage was set for the power struggle 
between Capitalism and Communism that would eventually dominate much of the 
globe.  Muslims and Eastern Christians found that their religious concerns and 
communal aspirations were often overshadowed by the devastation of war, the 
political push toward national identities, and the realities of being ruled by powers 
that were increasingly hostile toward their religious traditions.  Though in much of the 
world Communism and Capitalism seemed to be diametrically opposed from the 
philosophical, social, economic, and political points of view, Eastern Christians and 
Muslims often experienced these competing systems as two sides of the same coin.  
Communism and Capitalism both embodied the philosophy of modernity, which had 
been developed in the West during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and were 
experienced simply as two different programs for applying and implementing the core 
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values of modern life in the homelands of Muslims and Eastern Christians, and 
throughout the world. 
 The years leading up to the First World War saw the continued rise of 
nationalist sentiment in the Middle East, particularly among the Turks and the Arabs.  
As many of the Christians from the Ottoman Empire formed the independent nations 
of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia, the future of the Ottoman nationalism 
seemed to be in the hands of Muslims at the turn of the century.  The reforms in the 
Ottoman Empire from the previous century, known as the Tanzimat, had instituted 
Western military techniques, governmental forms, educational principles, and legal 
systems.  The Young Ottomans who had embraced modern values such as personal 
freedoms, humanitarianism, and a constitution that would limit the power of the sultan 
could not combat Islam as a unifying political symbol in the diminishing Ottoman 
Empire.  Sultan Abdulhamid II appealed to this pan-Islamic sentiment in an effort to 
reinvigorate fledgling Ottoman power and to position himself symbolically as a caliph 
with spiritual authority over the worldwide Muslim community.  Ottoman nationalism 
was finally eclipsed, however, by Turkish nationalism, which modeled closely the 
Western model for nation-states.   
 The movement toward nationalism among the Arabs took a slightly different 
form.  Building upon what had started primarily as a literary movement at the end of 
the nineteenth century, Arab nationalists began to assert themselves as a political 
force by the early part of the twentieth century.  This development involved both 
Christians and Muslims from Greater Syria.53  Though at this early stage Arabs in the 
region had not yet seriously proposed an independent Arab nation or nations, they did 
challenge growing Turkish influence emanating from Istanbul and became a force to 
be reckoned with by European powers that were rapidly asserting their hegemony in 
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the region.  Soon after World War I began in 1914, the Ottoman Empire chose to side 
with Germany and Austria.  In doing so, it put itself in a position to fight Russia in the 
northeast portion of the Empire and Britain in the east and the south.54  The Ottomans 
had lost all of the former Arab territories to the military might of England and France 
by the war’s end and the League of Nations divided control of the Middle East 
between the two countries in a formal way in 1922.  Though it was touted as a step 
toward nationalism for the Arabs, who were supposed to be granted at least a margin 
of independence, the reality was that after the war, France controlled Lebanon and 
Syria and England ruled Palestine, Jordan, Iran, the Emirates, Oman, and Aden.  This 
reality only reinforced what had already become a clear trend of Western influence 
and efforts to modernize Orthodox Christians and Muslims alike. 
The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 marked the official end of Ottoman Empire.  
Its remaining European territories became independent nations and Turkey was 
declared a republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk, “Father of the 
Turks”), who was Turkey’s first president.  Ataturk built upon the foundation for 
Turkish nationalism established by Zia Gökalp and took bold steps to create the first, 
and what remains the only, purely secular state in the Islamic world.55  Even before 
Turkey was officially declared a republic, the growing sense of Turkish nationalism 
was transforming the region.  In order to establish a nation on the basis of language 
and culture, it became important to “exchange” Turkish population for Greeks, Kurds, 
and Armenians.  This movement of peoples involved mass deportations, particularly 
of the Armenians who suffered the most for the nationalist fervor that had engrossed 
the area.  It is estimated that up to 1.5 million Armenians were killed during what is 
now commonly referred to as the Armenian Genocide, which lasted from roughly 
1915-1922.56  While Turks in neighboring countries were encouraged to join in the 
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movement toward the first Turkish nation, non-Turks who had in many cases lived 
peacefully for centuries as part of the Orthodox millet were forced to leave their 
homes and never return.  Because Muslim irregulars, along with ethnic Kurds and 
Turkish militants, were the perpetrators of many of the atrocities during the dark years 
that preceded the founding of Turkey, to the present day many Eastern Christians of 
Greek and Armenian heritage associate violence and treachery with Islam.  The tragic 
events of this period have often overshadowed in the historical memory of Christians 
from the region the centuries of relatively peaceful coexistence between Christians 
and Muslims during the Ottoman years.   
Turkish nationalism, particularly by way of the secularizing policies of 
Ataturk, caused drastic consequences for Muslims as well.  Within less than a decade, 
the Turkish government abolished the caliphate, replaced Sharī‘ah (Islamic law) with 
Swiss style legal codes, closed almost all Sufi tariqahs, banned Islamic styles of 
headdress and replaced them with western equivalents, took “Islam” out of the 
constitution, and introduced a Latin style script to replaced the Perso-Arabic alphabet.  
Despite the efforts of Ataturk, and the so called Kemalists, to secularize Turkey, the 
religious principles of Islam as expressed by the majority Muslim population 
continued to be an important part of Turkish life and culture, even to some extent for 
Orthodox Christians.  However, the state ideology of secularism, which emerged 
despite the fact that the region at no point was directly ruled by a European colonial 
power, did significantly impact the religious views Turkish Muslims in particular.  
Among all Muslims, those from Turkey were the most eager during the first half of 
the twentieth century to adapt Islamic principles creatively in the modern context.  
This trend led the Western scholar of Islam, William Cantwell Smith, to describe 
Turkish Muslims as, “the most realistic and self-critical group in present-day Islam.”57  
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The first generation of Muslims living in the newly formed Republic of Turkey 
witnessed radical changes on many levels in their society.  They did not, however, 
fully reject or forget their Islamic heritage as they responded to the transition from a 
traditional to modern society. 
The fall of the Ottoman Empire posed a significant religious challenge as well 
to Orthodox Christians, even those living outside of Turkey, because of the questions 
it raised about the role of the Ecumenical Patriarch.  Some had proposed, because so 
many Greek Christians had either emigrated from the country or had been forced to 
leave during the first quarter of the century, that the Patriarchate be moved to Greece.  
They argued that the secularizing tendencies of the Turkish government would 
severely threaten the Patriarchate were it to remain in Istanbul.  Others endeavored to 
establish a Turkish Orthodox Church with its own Patriarch so that Christians could 
better find their place among other religious minorities in the predominantly Muslim 
Turkey.  In the end, however, neither of these ideas could gain momentum because 
the majority of Orthodox Christians, Greeks in particular, wanted to retain at least 
symbolically the ecumenical significance of the Patriarchate.58  Many feared that 
moving the Patriarchate out of Turkey or the establishment of a Turkish Orthodox 
Church would leave a void within the Church worldwide, further eroding any sense of 
pan-Orthodox identity.  The universal role of the Ecumenical Patriarch only increased 
in the years following the establishment of Turkey.  This was in large part due to the 
changes that were taking place in Russia, which at that time was home for more 
Orthodox Christians than any other place in the world.   
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the great expansion of the power of the 
Soviet Union diminished the ability of the Patriarch of Moscow to provide any kind of 
significant leadership to the Church on the international level.  These events also led 
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the greatest period of persecution for Christians since the time of the Romans.  In fact, 
in many ways the Soviet period provided even more challenges because the 
Communists were atheists and militantly opposed in principle to religion.  As the 
‘opium of the masses,’ to use Karl Marx’s famous label, religion was viewed as one 
of the biggest obstacles to the goals of communism.  Many churches were destroyed 
or converted into functional buildings for the purposes of the state, a number of 
bishops and priests were killed or imprisoned, and clergy were no longer allowed to 
do charitable work or visit parishioners.  The Church could not conduct any sort of 
religious education program and Christians were forbidden to meet together in each 
other’s homes for Bible studies or other religious related gatherings.  Every word 
preached by a priest during a sermon and uttered in a conversation with a church 
member after the service to parishioners was monitored by the secret police, who 
could not be distinguished from anyone else in the crowd.  Gifted lay leaders and 
clergy who became too popular or inspirational to their flock would often disappear at 
the hand of the Communists and never return.59  Basically, the Church survived only 
through regular celebration of its divine services and the patient faith of its members 
who hoped for the day that their basic religious freedoms would be restored. 
Though Christians and Muslims in the Balkan nations were not under the 
control of, nor were they directly affected by, the Communists during the first half of 
the twentieth century, the rise of the Soviet Union did have indirect consequences for 
them as well.  The national Churches in the Balkans had only recently established 
their independence and were still relatively weak during the years following World 
War I.  They could have used the model and leadership of a strong Russian Church to 
help them build their own.  Since the Russian Church was by far the largest Orthodox 
Church at that time and since from the sixteenth century Moscow had been considered 
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the “Third Rome” because of its significance in the Orthodox world, the fact that it 
was under the control of militant atheists was a crisis.  Perhaps nowhere outside of 
Russia was the impact of this felt so strongly as in the nearby Balkan countries.   
Before turning to events following the Second World War, it is worth 
mentioning one other development that occurred during the inter-war period.  It has 
already been noted that following World War I the majority of the Middle East, with 
the exception of Turkey and to a limited extent Egypt, was under the control of either 
France or the UK.  Though the sense of Arab nationalism was growing throughout the 
period, it was only after the Second World War that Arab nations began to form as 
they won their independence from colonial rule.  There was one exception to this, 
however.  In 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia became the first modern state among 
what by the end of the century would become many Arab nations in the Middle East.  
Its basis for statehood was not Arab nationalism, however, but rather a marriage 
between religion and politics.  Though Saudis were Arabs, Saudi Arabia was touted as 
an Islamic State.  What made this possible was the key alliance between the Saudi 
royal family, which had been powerful in the Arabian peninsula for decades, and the 
Wahhabis, a conservative revivalist movement established by Muhammadibn Adl al-
Wahhab in the eighteenth century.  The Qur’an was made the constitution, the land 
was governed by the Sharī‘ah as interpreted by the ulamā (religious scholars/leaders), 
morality was enforced, and religion was used to justify everything.   
The significance of Saudi Arabia for Muslim-Christian relations was its 
prestige and influence in the Islamic world.  The Saudis became very powerful and 
controlled the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, so they were in a particularly good 
position to influence the worldview of all Muslims.  Also, the Wahhabi ideology, 
which was both traditional with a literal application of the Qur’an and modern, was 
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appealing to many who lived outside of the country.  Later in the century, the  
influence of the Wahhabis spread to many parts of the globe, and the Saudis also 
increased their influence by being hosts to the Muslim World League, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Islamic Development Bank.  Saudi 
Arabia became the dominant power in the Middle East in terms of the extraction and 
sale of oil to the rest of the world.  The nation’s oil wealth, as well as its position as 
the first modern Islamic State, made it the symbolic leader of the Islamic world for 
much of the twentieth century, challenged for this position only later on and 
intermittently by Egypt and Iran.  Initially, the new Saudi paradigm for nationalism 
only had an indirect impact on Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations and Orthodox 
views on Islam.  Over time, however, the ideology it fostered began to spread 
throughout the region and across the globe, introducing new obstacles to dialogue 
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims and placing further strain upon their often 
fragile relations with each other. 
 
FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT 
 
 The period between the Second World War and the present day has been filled 
with events and changes that few Orthodox Christians or Muslims could have 
predicted during the inter-war period.  They have found their religious traditions and 
cultural identities challenged in new ways by forces beyond their control and 
sometimes even beyond their understanding.  The increase of nation-states, the 
intrigue of the Cold War, the dependence of the West on Arab oil, and the 
manipulation of traditional religious symbols by modern ideologues have all had a 
major impact on relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  These and 
other factors have at times increased the ethnic and religious divisions that existed at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.  On the other hand, increased globalization 
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and rapidly advancing technological developments have provided greater 
opportunities for fruitful dialogue and solidarity.   
The rapid ascendance of the superpowers of Western Europe and their 
influence over much of the world began to break down as the Second World War was 
in full swing by the end of 1941.  Both the UK and France, which had dominated the 
Middle East for much of the inter-war period, were less and less in a position to assert 
control in the Arab world.  The end of the war brought the essential withdraw of 
Britain and France from the region, giving Arabs the opportunity to assert themselves 
anew as a people and to ferment the dream of Arab nationalism.  New nations were 
formed throughout much of the Islamic world during the years following the war, 
ending Europe’s age of hegemony.60   
As Western Europe struggled to rebuild after the ravages of the war, the 
United States and the USSR established themselves as the two new super-powers that 
would dominate the globe until about the last decade of the twentieth century when 
the Communist regime collapsed.  This new power alignment on the world stage led 
to significant changes in the Balkans and the Middle East.  The primarily Orthodox 
Christian nations of the Balkans fell under the control of newly formed Communist 
regimes.  Christians in these countries had to face the difficult task of working out 
their faith in an environment that was ideologically opposed to organized religion.  In 
each case, the State took many of the same measures toward Christians and their 
churches, as had the Soviet regime toward the Russian Church beginning in 1917.61  
Muslims suffered a similar fate to that of Christians under the Communists in places 
such as Albania and Yugoslavia.  The atheist regimes banned Muslims from wearing 
traditional headdress, closed and destroyed mosques, and killed and imprisoned 
imams and religious teachers.62   
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The Middle East experienced the consequences of the Second World War in a 
different form.  Where Muslims and Christians in the Arab world had easily found 
common ground before the war in their opposition to nascent Zionism, this unity was 
increasingly difficult to maintain following World War II.  The establishment of the 
state of Israel, the later defeat of the combined Arab armies in the Arab-Israeli war, 
and corrupting influences from the increased demand for Middle Eastern oil brought a 
deterioration of Arab unity, which had provided so much hope for a bright future for 
Arab peoples at the end of World War II.  Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, found 
it increasingly difficult to agree on the best way to respond to the new Jewish 
homeland that had been carved out of their land and supported by Western powers.63  
Arab nations also had to contend with the social and economic burdens of the refugee 
crisis from displaced Palestinians, at the same time that many of their own citizens 
were migrating to the Gulf states to work in the booming oil industry.64  These issues 
continue to be unresolved and at the forefront of Arab consciousness.  If the Arab 
Christians and Muslims are united on anything, it is in their unanimous support of the 
Palestinian cause and condemnation of the West for allowing Israel to continue with 
its stated and unstated policies to expand settlements into the Palestinian territories.65   
Muslims and the remaining Orthodox Christians in Turkey were also faced 
with new challenges in the second half of the twentieth century as secularism 
increased and the Turkish government struggled to find its identity either as part of 
Europe or the Middle East.  Though the policies initiated by Ataturk to disestablish 
religion have been watered down to some degree over the years, the powerful 
message of Kemalism has been a continuous force in Turkish life to the present day.  
This can be seen by the emotionally charged and seemingly endless controversy 
between government officials and activists over whether to allow Islamic head 
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coverings in public.  Christians in Turkey have also suffered at the hands of the 
political ambitions of the Turkish government.  Many Christians in the country are 
still bitter over the anti-Greek (and anti-Christian) riots in Istanbul either instigated or 
simply allowed by the Turkish authorities in the 1950s over political controversy 
surrounding Cyprus.66  The invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces in 1974 only added 
to the problem, which continues to be one of the major stumbling blocks to Turkey’s 
acceptance into the European Union.  Also from the early 1970’s the Turkish 
government closed Halki Seminary, which was a famous school for the training of 
Orthodox theologians around the globe.  Despite recurring pleas by the Ecumenical 
Patriarch to be allowed to reopen the school, and frequent articles in Greek 
newspapers worldwide condemning its continued forced closure, the Turkish 
government has not relented.  Also, in recent years there have been random attacks on 
the Patriarchate’s buildings in the Phanar by religious and ethnic zealots in Istanbul.  
This has only added to the frustration and tension between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims in Turkey and throughout the world. 
The final decades of the twentieth century up to the present day have 
witnessed a number of events and changes that have added more complexity to the 
relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  On the list would be: 1) 
growing corruption caused by the massive accumulation of wealth by the Arab oil 
states, 2) bloody civil wars in places such as Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia on 
the basis of ethnic or religious divisions, 3) rapid expansion of technology and the 
power of the media to spread the values of modernity across the globe, and 4) 
increased efforts on the part of the United States to influence global politics following 
the fall of the Soviet Union.  Each of these subjects have been frequently analyzed 
and debated in the writings of historians and social scientists over the past thirty years 
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and need not be addressed in detail here.  A more pertinent theme, however, to the 
topic of relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims is the rise in 
“fundamentalism” among the world’s religions, especially Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam. 
Fundamentalism is such an overused and abused term that it is almost better 
avoided altogether.  In light of its frequent appearance in discussions relating to 
Muslim-Christian relations, however, it is important at least to address some of the 
ways in which is it used and to identify the important trends behind the label.  It can 
be said that fundamentalism is simply a response among people of religion to the 
growing secularism of the modern age.  It is a phenomenon observed in many of the 
world’s religions, but it has been particularly appealing to Jews, Christians, and 
Muslims who refuse to let religion die and will do whatever they can to make it still 
mean something in a world that is hostile to it.   
Those who have studied fundamentalism as a social and religious phenomenon 
have pointed out that some common characteristics are: 1) literalism, especially with 
sacred texts, 2) an idealization of the past, 3) a strong emphasis on community, but 
only within one’s own group, 4) a bipolar attitude between the modern and the 
traditional, 5) activism against all secular forces, and 6) a fear-based skepticism about 
the world, sometimes leading to theologies of rage, resentment, or revenge.67  
Fundamentalists, often unknowingly, embrace many of the values of modernity while 
they simultaneously and selectively retrieve ‘fundamentals’ from the past that fit the 
modern situation.   
Much has been written in recent years about how fundamentalism has led to 
extremism in the form of terrorism or other types of violence.  For example, beyond 
the popular trend toward revivalism among Muslims who are now more likely to 
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connect their identity with the classical Islamic past, some Muslims have transformed 
Islam into an ideology that is in direct conflict with the norms and values of their 
religion.68  In a similar fashion, Protestant fundamentalists in the Unites States have 
become more “reactionary, intransigent, and literal-minded” and have attempted to 
“[bring] God back into the political realm” in recent years.69  Though Orthodox 
Christians have been less prone to fundamentalism for various reasons, they have not 
been immune to the trend.  One can observe some characteristics of fundamentalism 
in certain Orthodox parishes, particularly in areas of the world where Orthodox 
Christianity is in the minority and there are large numbers of individuals in the 
churches who have converted from Protestant Evangelicalism to the Orthodox faith.70  
This trend has had an indirect impact as well on the Christians in the Balkans and the 
Middle East because of the close ties between the old country and the “diaspora,” the 
term often used to refer to Orthodox communities established in primarily the 
Americas, Europe, and Australia after emigration from traditional Orthodox lands 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The rise of fundamentalism has had another consequence for some Orthodox 
Christians and has provided an additional challenge to their ability to conduct fruitful 
dialogue with Muslims.  As the Communist regimes in the Balkans fell toward the 
end of the last century, Orthodox Christians struggled to rebuild their churches and 
communities, which had been under direct attack by the atheists in power for decades.  
At the same time that the churches were recovering from being in such a weakened 
state, Evangelical missionaries, primarily from the United States, actively tried to gain 
converts in the region.  The Orthodox hierarchs from the various national churches 
resented the efforts of these Protestant missionaries to proselytize the remnant of their 
own flocks that had already suffered under years of communist oppression.  They 
43 
 
argued that Christianity had been well established in the Balkans for centuries and 
that in the spirit of Christian unity the Evangelicals should help them rebuild the 
indigenous Christian communities instead of weakening them further by imposing 
their Westernized version of Christianity on the region.71  Though not directly related 
to the question of Muslim-Christian relations, this issue became such a preoccupation 
in some areas that it served as a distraction from efforts to foster inter-religious 
dialogue. 
Another thematic development in the latter part of the twentieth century that 
can be seen both among Muslims and Orthodox Christians is what could be labeled as 
the rise of postmodernism and the revival of traditionalism.  Stated otherwise, there 
has been a growing trend to reject many of the core values of “modernity” and to 
attempt to replace them with “traditional” values and customs from the pre-modern 
period.  Many Orthodox Christians and Muslims from the Balkans and the Middle 
East have been critical of the programs of modernization and Westernization, which 
they have identified as the source of many of the hardships they have endured over 
the past hundred years.  In contrast to the generally positive assessment of modernity 
by previous generations, they have become more cynical about the motives of 
Western governments and businesses that have “interests” in the region.   
The trend toward traditionalism has manifested itself among Orthodox 
Christians in the growing number of clergy, monastics, and lay persons who call for a 
strict, literal adherence to the Typikon (a collection of rubrics governing liturgical and 
ascetic practice) and the Pedalion (the primary compilation of canon law).  
Proponents of this approach have not been deterred by the fact that these volumes 
have by and large not been critically updated for centuries.  One can also observe 
numerous examples of church leaders taking actions and making statements with the 
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clear intent of distancing themselves from Western influences.  Perhaps the best 
example is the withdrawal, usually for short periods of time and in protest to specific 
events, of various Orthodox Patriarchates from the World Council of Churches.72   
The trend toward postmodernism can be observed in the speeches and writings 
of a number of prominent Orthodox theologians.  For example, certain “neo-
orthodox” theologians, as they have been occasionally labeled, shared a common goal 
of liberating Orthodox theology from its “pseudomorphosis”73 or, as Alexander 
Schmemann was so inclined to say, its “western captivity.”74  What the neo-orthodox 
theologians shared, despite the different focuses of their independent work, was a 
desire to do a critical analysis of Orthodox thought on the basis of a fresh reading of 
the Church Fathers (and Mothers).75   
 Perhaps the most striking development among Muslims that indicated the 
growing popularity of traditionalism toward the end of the twentieth century was the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979.  For all that it was and for all that it represented, in the 
main the revolution was a reaction against what was perceived as years oppression 
through the American sponsored Shah and the imposition of modern and Western 
values in Iran.  Ayatollah Khomeini was in large part able to build the Islamic 
Republic of Iran on the promise that he would restore the Sharī‘ah to its rightful place 
as the foundation of society’s laws and cultural norms.  Though many Muslim leaders 
who lived before and after Khomeini have had the same goal, Iran has probably had 
the most success in implementing traditionalism in a widespread and sustained way.   
 Muslims, much like the “neo-orthodox” theologians in the Orthodox Church, 
have had their own proponents of postmodernism.  Without slipping into some of the 
fundamentalist tendencies of revivalists or extremists, while at the same time rejecting 
in large part the modernizing trends of certain reformists, these individuals have 
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emphasized traditional religious practices and the norms of traditional Islamic 
societies.  With highly developed philosophical arguments, they have pointed to the 
fallacies of modern presuppositions and have identified the devastating consequences 
of modernization.76  Though the proponents of this type of postmodernist thought 
have often been confined to academicians, in recent years their themes have grown in 
popularity among the masses, to the extent that it is not uncommon today for imams 
to express postmodernist notions in their Friday sermons.   
 One final factor to consider in any discussion about relations between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the postmodern age is the impact of the 
American-led wars in the Middle East over the last decade and a half.  Politics aside, 
one cannot overestimate the negative consequences of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 
and the current War in Iraq upon Muslim-Christian relations.  The rhetoric on both 
sides of these conflicts has revived the old paradigm of the Crusades and the Counter-
Crusades and has brought to the surface painful memories from past interactions 
between the Muslim world and the West.  As was the case with the Crusades in the 
Middle Ages, not only have these wars increased the animosity and misunderstanding 
between Christians and Muslims generally, they have also had a negative impact on 
Christianity in that they have led to inter-religious divisions.   
To the extent that the wars have indicated a trend towards the polarization of 
Western and Islamic civilizations, Orthodox Christians have been in between the two 
extremes.  In many ways, in fact, they have found themselves to be closer to the 
Islamic side of the continuum.  For example, in the months and weeks leading up to 
the start of the War in Iraq, many Orthodox hierarchs issued statements in opposition 
to the impending war.  Their rationale included, in addition to the general and 
predictable plea to spare human life and to avoid the inevitable destruction caused by 
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war, concerns that the motives for the war were imperialistic or driven out of the need 
to fuel Western excesses.77  As Islamic extremists have learned to use the media to 
their advantage, Muslims have increasingly come to associate Christianity with the 
Crusades.  The claim that the nation of Israel is in large part a platform from which 
Western powers, such as Britain and the United States, purposefully perpetuate their 
historic, cultural, and religious imperialism seem plausible to a growing number of 
Muslims in the Middle East and throughout the world.  These troubling circumstances 
have placed many Orthodox Christians in the Middle East in a very uncomfortable 
position.  Many have a lot of sympathy with the point of view of their Muslim 
neighbors with regard to recent actions in their region by Western nations, for they 
too have felt offended and betrayed by the West.  Also, even among those who 
themselves are not Palestinians, there is sustained support and concern for the plight 
of Christian and Muslim Palestinians.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The relationship between Orthodox Christians and Muslims has grown in 
complexity over the last five and a half centuries.  The last two centuries in particular, 
have posed many challenges to their ability to live together in relative peace and 
mutual respect as new rivalries and suspicions have emerged in response to the 
pervasive, global trend toward modernization.  In fact, with the rise of nation-states 
and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, some Orthodox Christians and Muslims found it 
possible to distance themselves from each other and their shared past.   
The atrocities of the twentieth century showed that nationalism would not 
necessarily lead the human race to a more humane world, nor would it guarantee a 
greater degree of tolerance, understanding, and peace.  In places such as Lebanon, 
(the former) Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Turkey, Christians and Muslims found 
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themselves face-to-face once again, competing for the illusionary good life promised 
to them by the modern world, even if it meant killing each other to get it.  There is 
hope, however, at the start of the twenty-first century.  Increasingly, Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims have realized that they need to rediscover their shared 
ancestry.  In the process, many have done a fresh reading of their past and have 
discovered that together their religions may have something crucial to offer to the 
Westernized, modern man – his heart.  What follows in the proceeding chapters is one 
side of that story and an examination of what Orthodox Christians have been saying 
about religion in the postmodern world, their Church, and relations with their Muslim 
neighbors.  Many, it seems, have started to see Islam, or at least their relationship to 
the religion, as an essential part of their own identity.  It is this theme of “identity,” in 
particular, that will be explored throughout the study, both directly and indirectly as a 
lens through which to evaluate what Orthodox Christians have had to say in recent 
years about Islam and Muslims. 
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Chapter 2: Orthodox Theological Perspectives on 
the Religions 
 
 
What is the significance of the entrance of Moses into the cloud and his 
vision of God? … As the mind, moving forward by ever more perfect 
concentration, comes to understand true knowledge of realities, as it 
draws closer to contemplation, the more it sees that the divine nature is 
invisible.  Leaving behind all appearances, not only of the senses but of 
what the intellect sees in thought, it turns always more to the interior 
world, until by the effort of mind it penetrates even to the Invisible and 
the Unknowable and there it sees God.  For in fact true knowledge and 
true vision of the One it seeks consists in seeing that He is invisible, 
wrapped all around by His Unknowability as by a cloud.  That is why the 
great John, who penetrated into that luminous cloud, says that “no one 
has ever seen God” (John 1:18), asserting by this negation that the 
knowledge of the divine essence is inaccessible not only to men but to all 
intellectual beings.  Thus when Moses makes progress in knowledge, he 
declares that he sees God in the darkness, that is to say, he understands 
that the divinity is that which transcends all knowledge and escapes the 
grasp of the mind.  “Moses entered into the darkness where God was,” 
the Scripture says.  What God?  “He who makes darkness his retreat,” 
as David says.78 
 
This passage from Gregory of Nyssa, one of the “Cappadocian Fathers” from the 
fourth century, is quoted as an example of the apophatic approach of the Eastern 
Church.  This ‘negative theologizing’ is used by Orthodox Christians to free the 
intellect of its earthly presuppositions and open the heart to the divine mystery, which 
through the grace of the Holy Spirit they believe will lead to theōsis, the Greek term 
for deification.79   
 It is useful to reflect on the central Orthodox concept of apophatic theology at 
the beginning of this discussion on the theological perspectives of Orthodox 
Christians toward the religions of the world.  This is because, when it comes to 
figuring out what God does or does not do, the Orthodox tend to proceed with 
caution.  They affirm that at a certain level what God does, how He does it, and why 
are a mystery.  On the other hand, Eastern Christians do affirm that one can know 
God through his ‘energies,’ as Gregory Palamas so eloquently explained,80 which can 
be observed in many ways and in many places.  In other words, while Orthodox 
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Christians constantly strive to have a better knowledge of God, they are also reluctant 
to define Him, fearing that with the limitations of the human mind, they will construct 
merely a caricature of the Divine.  This tendency has certain repercussions for how 
Orthodox Christians view other religions.  Though Orthodox theologians have always 
been passionate, and in many ways unyielding, about their dogmas and traditions – 
the term “Orthodoxy” translates as “right belief” or, better, “right worship” – at the 
same time they highly value humility when in comes to the beliefs and practices of 
others.  Peter Bouteneff, echoing a common sentiment among Orthodox theologians 
in recent years, puts it this way: 
Truth is truth, wherever it is found, and while Orthodox Christianity does 
claim uniquely to teach the fullness of truth, it does not claim a monopoly on 
truth.  On that basis, Orthodox Christians are open to mutual learning and 
mutual transformation.  This step may sound radical.  But once we admit that 
truth exists outside our own faith, and especially if we say that everything that 
is true is true because it reflects Jesus Christ (who is Truth), then we must be 
open to the ways in which God’s truth has been found even in faiths that do 
not share our belief in Christ.81 
 
Therefore, it is not only possible to maintain a strong sense of one’s own beliefs while 
searching for common ground in other religions, but the search for truth itself, no 
matter where it might be found, will only strengthen one’s faith.   
 Before moving on, however, to the ways in which Orthodox Christians have 
sought to find common ground with other religions, it is first necessary to have a 
framework for how the Orthodox tradition determines truth in general.  In other 
words, whether it is in relation to non-Christian religions or to any given topic, how 
do the Orthodox determine an authoritative position?  It is in answering this question 
that one encounters a particular challenge for the Orthodox Church in terms inter-
religious relations.   
Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, which because of its centralized 
ecclesiastical structure is able to make clear position statements about the church’s 
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relationship to non-Christian religions or any other matter, the Orthodox Church must 
often struggle to come to a clear, standardized position on just about anything. Unlike 
many Protestant denominations, in which a problem can be solved in a relatively short 
period of time through the formation of a committee to examine the issues and then 
bring a resolution to a vote by either the leaders or a representative body within the 
denomination, the Orthodox do not resolve matters of faith through the use of modern 
democratic principles.  It is not that Orthodox Christians are incapable of formulating 
dogmas, for they have a number of clearly defined beliefs that they have defended for 
centuries.  It is, rather, that they take very seriously the notion of consensus and are 
willing to take the painstaking steps necessary to determine the “mind of the Church.”  
Where would one turn then to find the sources of authoritative truth within the 
Orthodox tradition?  On this question, Orthodox theologians generally point to the 
following: 1) scripture, 2) “Tradition,” as expressed through liturgy and pious 
practices, 3) local and/or “ecumenical” councils, 4) canon law, and 5) the wisdom 
from the fathers of the Church.  Among these sources, the greatest and most 
controversial matters within the Church were resolved through the seven “Great” or 
“Ecumenical” councils, which occurred during the 4th-8th centuries of the Common 
Era.  For many of the reasons discussed already in chapter one, the modern period has 
produced a number of very challenging issues and questions within the Orthodox 
Church.  This has led a number of Orthodox Christians to propose and long for an 
“Eighth Ecumenical Council” of leaders in the Church from across the globe.  Indeed, 
there has been talk of a “Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church,” as it has 
been called, since the beginning of last century and over the past ten decades there 
have been a number of Pan-Orthodox conferences and commissions in efforts to plan 
for the future convening of the council and to establish the subjects for discussion.82  
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Since the subject of non-Christian religions falls clearly under one of the ten proposed 
topics on the agenda for the forthcoming Great Council, once the council meets it may 
be possible to point to a more definitive Orthodox position on inter-religious relations.  
What this decision will be, and the degree to which it will be accepted by Orthodox 
Christians worldwide, remains to be seen, however.   
There have been several leading Orthodox theologians who have had a 
particular interest in the question of Orthodox relations with other (non-Christian) 
religions and have spoken out on the issue through various means and in different 
contexts.83  These individuals, as they have waited for the convening of a Great 
Council, have turned to a combination of the other sources in an attempt to establish 
the most likely Orthodox position on the topic.  Thus far, they have primarily looked 
at scripture, patristic sources, and the central Christological and Trinitarian doctrines 
of the Church.  A close examination of their treatment of these sources will 
demonstrate that one can already begin to see an emerging authoritative Orthodox 
position on inter-religious relations. 
 
SCRIPTURE AND THE RELIGIONS 
 
The starting point for Orthodox theologians who have attempted to articulate a 
scriptural understanding of other religions is the biblical view of the human person. 
According to Genesis 1.26-27, humankind is made in the image and likeness of God.  
This common origin for all persons – regardless of race, gender, time and place of 
origin, or religious orientation – has been emphasized a great deal by the Orthodox, as 
well as the wide spectrum of Christian theological tradition.  Nevertheless, it is a key 
component in the Orthodox understanding of scripture as it relates to inter-religious 
relations, because it shows that every man, woman, and child share central core 
attributes and that they were created to have basically the same life purpose.  
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Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos of Albania, commenting on the significance of 
this in the Eastern Christian tradition in terms of how Christians are united with those 
of other religious (and non-religious) traditions, says: 
Since the human race was created from one homogeneous substance, the 
introduction of sin brought on an infirmity throughout the entire human race.  
Humanity’s nature continues to be unified, both in its greatness and in its fall.  
All human being share a common place before the judgment of God, “since all 
have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom. 3:23).  In the East there 
is unshakable theological certainty that all people have both “the desire…to 
seek God,” as St. Gregory the Theologian expresses it, and also the ability to 
obtain some faint knowledge of God through their reason and mental 
powers….People also have an innate ability to love and to sense, even if 
imperfectly, that love occupies a “greater” position.84 
 
Archbishop Anastasios illustrates here the ways in which human beings are bound up 
together, for better or worse, and that because of this Christians and non-Christians 
should work together in their search for God and their attempts to be conformed into 
his likeness. 
 Metropolitan Georges Khodr of Mount Lebanon has also found that scripture 
is helpful in determining an Orthodox perspective on inter-religious relations.  He 
points specifically to the actions of Paul and the early Christian community for 
answers on this question.  Quoting sections from the Acts of the Apostles, which is 
where one sees the Church’s unique identity emerging at a time and place in which 
extreme religious pluralism was the norm, Metropolitan Georges states: 
In the Cornelius narrative we learn that ‘in every nation the man who is god-
fearing and does what is right is acceptable’ to God ([Acts] 10:35).  ‘In past 
ages God allowed all nations to go their own way’ (14:16) ‘yet he has not left 
you without some clue to his nature’ (14:17).  There is among the Gentiles a 
yearning to the ‘unknown God’ (17:23), a search for the God who ‘is not far 
from each one of us, for in him we live and move, in him we exist’ 
(17:28)….the view of the apostle as expressed in his Areopagus speech is that 
the Athenians worshipped the true God without recognizing him as the 
Creator.  His face had not been unveiled to them.  In other words, they were 
Christians without knowing it.  Paul gave their God a name.  The Name, 
together with its attributes, is the revelation of God.85 
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Metropolitan Georges does not deny that Paul in many ways continues the Old 
Testament notion that, “paganism is [to be] regarded…as an abomination.”86  
However, he does assert that there is an opening in Paul’s theology towards a positive 
assessment of the general religious experiences of all people, because in their sincere 
expressions of religious devotion they are unknowingly responding to Christ.   
The late Greek theologian, Ioannes Karmires found Paul to be even more 
sympathetic towards those outside of the visible boundaries of the Church.  He says: 
…not only Christians, but also non-Christians, the unbelievers or gentiles, are 
able to become fellow heirs and ‘members of the same body and partakers of 
the promise of Jesus Christ’ (Eph. 3:6), through the Church to which the 
gentiles, the heterodox, may also belong invisibly, on the basis and by the 
power of their faith and of the saving grace bestowed on them by God as a free 
gift, both of which have as it were an ecclesial character.87 
 
For Karmires, the message is that non-Christians truly can participate in and benefit 
from the saving work of Christ, even while adhering to their own religious beliefs and 
pious practices.  Metropolitan Georges and Professor Karmires see a biblical 
precedent for finding as much as possible that might be good and of God in other 
religions.  They argue that this is necessary since the Divine sometimes works in 
‘mysterious ways,’ which may not always be visible or immediately evident to the 
Christian community. 
This theme of humility with regard to those of other religious persuasions is a 
common one among Orthodox theologians interested in inter-religious relations.  
They often comment that though Christians may affirm that God is working within 
their community, this does not mean that they are in any position to put a limit on 
Him or to claim that He is not working in and through another revelation(s).  
Archbishop Anastasios has observed that Jesus himself, whose example Christians 
should emulate, showed a great deal of affection and humility to those outside of his 
religious community.  He remarks that: 
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Jesus Christ did not exclude people of other religions from his concern.  On 
certain occasions during his earthly life, he conversed with people of different 
religious traditions (such as the Samaritan woman, the Canaanite woman and 
the Roman centurion) and gave them help.  He expressed admiration and 
respect for their faith, which he did not find among the Israelites: ‘…not even 
in Israel have I found such faith’ (Mt. 8:10; cf. 15:28, Lk. 7:9)….He, the ‘Son 
of God’, who at the Last Judgement will identify himself with ‘the least’ of 
this world (Mt. 25) regardless of their race or religion, exhorts us to approach 
each human person with genuine respect and love.88 
 
Archbishop Anastasios makes the case here that an important aspect of Jesus’ 
teaching was that God works through all people and that Christians in particular 
should have enough humility to listen to what God may be saying to them through 
other religions.  One could also add, as is argued below, that a very similar idea is 
present in the Hebrew scriptures: 
Beginning with the prophets in the Old Testament, anytime a notion of 
judgment is presented it is meant as a message to God’s people – not to those 
outside the covenanted community.  In fact, in Isaiah 10 God uses Assyria, a 
foreign nation, to judge his own people who have not been faithful to Him.  
This same idea can be seen throughout the New Testament.  Any message of 
judgment seems to be directed towards insiders.  What is important is for the 
individual to respond in love, being faithful to God to the degree to which he 
or she has received revelation of Him.89 
In other words, scripture presents for the Christian the heavy responsibility of finding 
God’s own voice speaking directly to them through the adherents of the non-Christian 
religions.   
 
THE FATHERS AND THE RELIGIONS 
 
Orthodox theologians interested in recent years with the question of inter-
religious relations have in addition to scripture sought guidance from the writings of 
the patristic age.  They have pointed out that from the time Christianity emerged as a 
distinct religion from Judaism up to the present day, Christians have had to face the 
question of how to understand and relate to non-Christian religions.  This has 
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especially been the case for Eastern Christians who have had a long history of living 
side by side with those of other faiths.   
Though responses of patristic writers have varied considerably based on time 
and place, as well as the context of the interaction and the orientation of the speaker 
or author, Archbishop Anastasios has argued one can construct a historical outline of 
the Orthodox Church’s theological positions toward other religions.90  The first 
period, he says, comprises basically the first three centuries of Christianity during 
which Christians interacted primarily with Judaism and the pagan religions of the pre-
Christian Roman world.  He emphasizes that during this period there was, “…a 
constant attempt to understand religious belief outside the Christian faith.”91  The 
second period that he describes relates to the era directly preceding the establishment 
of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire up to the seventh century 
when Islam appears as a rival to Christendom.  He points out that as “leaders 
interested in social-political cohesion sought religious uniformity,”92 the 
“inclusive/universalist tradition”93 of Christians from the first three centuries began to 
fade.  Archbishop Anastasios argues that a third period of Orthodox theological 
reflection on non-Christian religions can be identified as starting with the rise of Islam 
in the seventh century and going at least to the beginning of the Ottoman period.94  He 
says that during this third period: 
…the moderate attitudes of earlier centuries were abandoned [as]…the 
Orthodox Church [was]…confronted with military and political pressure from 
a new religion [Islam] which appear[ed] on the scene with claims to 
worldwide domination.  In an eschatological perspective, the appearance of 
Islam looked like the beginning of the great final struggle as described by John 
the Evangelist in Revelation.  The reaction of the Christian community began 
with conversations, but quickly turned into military defense and counter 
attack.  At the same time, a series of anti-Islamic works appeared in 
Byzantium.95 
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He points out here that the discussion on inter-religious relations by Byzantine 
theologians becomes more narrowly focused and in some ways preoccupied with 
Islam from the seventh century to at least the pre-modern period.   
Archbishop Anastasios concludes from all of this that outside of a few notable 
exceptions from later centuries,96 the first period of theological reflection is most 
helpful in terms of articulating an Orthodox position on other religions in today’s 
world.  He characterizes the open and pluralistic nature of the patristic writers from 
this early phase in this way: 
When we examine the earliest layers of theological thought in the Orthodox 
East, we find that…there is a constant attempt to understand religious belief 
outside the Christian faith, with discernment and the recognition of a certain 
revelation of God to the world.97 
 
After demonstrating his point by quoting and analyzing several early patristic authors, 
he then concludes that they, “impel us to take an attitude of respect and at the same 
time discernment towards the other religious experiences of mankind.”98 
 Much like Archbishop Anastasios, Alexander Men finds that the early patristic 
period was an age of openness, which could serve as a useful paradigm for today’s 
Christians.  Father Men says: 
When Christianity first appeared in the ancient world, it faced the question: 
how to treat all this heritage?  How to treat the philosophy, art, literature and 
in general all the great edifice of ancient culture?  Should we say it’s all 
rubbish?…The main answer given by the classic Christian thinkers, who are 
known as the patristic writers or the Fathers of the Church was, however, a 
positive one.  Christianity could and should be open to all these 
questions….The return of contemporary Christian thought…to the tradition of 
the Church Fathers, is the return of Christianity to an open model, which 
participates in the whole movement of human society.99 
 
He makes the case here, while arguing against the tendency in some Orthodox circles 
to withdraw from the world and reject anything considered “secular,” that Christians 
today must recover the courage the of the early Christians who engaged the world.  
He presents the vision of the early Fathers of the Church in order to counter the 
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tendencies toward extremism in what he calls a kind of, “other-worldly culture-
denying Christianity.” 
 There have been other authors as well who have been interested in this early 
phase of theological reflection on non-Christian religions.  It seems that, like 
Archbishop Ananstasios and Fr. Alexander Men, they have found the writings of this 
early period to have an important resonance with today’s realities.  John Garvey is 
one example.  In his recently published work on Orthodoxy’s relationship with other 
religions, he states: 
Our situation today can be seen as not all that different from the world the 
early apologists had to address.  Orthodoxy must now make itself known and 
understood in a world where no religion has a privileged place.  Some may 
mourn this fact, but it may be a new and profoundly important opportunity.100 
 
Fr. Garvey makes a parallel here between the persecution of the early Church by 
Roman authorities and the realities for Christians today who have had to adjust to the 
dominant social-political principles of secularism.  Likewise, Metropolitan Georges 
Khodr has argued that it is important for the Orthodox Church to rediscover the 
wisdom from the early patristic writers in relation to other religions.  He identifies a 
clear shift in attitude beginning in the seventh and eighth centuries stating: 
Suffice it to say that in the Greek-speaking Christian Byzantine East following 
John Damascene, the attitude towards Islam was somewhat negative…. The 
negative evaluation of other religions obviously rests on an ecclesiology which 
is bound up with a history which has been lived through and with a definite 
outlook on history…. What I should like to emphasize here is that this linear 
view of history is bound up with a monolithic ecclesiological approach…. It 
comes to this: contemporary theology must go beyond the notion of ‘salvation 
history’ in order to rediscover the meaning of the oikonomia.101 
 
Metropolitan Georges’ reference to the Orthodox notion of oikonomia refers in this 
instance both to the work of Christ and that of the Holy Spirit among peoples of all 
cultures and religious traditions.  His analysis of the central Christological and 
Trinitarian doctrines of the Church in relation to non-Christian religions will be 
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examined in further detail.  Before moving on to that, however, it would be useful to 
summarize the basic views – covered in various degrees by Archbishop Anastasios, 
Fr. Garvey, Metropolitan Khodr, and others – of the relevant patristic writers from the 
first three Christian centuries. 
Perhaps the earliest author from the patristic period to talk about Christianity’s 
relationship with other religions was Justin Martyr.  As with the patristic authors who 
will be mentioned in this section, the ‘other religions’ that Justin specifically had in 
mind are Judaism and Greek philosophy.  Justin’s argument was hinged around his, 
now famous, concept of logos spermatikos (“seminal reason”).  Building on the Stoic 
understanding of logos as ‘reason’ or an ‘universal law’ inherent in all things and 
persons, Justin makes this conclusion about the Greek philosophers, poets, and 
historians: 
For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic 
word [logos spermatikos], seeing what was related to it…. Whatever things 
were rightly said among all men, are the property of us Christians…. For all 
writers were able to see realities darkly through the sowing of the implanted 
word that was in them.102 
 
He also says that: 
 
…those who lived reasonably [meta logou] are Christians, even though they 
have been thought atheists; as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and 
men like them; and among the barbarians, Abraham, and Ananias, and 
Azarias, and Misael, and Elias, and many others whose actions and names we 
now decline to recount, because we know it would be tedious.103 
 
Orthodox theologians in recent years have found Justin’s use of logos spermatikos to 
be of great significance for inter-religious relations.  They have argued that it is 
indeed appropriate to apply this theological concept to the relationship of Orthodox 
Christianity to all non-Christian religions.  For example, Olivier Clément says of 
Justin’s logos spermatikos:   
We must regain this vision today, extending it to the entire planet, and first 
and foremost to Islam which recognized in Jesus the Messiah the 
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manifestation of the Word [logos] and of the Spirit and awaits his return at the 
end of time, and which maintains the close connection between the “seal of 
holiness” and the “seal of prophecy.”104 
 
Here he sees a universal application of Justin’s inclusivist orientation with regard to 
the ‘other religions’ of his day.   
 John Garvey argues as well for a universal application of Justin’s thought, 
though he approaches it in terms of the way one can find manifestations of ultimate 
“truth” in the world’s religions. After quoting extensively from Justin’s first apology, 
he gives this analysis: 
[Justin] says that all truth belongs to Christians because God, through the 
Word, is the source of all truth, and the Word who took on human flesh in 
Christ is the fullness of all human truth.  But those who even unwittingly have 
participated in this truth are in some sense in communion with it, however 
imperfectly, and this is because “seeds of the Word (Logos)” [logos 
spermatikos] are found everywhere.105 
 
Fr. Garvey identifies that for Justin, truth as it is found in the religions of man is in 
very close association with Christ, the Logos.  It is perhaps no coincidence that he 
uses the word “communion” here, since Orthodox Christians would likely connect 
this image with their concept of the Eucharist, through which they believe they 
experience an intimate, physical and spiritual connection with the Divine.   
 Clement of Alexandria is another figure from the patristic period in whom 
Orthodox scholars today find a precedent for positive interaction with other religions.  
They will point out, for example, that in his Exhortation to the Heathen 7 he says that:  
…the Greeks, having received certain scintillations of the divine word, have 
given forth some utterances of truth, they bear indeed witness that the force of 
truth is not hidden….106  
 
Clement also suggests that God gave philosophy to the Greeks as a kind of scripture, 
leading them to the fullness of the truth, which they will find in the Logos.  This can 
be seen, for example, in Stromata 1.5:  
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Perchance, too, philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and primarily, till 
the Lord should call the Greeks.  For this was a schoolmaster to bring ‘the 
Hellenic mind,’ as the law, the Hebrews, ‘to Christ.’  Philosophy, therefore, 
was a preparation, paving the way for him who is perfected in Christ.107   
 
Metropolitan Georges finds Clement’s thought in passages such as these to be 
significant because of his openness to the religious and philosophical worldviews of 
his day.  He gives this analysis of Clement’s theology, in terms of how it should be 
applied to the question of inter-religious relations: 
In the thought of Clement of Alexandria, the divine Word speaks to the entire 
world, and God justifies mankind through numerous salvation paths.  God is 
not only the God of Israel, He is also the savior of the world, and appears to be 
engaged throughout the world by means of multiple faces of his wisdom.108 
 
Metropolitan Georges clearly believes that were Clement alive today, he would find 
“scintillations,” or glimmers, of the Divine Logos in many of the non-Christian 
religions and that he himself would assert that God is using these various “paths” to 
lead men and women to salvation.   
 Similar to Metropolitan Georges, Nicholas Arseniev perceived the same kind 
of openness in Clement of Alexandria, as well as Justin Martyr, and found that their 
theology forms a significant piece of the Orthodox position on other religions.  He 
says, for example, that: 
…there is a certain knowledge of God or a yearning and craving and searching 
after Him given to all men….[T]wo early Christian Fathers – Justin [Martyr] 
the Philosopher and Clement of Alexandria – say of the seed of the Divine 
Logos scattered in the hearts of the just among the Greeks, thus in the hearts of 
Socrates and Heraclitus.  There is a natural leaning in man, innate to man, 
toward God: it is the working of the Divine Logos who gives light and life.  
Man is naturally attracted by the Divine Logos who is the interior Law 
according to which the world has its being.109  
 
Though Arseniev does not go as far as Metropolitan Georges to say that, “God 
justifies mankind through numerous salvation paths,” he does agree that according to 
the early fathers of the Church there is an “interior Law,” which is the “Divine 
Logos,” in each person guiding him toward truth.   
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Continuing with the Alexandrine school of thought among the early fathers of 
the Church, Orthodox scholars have found Origen’s contribution to be of note on the 
topic of inter-religious relations.  In his Against Celsus, he says: 
For he [Celsus] was unable so to consider the times of Moses and the 
prophets, as to see that the Jewish prophets predicted generally that there was 
a “Son of God” long before the Greeks and those men of ancient time [i.e. 
pagan religions] of whom Celsus speaks.  Nay, he would not even quote the 
passage in the letters of Plato, to which we referred in the preceding pages, 
concerning Him who so beautifully arranged this world, as being Son of 
God.110 
 
Theologians have interpreted this and similar passages by Origen to mean that God 
has and can speak through a variety of prophetic voices, even those that are outside of 
the canonical boundaries of the Church.  Archbishop Anastasios, for example, says 
that: 
Origen…taught that God did not give testimony of himself only among certain 
peoples and at certain periods, but had enlightened chosen souls (e.g. Plato) at 
all times and places….Hence Christians should not mock the likenesses of the 
gods, because they represent attempts to depict the Divine.111 
 
In other words, Christians should approach other religions with respect and humility, 
following the example of Origen in his treatment of Jewish prophecy, Greek myths, 
pagan traditions, and Hellenic wisdom.   
 Eusebius of Caesarea is also presented as an example from patristic sources 
during the first three Christian centuries of the open attitude toward other religions.  
Similar to Origen in outlook, though perhaps more direct, Eusebius claims that: 
All that are said to have excelled in righteousness and piety since the creation 
of man, the great servant Moses and before him in the first place Abraham and 
his children, and as many righteous men and prophets as afterward appeared, 
have contemplated him with the pure eyes of the mind, and have recognized 
him and offered to him the worship which is due him as Son of God.  But he, 
by no means neglectful of the reverence due to the Father, was appointed to 
teach the knowledge of the Father to them all.112 
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Archbishop Anastasios finds this specific passage to be particularly significant in 
terms of its usefulness as a paradigm for how Orthodox Christians should view 
adherents of other religions.  He says:  
Eusebius of Caesarea stressed the catholicity of divine revelation of all nations 
and all people, maintaining that religious feeling is innate….at all times and 
among all nations there were people…who, because of their inner purity, 
assimilated divine truths through an inner revelation which opened the eyes of 
their mind.113 
 
In other words, Orthodox Christians should contemplate on the universality of God’s 
revelation across language, religion, culture, and time itself. 
These are just a sample of the early patristic sources that recent Orthodox 
theologians have referenced in their attempts to establish an Orthodox position on 
other religions.114  Along with scripture, the principles established in these early 
traditions, have allowed Orthodox scholars to open the discourse into broad areas of 
theology, which will be the focus of the next section of this chapter. 
 
THE ECONOMIES OF THE LOGOS AND THE SPIRIT IN THE RELIGIONS 
 
 Perhaps the most important contribution from the Orthodox in recent years to 
inter-religious relations is the application of their Christological and Trinitarian 
doctrines to the question of non-Christian religions.  Though several theologians have 
written on the topic, by far the most visible and outspoken have been two individuals 
already mentioned several times in this chapter, namely Metropolitan Georges Khodr 
of Mount Lebanon and Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos of Albania (formerly 
Bishop Anastasios of Androussa).  These two men were actively involved, beginning 
in the late 1960s, in the development of a theology of religions and guidelines for 
dialogue within the World Council of Churches and have been key personalities on 
the international, regional, and local levels with interfaith encounters ever since.115  
Both have attempted to construct an Orthodox position on non-Christian religions 
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with a special emphasis on what they have argued are Eastern Orthodoxy’s relatively 
unique contributions in the areas of christology and pneumatology.116   
 During his address at the World Council of Churches Central Committee 
meeting in 1971, Metropolitan Georges put forward what he believes to be a 
distinctive approach of the Eastern Church with regard to Christology as it relates to 
other religions.  As Jutta Sperber explains, Metropolitan Georges’ remarks where in 
many ways a challenge to the basic assumptions of much Catholic and Protestant 
ecclesiology, because he: 
…dealt mainly with the church’s exclusive claim to truth which was expressed 
in all theological disciplines but could not be combined with genuine spiritual 
life among non-Christians.117   
 
Metropolitan Georges argued that the “negative evaluation of other religions,” which 
has been so prevalent in the modern period, is a direct result of, “an ecclesiology 
which is bound up with a history which has been lived through and with a definite 
outlook on history.”  He proposed as a solution to this divergent perspective a more 
balanced Christology, which he argued was characteristically Orthodox.  In the words 
of Metropolitan Georges:  
Too much emphasis has been placed on the succession of salvation events, 
with the result that Christ appears as the end of the history of the Old 
Covenant and the end of human history….What I should like to emphasize 
here is that this linear view of history is bound up with a monolithic 
ecclesiological approach which, while rightly rejecting the Graeco-Asian idea 
of eternally recurring cycles, turns its back on the idea of an eternity 
transcending history and based on a conception of the Church in which Christ 
is seen ‘not merely chronologically but also and above all ontologically.’118 
 
He presents here a view of Christian history much more in line with the thought of 
Irenaeus, who evaluated all of human history from the point of view of the incarnation 
of Christ.119  In other words, he proposes that Christians must move beyond the 
antiquated, linear concept of “salvation history” because it reduces the “economy of 
Christ” to “its historical manifestation.”120  He emphasizes that the entire world 
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changed when ‘Christ took on human flesh’ and that the Church’s primary mission is 
to be a witness to the life-changing potential resulting from this event.  Metropolitan 
Georges says that: 
The coming of Christ, in whom ‘all things are held together’ (Col. 1:17) has 
led the whole of mankind to its true existence and brings about spiritual 
renewals, economies which can take charge of human souls until he comes.  
The Church’s mediatorial role remains unimpaired.  But the freedom of God is 
such that he can raise up prophets outside the sociological confines of the New 
Israel just as he raised them up outside the confines of Old Israel.121 
 
The alternative view that he presents, which he argues is the authoritative Eastern 
Orthodox position, results in a very different outcome for inter-religious relations.  
For, as he puts it: 
The supreme task [of the Christian community] is to identify all the Christic 
values in other religions, to show them Christ as the bond which unites them 
and his love as their fulfillment.  True mission laughs at missionary activity.  
Our task is simply to follow the tracks of Christ perceptible in the shadows of 
other religions.122 
 
According to Metropolitan Georges, Christ is at work in many of the world religions 
and, therefore, Christians have the opportunity to grow closer to Him through 
dialogue and expanding their understanding of both their own religious tradition and 
those of others.     
One can see a very similar line of reasoning in terms of Christology, in the 
thought of Archbishop Anastasios.  Echoing Metropolitan Georges, he has this to say 
about the distinctiveness of the traditional Orthodox Christian approach as contrasted 
with other ‘modern’ forms of Christianity: 
During the last four centuries [17th-20th] of Western Christianity, deep faith in 
the uniqueness of Jesus Christ has expressed itself on numerous occasions as 
exclusivity.  Several verses in the New Testament – such as “no one comes to 
the Father, but by me” (Jn 14:6) and “there is salvation in no one else” (Acts 
4:12) – were isolated from their context and used to defend a Christology of 
exclusivity.  Christian thought in the Eastern Church has shown a greater 
degree of understanding.123   
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He begins with what he sees as a rather myopic treatment of scripture with regard to 
Christology and soteriology, which he argues has had the direct result of a very closed 
orientation in the West toward non-Christian religions.  Then, after quoting and giving 
an analysis of several biblical and patristic sources, he goes on to further clarify the 
different emphases between theologians of the West and the East:  
When they discuss Christology, many Western theologians tend to focus their 
attention on Christ’s earthly life, from his birth until the Resurrection – the so-
called “historical Jesus.”  In the East, however, emphasis is placed on the risen 
Christ, on Christ ascended, on Christ who will come again, on the Lord and 
Logos of the world.124   
 
Archbishop Anastasios emphasizes here the eschatological nature of Orthodox 
theology in which there is always a sense that the kingdom of God is both at hand and 
yet to come.  Though the Orthodox would agree that salvation is only found in Christ, 
the notion of salvation is much more fluid than it is in the West.125  For this reason, 
according to Archbishop Anastasios, Orthodox Christians are much more willing to 
contemplate the saving work of the Logos at all times and places – past, present, and 
future.  In the often repeated words of Saint Athanasius, “God become man so we 
might be made God,”126 which in essence is the Orthodox concept of theōsis, there is 
an implicit openness to seeing Christ wherever he might be found.  Orthodox 
Christians, therefore, are much less prone to the kind of “Christology of exclusivity,” 
which Archbishop Anastasios describes.   
This leads to the second theological contribution of the Orthodox in recent 
years with regard to inter-religious relations.  As Archbishop Anastasios puts it, one 
cannot discover a full view of the Christian perspective based solely on Christology.  
He says: 
The debate in the West on how to evaluate other religions theologically has 
always centered on christological issues.  Western theological thought on this 
subject is defined mainly by the Augustinian and Calvinist legacies, with 
secondary influences from Luther and Wesley.  In Orthodox tradition, 
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however, theological problems related to this subject – especially with regard 
to Christian anthropology, i.e., to that part of Christian teaching that concerns 
the origin, nature, and destiny of human beings – have always been viewed in 
the light of our theology of the Holy Trinity.127 
 
Both Archbishop Anastasios and Metropolitan Georges have emphasized the 
important role of the Holy Spirit with regard to other religions, though they have 
come to slightly different conclusions. 
 The role of Christ in the world, according to Metropolitan Georges, can only 
be understood in terms of its connection with the role of the Holy Spirit, in that, “The 
economy of salvation achieves its full reality as the End, as the ultimate meaning of 
all things.  The economy of Christ is unintelligible without the economy of the Spirit.”  
Here, one can see the characteristic emphasis on Trinitarian theology, a theme which 
is nearly always present when the Orthodox are involved in an ecumenical gathering.  
Without identifying it by name, Metropolitan Georges clearly alluded to one of the 
essential issues of contention between the Christian East and West, the filioque.128  
However, he does this not to dwell on a long-standing point of theological 
disagreement, but rather to identify one of the ways in which the role and actions of 
the Holy Spirit have often been overlooked.  He says, based on Acts 2.17 and 10.45, 
as well as Irenaeus’ presentation of the Logos and the Spirit [as] the “two hands of the 
Father,” that:  
The Spirit is present everywhere and fills everything129 by virtue of an 
economy distinct from that of the Son…. This means that we must affirm not 
only their hypostatic independence but also that the advent of the Holy Spirit 
in the world is not subordinated to the Son, is not simply a function of the 
Word….Between the two economies there is a reciprocity and a mutual 
service….The Spirit operates and applies his energies in accordance with his 
own economy and we could, from this angle, regard the non-Christian 
religions as points where his inspiration is at work.130 
 
His basic point is that the kind of Trinitarian theology that makes the Holy Spirit 
subservient to the Son obscures the work of the Holy Spirit both inside and outside of 
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the visible Church.  He would argue, in fact, that this is the case in the West’s 
Christocentric orientation, which has lead to the linear concept of the “history of 
salvation.”   
 Metropolitan Georges finds that because of the role of the Holy Spirit, there is 
an intimate connection among the people of God, both Christian and non-Christian, 
and he refers to this mystical communion of saints as the, “universal religious 
community.”  He says that: 
All who are visited by the Spirit are the people of God.  The Church represents 
the first-fruits of the whole of mankind called to salvation.  ‘In Christ all will 
be brought to life’ (I Cor. 15:22) because of this communion which is the 
Church.  At the present moment the Church is the sacrament of this future 
unity, the unity of both ‘those whom the church will have baptized and those 
whom the Church’s bridegroom will have baptized,’ to use Nicholas 
Cabasilas’ wonderful expression…. They are all within the eucharistic cup, 
awaiting the time of the Parousia when they will constitute the unique and 
glorious body of the Savior and when all the signs will disappear before ‘the 
throne of God and of the Lamb.’ (Rev. 22:3)131 
 
This was one of the most controversial aspects of Metropolitan Georges’ argument 
when it was first presented to the WCC Central Committee in 1971 and it continues to 
be so today.  It was quite appealing to some because it was, “the first clear theological 
formulation of what may have been behind many of the pleas by the supporters of 
dialogue, especially from the ‘Third World.’”132  Orthodox leaders themselves, of no 
less stature that Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, who have been in favor of 
dialogue continue to find Metropolitan Georges’ presentation convincing.133  On the 
other hand, his claims about the Holy Spirit have been troubling to others, to the 
extent that none of his statements were included in the final document adopted by the 
WCC Central Committee in Addis Ababa, in large part because of his implicit 
rejection of the filioque.134   
Hugh Goddard frames the question very simply in his analysis of Metropolitan 
Georges: 
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Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father only (as the Eastern churches 
hold) or does the Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son (as opinion 
developed in the West)?  If the first view is correct, then it is easier for 
Christians to perceive the activity of the Holy Spirit even where the Son is not 
specifically named…[as Metropolitan Georges] Khodr suggests….135 
 
Unfortunately, most critics of Metropolitan Georges or those who have presented 
similar arguments with regard to inter-religious relations, start from a position of 
intolerance, or a negative assessment of other religions, and then attempt to support 
this viewpoint with theological arguments or proofs from scripture.  Few, even among 
the Orthodox who would agree with Metropolitan Georges in his statements about the 
filioque, have been able to argue successfully that his connection between Orthodox 
pneumatology and non-Christian religions is invalid.  Perhaps the only Orthodox 
theologian to successfully argue a slightly different case, in terms of the role of the 
Holy Spirit within world religions, is Archbishop Anastasios.  He does so with 
subtlety, however, and as will be seen below in the broad stroke he basically agrees 
with many of Metropolitan Georges’ points. 
 Archbishop Anastasios supported from the start the notion that Orthodox 
pneumatology might be the answer to many of the difficult questioned faced by the 
World Council of Churches, and Christianity generally, with regard to a consistent 
position on the non-Christian religions.  Like Metropolitan Georges, he too argued 
that this was the case because, “Orthodox thought sees the activity of the Holy Spirit 
very broadly,” allowing for many possibilities in terms of the presence of the Divine 
in all men and all religions.  He declared with all confidence, “In addition to the 
‘economy of the Logos,’ the Christian East, full of hope and humble expectation, 
gazes at the ‘economy of the Spirit.’”136  He has often spoken of numerous 
possibilities in terms of the role of the Holy Spirit outside of the visible Church.  He 
says for example: 
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The manifestation of the Trinitarian God’s presence – everywhere in the 
world, throughout time, and for all eternity – occurs through the constant 
activity of the Holy Spirit.  The one “who is everywhere present and fills all 
things” continues to act for the salvation of every person and the fulfillment 
and completion of the entire world.137   
 
Like Metropolitan Georges Khodr, Archbishop Anastasios uses the imagery in the 
Trisagion (“Thrice Holy”) Hymn to illustrate the activities of the Spirit throughout the 
entire cosmos.  He goes on to say that the Holy Spirit: 
…vigorously renews the atmosphere in which human beings live and 
breath….motivates and inspires people to crave and search for the 
truth….[and] soothes our hearts and helps to create a new kind of relationship 
between human persons….Nothing can restrict the radiance of the Holy Spirit.  
Wherever we find love, goodness, peace, and the Spirit’s other “fruits” (Gal. 
5:22), there we discern the signs of its activity.  Furthermore, it is clear that 
quite a few of these things are present in the lives of many people who belong 
to other religions.138 
 
 All these assertions are again similar and supportive of the perspective given by 
Metropolitan Georges some years earlier.   
 Where Archbishop Anastasios departs with Metropolitan Georges is on the 
question of whether it is imperative for Christians to affirm that the Holy Spirit must 
be independently at work in other religions.  According to him: 
We do need to be very cautious, however, concerning theological ideas that 
arise in this area; moreover, we need to be theologically sensitive and 
precise…. In order to avoid slipping into ambiguous notions or performing 
theoretical acrobatics, theological study of the Holy Spirit should be carried 
out with constant reference to our doctrines about Christ and the Holy 
Trinity.139 
 
This statement was perhaps to soften the previous statements in ecumenical circles by 
his fellow churchman.   Metropolitan Georges had, after all, continued to speak out 
passionately about the need for extreme humility with regard to non-Christians.  For 
example, at an inter-religious colloquium in Crete (Kolybari, 1987) he said, “A person 
who claims to be religious condemns himself to hell if he does not see, in love, the 
light of God on the face of one who is different.”140  Archbishop Anastasios had more 
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in mind, however, than making peace between the Orthodox and their Protestant and 
Catholic brethren.  His statements were an attempt to give a bit more, and necessary, 
precision to the Orthodox position on the work of the Holy Spirit among the religions.  
The same can be seen in a clarification by the Archbishop on the filioque: 
In the great discussion about filioque, we did not say that the Spirit acted only 
through Christ, but we cannot say so clearly that the Holy Spirit is working 
outside of Christ…. The Holy Spirit remains always undefined; we avoid 
defining the Spirit.141 
 
Jutta Sperber indicates that statements such as this and the previous one cited were 
much more palatable at the time, in comparison to those by Metropolitan Georges, to 
most of the Protestants in the World Council of Churches.  In Sperber’s words, “[His] 
expressions are considerably more ‘biblical’ but therefore do not constitute such a 
closed conception.  On the contrary, the statements about pneumatology remain so 
much in suspense that the wording must almost be considered brilliant.”142  Though 
Archbishop Anastasios words may have contributed to progress in the ecumenical 
dialogue, more importantly, perhaps, he has also elaborated for his coreligionists 
another possible position based on Orthodox pneumatology with regard to an 
Orthodox view on other religions. 
 There is one other particular contribution of note from Archbishop Anastasios 
that has more to do with expressly Trinitarian theology, than either christology or 
pneumatology.  This is his introduction of the concept of ‘koinōnia agapēs’ in relation 
to interaction between Christians and non-Christians.143  Koinōnia means communion, 
association, partnership, and or fellowship in Greek and agapē means love.  
Archbishop Anastasios uses koinōnia agapēs, then, as a reference to the mutual, self-
giving love found first and foremost between the three persons – Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit – of the Trinity.  It is also a reference to the opportunity given to 
humankind, particularly after the incarnation of Christ, to share in this communion of 
71 
 
love – expressed perfectly in the Godhead – and subsequently to spread it throughout 
the cosmos and into the heart of every person on earth.   
This aspect of Archbishop Anastasios’ notion of the koinōnia agapēs has been 
around for centuries in the Orthodox tradition, as for example in the thought of 
Maximos the Confessor.144  It forms the anthropological piece of the doctrine and 
practices associated with theōsis, because it identifies the intended meaning and 
purpose of earthly life.  What Archbishop Anastasios does, however, is to speak of the 
koinōnia agapēs in terms of how it relates to those of other religions and how it 
should serve as a motivation for inter-religious dialogue.  If for no other reason, 
Christians and those of other religions should engage in dialogue and work together 
for the common good in a ‘fellowship of love.’  He says, for example, that, “A faithful 
Christian has ‘to become a neighbor’ to each and every man, regardless of race, 
religion, language, guilt, especially in time of crisis.”145  With all of the challenges 
placed upon religious persons of any sort in the modern world, this is an important 
message to consider and apply. 
 
ORTHODOXY AND ISLAM 
 
 The basic outline in the preceding pages of the emerging Orthodox position on 
the religions can and has been applied by Orthodox theologians in the specific case of 
Islam.  In fact, the two central figures of this discussion thus far – Metropolitan 
Georges and Archbishop Anastasios – developed their arguments with primarily Islam 
in mind.  This is not surprising since of all the religions the Orthodox have had the 
most significant contact and interaction with Islam.  Both historically and to the 
present day Orthodox Christians and Muslims have lived side by side, sometimes 
because of their life circumstances, sometimes by choice.  Metropolitan George and 
Archbishop Anastasios are good examples of this and their personal experiences, 
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along with those of their communities, have informed their thinking about other 
religions.  There has in addition to the general consideration about the relationship of 
Orthodox Christianity and other religions been some reflection focused specifically on 
Islam.   
 One example of this type of reflection comes from Metropolitan Georges 
himself.  In an article that preceded his well-received address to the World Council of 
Churches in 1971, he wrote about the unique relationship between Muhammad and 
the Biblical prophets.  He states in that article, “For those who believe in Jesus as God 
and Savior, the Abrahamic line is like a providential, mysterious path, going from the 
father of believers [Abraham] to the Arabic prophet [Muhammad].”146  Again echoing 
Irenaeus of Lyons, he argues that ‘salvation history’ does not unfold in the linear 
manner to which we moderns are so accustomed.  In his view, Muhammad should be 
seen not only as a prophet to Muslims, but also as a type of messenger to Christians.  
Metropolitan Georges finds that though Islam appeared chronologically after the 
coming of Christ, at least its central message of ‘submission to God’ is relevant for 
Christians as well as Muslims.  He argues that this is the case because the 
“presentation that the Qur’an gives of the person of Jesus” is one of “piety and love,” 
with Muhammad as the “one who brings forth [Jesus’] message.”147  He encourages 
Christians, particularly Orthodox Christians who have a deep cultural and historic 
connection to Islam, to study the Qur’an.  He feels that this is “indispensable,” 
because it will help them to have a better appreciation not only of their Muslim 
brothers and sisters, but also of their own path toward the day when Christ returns at 
his Second Coming. 
 Another example of reflection specific to the relationship between Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam comes from Archbishop Anastasios in an article he wrote in the 
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mid-1990s to outline the historic and contemporary Orthodox approaches to Islam.148  
In the article, he highlights the importance of the intimately connected social-history 
of Muslims and Eastern Christians in many parts of the world and suggests that this is 
an important factor to consider with regard to an Orthodox view of Islam.  In his 
words: 
It is obvious that the cultural tradition and heritage of the Christians of the 
East bring them much closer to the Muslim world, with whom they have 
coexisted for many centuries.  In spite of deep theological differences and our 
dramatic conflicts in the past, there is a move from many sides toward one 
common cultural ground.149 
 
Archbishop Anastasios sees this cultural legacy, of which Orthodox Christians are in 
the best position to pass on, as a special contribution of the Orthodox to the inter-faith 
dialogue.  He further elaborates on this point by saying: 
…Orthodoxy, from its long cohabitation – which I call the “dialogue of life” – 
with the Muslim world, offers something important to the balance in the 
contemporary Christian-Muslim dialogue: the witness to the Passion and the 
honor of persecutions, making up for a series of failures of the West.150 
 
Here he points out that the Orthodox like Muslims have suffered from the misuses of 
power in their lands by Western Christians.  He admits too that there have been 
examples, past and present, of poor treatment of the Eastern Christian minority under 
Muslim rule and that this in some ways proves to be an impediment to inter-religious 
understanding.  Even so, he says that with regard to Muslims, Orthodox and all 
Christians are, “obligated to encounter the new challenges of our age, no longer 
speaking to one another or one against the other but sharing in common the new signs 
of the times and the new, thorny problems set forth by the coming world.”151 
 There has been some interest in recent years as well in looking at the 
possibilities of increased understanding and learning between Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims by examining the shared mystical dimension of both Eastern 
Christianity and Islam.152  For example, Stephen Headley, an Orthodox priest in 
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France who spent long periods of his life in Indonesia, suggests that it would be 
profitable for Christians to study the ways in which Islam has provided avenues for 
‘union with God.’  He says: 
What are Christians looking for in Islam?  We should look for expressions of 
the love of God and the paths proposed for union with him.  It is this that has 
the greatest potential for being understood from the perspective of a Christian 
theology of religious pluralism.153 
 
He goes on to give a presentation and analysis of the spirituality of the great Sufi 
mystic, Al-Hallaj.  In another context, Tarek Mitri comments on the benefits of 
Muslims and Christians collectively dialoging with the ‘believing scientist 
community’ on the topic of metaphysics.  This is an area of shared interest, albeit in 
different ways, by mystics of both the Eastern Christian and Islamic traditions.  He 
says in this light that: 
…we are before a possible dialogue that may be motivated by a yearning to a 
holistic organic culture which harmoniously combines what we call, with 
some reservation on terminology, spiritual and temporal.  Such dialogue, 
however, is tied to the future in that it is a renewed longing for a knowledge 
that is generated in making the mind occupy the heart or the heart occupy the 
mind according to the literature of the Eastern Church Fathers.154 
 
There is a growing sense among Orthodox scholars today that Orthodoxy and Islam 
can collectively help modern man regain a healthy sense of balance between the mind 
and the heart.  Since this is a common theme in Sufism, many of these same 
individuals see mysticism as a bridge between Eastern Christianity and Islam with 
much potential for future inter-religious encounters.155 
 A scholar from a younger generation of Orthodox theologians presents another 
example of those who have reflected on the benefits for Orthodox Christians in 
having positive relations with Islam and Muslims.  Theodore Pulcini, a priest of the 
Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America and former visiting 
professor at St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Seminary, did his doctoral dissertation on the 
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Muslim scholar Ibn Hazm and has asserted that Christians have much to learn from 
the faith and pious customs of Muslims.  He offers that a better understanding of 
Islam will help Christians combat the growing “neo-Gnosticism” within their 
churches, which ‘spiritualizes’ the faith and de-emphasizes the importance of Christ’s 
incarnation “in the flesh.”  He says: 
Islamic life…requires bodily acts of worship like bowing and prostrating, 
gestures often dismissed as archaic to the “sophisticated” modern Christian.  
In short, for all of our talk about “incarnational” Christianity, we are becoming 
a religion less and less likely to enflesh our religious sentiments in external 
expression.  We stress thought and emotion over physicality, enforcing a kind 
of neo-Gnosticism that sees religion primarily as a “spiritual” sentiment, 
having little to do with bodily performance.  This is, I would say, a most 
unfortunate trend.  Islam reminds us of the need for physical religious 
enactment.156 
 
Fr. Pulcini finds that Muslim worship has preserved well in the modern age the 
connection between the physical and the spiritual aspects of the faith, something 
which though an important part of traditional Eastern Christian worship has been lost 
to some extent in modern Orthodoxy.   
 Fr. Pulcini is similarly impressed with the way Muslims have preserved 
communal life, based on the Islamic concept of the umma (Islamic community), under 
the pressures of modern secularism.  Here again, he asserts that even Orthodox 
Christians, particularly those who live in the West, could learn something from their 
example.  He states: 
As Christianity in the Western world becomes more atomized and Christian 
spirituality more privatized, Islam provides a strong testimony to the power of 
community….[Islam should] challenge us Christians in particular to revitalize 
our communal structures, even if that means drawing boundaries between 
ourselves and “the world,” boundaries that have been blurred by encroaching 
secularization.  In re-thinking our definition of religious communities and re-
shaping the dynamics of life within them, we can learn some valuable lessons 
from the Muslim experience.157 
 
Fr. Pulcini, whose thoughts on this topic have likely been shaped by his experiences 
as a parish priest, finds that Christians should see Muslim communal life as a model 
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for their own behavior, both in terms of family life and with regard to the health and 
unity within their church communities.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 It was argued in chapter one that the fall of Constantinople to Muslim 
conquerors and the consequences of the “modern technical age” posed some 
significant challenges to the Church and the identity of Orthodox Christians in 
relation to it and the world around them.  In this chapter, as well as the last portion of 
chapter one, it was noted that in an effort to find their essence as Orthodox Christians 
in modern times, Orthodox theologians have placed special attention on rediscovering 
the sources of their faith in an effort to live more authentically as “Orthodox” in this 
postmodern age.158  To what extent, though, has this trend had an impact on their 
understanding of relations with those outside of their tradition, especially those of 
other religions such as Islam?  The materials under considerations in this chapter 
seem to indicate that rediscovering the sources of their faith, in particular the vast and 
profound legacy of the patristic tradition, has led at least some Orthodox Christians – 
such as Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos) and Metropolitan Georges (Khodr) – to 
see God at work in and through other religions.  There certainly have been many 
examples going back to Ottoman times (and even before that) of Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims living side by side in mutual respect and peace.  One could argue, 
however, that by rediscovering the open attitudes towards other religions held by 
great theologians of earlier centuries – such as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, 
Origen, and Eusebius of Caesarea – the Orthodox Christians mentioned in this chapter 
may have found a stronger theological footing upon which to engage in dialogue with 
their Muslim neighbors.  At the same time, it seems they have maintained continuity 
with their cherished dogmatic principles established during the Ecumenical Councils 
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and relating to christology and pneumatology.  Without diminishing the foundational 
elements of their key beliefs, they have expanded the scope of the saving work of 
Christ and the active presence of the Holy Spirit to include Islam and their Muslim 
neighbors.  If indeed the modern age has been a transformational event for the Church 
and in the daily lives of Orthodox Christians, it seems the theologians covered in this 
chapter have been successful in finding new ways to envision salvation beyond the 
paradigm of Byzantium, somewhat parallel to the way New Testament Christians had 
to reimage their view of how God was working his salvation plan to and through the 
Gentiles.   
This chapter has shown that as Orthodox theologians have turned to scripture, 
early patristic sources, and their theological tradition relating to the Trinity for 
answers to various question on inter-religious relations, it is now possible to speak of 
an emerging Orthodox position on the non-Christian religions in the postmodern age.  
Among the growing number of Orthodox theologians who have developed an interest 
in this area of study and reflection, several individuals have made important 
contributions to the work of the World Council of Churches in the area of inter-
religious relations and have fostered relationships with their neighbors who practice a 
different faith from their own.  There has been a particular interest in exploring the 
relationship between Orthodox Christianity and Islam, looking for avenues to greater 
understanding and collaboration between Eastern Christians and Muslims, who in 
many cases have lived side by side for centuries.   
Orthodox leaders have taken important steps, particularly within the past 
quarter century, in promoting dialogue and fostering cooperation between Muslims 
and Christians.  This will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.  This 
chapter has attempted to demonstrate that Orthodox Christians have identified a 
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genuine theological basis for wanting to learn more about Islam and to work closely 
with Muslims to promote activities that will benefit humanity in general.  It will be 
shown in subsequent chapters that with a generous spirit and great deal of humility 
numerous Orthodox theologians and leaders have fervently applied themselves to 
these tasks.   
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Chapter 3: Dialogue and Declarations 
 
 
[The] global perspective is in the blood of the Orthodox….Instead of a 
globalization that transforms nation and people into an 
indistinguishable, homogenized mass, convenient for the economic 
objectives of an anonymous oligarchy, the Orthodox religious experience 
and vision propose a communion of love, a society of love, and call on 
people to make every effort in that direction.  The truly Christian thing 
is to continue believing when there seems to be no hope, by grounding 
oneself in the certainty that ultimately there is Another who controls the 
evolution of the universe – he “who is and who was and who is to come, 
the Almighty” (Rev 1:8).  The truly Christian thing is to live with the 
certainty that a global communion of love between free persons is an 
ideal that deserves to be struggled for.  The truly Christian thing is to be 
active and productive at the local level by maintaining a perspective that 
is global, and to fulfil our own obligations responsibly by orienting 
ourselves toward the infinite – the God of Love – as the purpose and goal 
of life.159 
 
So concludes Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos in his remarks at the occasion of 
his receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of Athens, in part because of 
his achievements in the areas of inter-religious and international relations.  The 
Archbishop’s words not only illustrate how he believes Christians can make a positive 
contribution in a world where globalization is an unstoppable force, they also 
summarize his approach, and that of many other Orthodox leaders in recent years, to 
Orthodox-Muslim relations.  He and others have truly struggled for a, “global 
communion of love between free persons,” be they Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, 
Hindu, or non-religious.  Working at the “local level by maintaining a perspective that 
is global,” Orthodox leaders have at once been engaged in local, regional, and 
international dialogues and encounters with Muslims, as well as other non-Christians, 
in order to promote peace, understanding, and cooperation between all peoples.  They 
have also encouraged members of their own flocks, and their brothers and sisters from 
other Christian traditions, to reflect upon what they might learn about themselves by 
pursuing and nurturing relationships with Muslims.   
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In many places and in many ways, a growing number of Muslims have 
extended the same generous spirit toward Christians.160  One of the positive outcomes 
of these efforts by members of both traditions is that in the last quarter century 
Muslims and Orthodox Christians in particular have begun to rediscover their shared 
ancestry in order to build bridges between their traditions, and more broadly between 
Eastern and Western civilizations.  This chapter will present the various occasions in 
recent years in which the themes of Islam and relations with Muslims have appeared 
in official statements by Orthodox leaders throughout the world.  It will show the 
ways in which there has been a concerted effort to present Islam as a religious 
tradition and social system worthy of respect.  It will also include a summary and 
analysis of efforts by Orthodox Christians to encounter Muslims on a personal and 
intellectual level through what can be broadly referred to as inter-religious dialogue.  
Since chapter five will examine statements and dialogues (which increased 
dramatically) during the period following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 
the autumn of 2001, this chapter will be limited roughly to the quarter century that 
preceded those events (roughly 1975-2001).   
It would be useful before going any further to reflect briefly on the general 
backdrop to the dialogue and declarations discussed in this chapter.  The overall 
history and conditions in Orthodox Christian and Muslim lands from the conclusion 
of World War II to the end of the twentieth century were discussed in a chapter one.  
Within this broader framework, there were some developments of particular 
significance with regard to their impact on declarations and dialogues involving 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims.   
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, most of the newly formed 
nations in traditionally Muslim lands were busy establishing themselves in their 
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respective regions and finding their place in a world dominated by two super-powers, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, along with a European continent on the verge 
of regaining its ability to assert great influence in many areas.  As these new nations 
defined themselves, one of the natural consequences was that religious leaders 
engaged in dialogue and negotiations with politicians and other religious communities 
in order to establish their place within their societies.  These activities and 
relationships were most pronounced within nations, but often spread as well beyond 
national borders.  There were peaceful encounters on the one extreme and civil strife, 
even wars, on the other.   
The most striking examples of aggressive, violent encounters within and 
between nations that have had negative consequences upon relations between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims are the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974) and the 
resulting “Cyprus dispute,” the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990), and the ethno-
religious conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (a.k.a. Yugoslav Wars, 1991-2001).  
Religious leaders among Orthodox Christians and Muslims were in many ways 
enmeshed in these conflicts, but likewise were often the voice of reason and sanity in 
the face of senseless violence and brutality pervading their societies.161  It was during 
such times of trial that a number of religious leaders established important 
relationships and availed themselves to the opportunities for positive inter-religious 
dialogue.   
It was also during this same period that the World Council of Churches 
(WCC) multiplied its ecumenical activities and began branching out into the sphere of 
inter-religious dialogue.  Since the Orthodox (and Oriental Orthodox) churches have 
played such a key role in the Council over the years162, it is no surprise that Islam 
featured prominently from 1975-2001 in the discussions among the member churches 
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about the relationship between Christianity and non-Christian religions and the 
various inter-religious dialogues sponsored by the WCC.   
On a parallel and related track, one must consider the theological reflection 
and activities of the Roman Catholic Church following Vatican II with regard to its 
relations with world religions and Islam in particular.  The efforts during the papacy 
of John Paul II are most notable, as the Pope took many steps to reach out to Muslims, 
and the Orthodox churches for that matter, opening unprecedented opportunities for 
dialogue and improved relations between Muslims and Christians across the globe.  It 
cannot be denied that the Pope’s leadership in this area inspired a number of Orthodox 
bishops, clergy, and lay leaders to increase their efforts to improve relations with 
Muslims as well as the Roman Catholic Church.163 
 
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING ISLAM 
 
The relationship of Orthodox Christianity and other religions, Islam in 
particular, was a topic that appeared in a number of official statements by Orthodox 
leaders in a variety of contexts during the last quarter of the twentieth century.  
Surprisingly perhaps, such statements emerged not only through inter-religious 
encounters, but also as a result of pan-Orthodox endeavors or in the context of 
ecumenical encounters with Christians of other traditions.   
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the question of inter-religious 
relations has been slated as one of ten major topics on the agenda for the proposed 
Great Council of Orthodox leaders from around the globe.  Though the topic of 
Orthodoxy and other religions appeared in the first Pre-Synodal Pan-Orthodox 
Consultation in the year 1976, by the third consultation in 1986 inter-religious 
cooperation was identified not only as a topic for the future Council, but also as a duty 
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of all Orthodox Christians in the present.  The document from that consultation reads 
as follows: 
The local Orthodox Churches, in close cooperation with all the peace-loving 
adherents of the other world religions, deem it their duty to work for peace on 
earth and for the establishment of fraternal relations between peoples.  The 
Orthodox Churches are called to contribute to interfaith understanding and 
cooperation, and thereby to the elimination of fanaticism from every quarter, 
and in this way to the reconciliation of peoples and the ascendancy of the 
blessings of freedom and peace in the world, in order to serve modern man, 
independently of race or religion.164 
 
It is clear that, the Orthodox primates and leaders who signed this statement held the 
belief that the Orthodox Christians owe it to themselves, their Church, other 
Christians, and people of all religious traditions to participate in inter-religious 
dialogue and to work in whatever way they can toward better relations between 
peoples of all the major religions.   
 Orthodox leaders continued to engage in inter-religious dialogue throughout 
the remaining years of the twentieth century, but also began to address some of the 
shared social and political concerns of Muslims and Christians.  As tensions in the 
Middle East mounted in the year 1995, the primates of the Orthodox Churches 
gathered on the island of Patmos to celebrate the anniversary of 1,900 years since St. 
John wrote the book of Revelation in that place by holding the first Pan-Orthodox 
international symposium at which a large majority all of the Orthodox patriarchs and 
archbishops of national churches were present.165  Commenting on the rising conflicts 
among nations and “hatred among peoples,” the primates made the following 
statement: 
During these times, we believe it is our obligation to underscore what the 
revelation in Christ means for the progress of humanity, peace, and fellowship 
of all peoples.  It is the responsibility of the Orthodox Churches to contribute 
in every way possible to the realization and prevalence of these principles 
throughout the world, by becoming bearers and messengers of the spirit and 
ethos of the revelation.  Therefore…we make an appeal to all – foremost to 
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those who exercise power on earth and those who live in the regions of 
conflicts and wars – for the sake of peace and justice for all.166 
 
Though this statement was a general call for peace and tolerance in the face of 
warfare and oppression, it is interesting that the only specific region mentioned in the 
document – aside from a passing reference to “nationalistic fanaticism” which was 
probably directed at some Orthodox Serbs and their rivals committing atrocities in the 
former Yugoslavia – was the Holy Land.  Though trying their best to, “remain 
steadfast to the fundamental principle of noninterference in politics,” the Orthodox 
primates condemned the “status quo” mentality and negligence of world leaders to 
address the pressing concerns of Muslims and Christians living in Israel.  Stating that, 
“the Church cannot be indifferent when political decisions affect the very existence of 
the Orthodox Churches,” they highlighted the difficulties experienced by Patriarch 
Diodoros of Jerusalem and his flock under Israeli rule.       
 Beyond specific concerns about the dwindling presence of Christianity in the 
Holy Land related in part to some of the restrictive policies of the Israeli government, 
the message of the Orthodox primates at Patmos addressed what they considered to be 
the growing, dangerous tendency to mix political power with religious fanaticism.  
This was highlighted as one of the issues of concern for the beginning of the twenty-
first century.  In relation to the conflict between Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the 
Middle East, the statement reads: 
…many have expressed the view that the coming century will bring humanity 
to “a clash of civilizations” in which the religious elements will be dominant.  
Such a possibility obliges all religious leaders to show wisdom, prudence, and 
courage in order that every element of fanaticism and hatred may be 
eliminated….all of us, especially the younger generation, are called to learn 
and to bear witness, in word and deed, to the fact that only the love of God, of 
our fellow human beings, and of all His creation offers meaning and salvation 
to our lives, even during the most difficult periods of history.167   
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There is a clear reference here to the notion, proposed by Samuel Huntington and 
other political theorists, that there will be an unavoidable collision between cultures 
on the basis (at least in part) of religious distinction.  Without endorsing the theory, 
these Christian leaders urge their Orthodox flock to transcend by love any inclination 
towards political extremism, based as it may be on religious rivalry, and reach out to 
“our fellow human beings” regardless of their religious persuasion.   
 At about the same period as the Pan-Orthodox gathering on Patmos, the three 
patriarchs from the Middle East – namely Diodoros of Jerusalem, Parthenios of 
Alexandria, and Ignatios IV – along with Archbishop Iakovos and Metropolitan Philip 
of America (of the Greek and Antiochian Archdioceses respectively) joined in support 
of what was called the “Jerusalem Appeal.”  This was a reference to, or perhaps an 
umbrella term for, a series of documents put together over the period of November 
1994 – June 1996 that called for peace and justice for Jerusalem, emphasizing the 
plight of Palestinian Christians and Muslims in the face of efforts by certain world 
powers to “Judaize Jerusalem…[and] deprive it of its Christian-Muslim character.”168  
These documents indicate the willingness of Orthodox Christian leaders to join with 
their Muslim neighbors in the struggle to restore a homeland to Palestinians, be they 
Christian or Muslim.  One of the documents, a letter to then President Bill Clinton, 
urged the U.S. government to intervene in order to stop Israeli construction into East 
Jerusalem and Palestinian areas and keep the Zionists from attempting to make 
Jerusalem “the eternal and undivided capital of Israel.”  Though the Jerusalem Appeal 
began by emphasizing only the significance of Jerusalem for Christians, by 1996 its 
scope was much broader, to the extent that it had become an appeal signed by all key 
Arab Christian and Muslim leaders.  Regardless of all of its political rhetoric and 
activism, the Jerusalem Appeal serves as a good example of how openness to 
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Muslims and a willingness to engage with them in dialogue has led Orthodox 
Christians (and others) to action for the betterment of both Muslims and Christians. 
By the end of the century, the desire to support and engage in inter-religious 
dialogue remained strong among Orthodox leaders.  In a clear sign that they were 
committed to keeping the topic on the agenda at any future pan-Orthodox encounters, 
the primates of the Orthodox churches made the following statement as they convened 
in Jerusalem several years ago to celebrate the second millennium of Christianity: 
It is in …[the spirit of peace and reconciliation] that we turn toward the other 
great world religions, particularly the monotheistic religions of Judaism and 
Islam, with a hope to create the most favorable conditions for a dialogue with 
them with a view to the peaceful coexistence of all peoples…The Orthodox 
Church condemns the spirit of hatred with regard to the convictions of others 
as well as religious fanaticism in whatever form.169 
 
This statement, issued by the heads of Orthodox churches from around the world prior 
to the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, shows both the 
commitment of Orthodox leaders to peace in the Middle East as well as a united 
response to the rise of fundamentalism, which has had such negative effects upon the 
Abrahamic religions in particular.170   
 One further statement from Orthodox hierarchs at the century’s end illustrates 
the growing desire among Orthodox Christians to engage in a positive way with 
Muslims, as well as those of other faith traditions.  In a pastoral letter from of the 
Standing Conference of the Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas, Orthodox 
Christians of North and South America were urged to resist becoming another of the 
many Christian sects, which by focusing inwardly have seriously neglected 
engagement with the culture around them.  The bishops argued that: 
To transform our culture we must be prepared to enter into a dialogue 
especially with those of other faiths.  Such a dialogue must be constructive.  It 
must be based on religious conviction.  This will require that we strengthen 
and deepen our own theological understanding.  Dialogue is more than 
tolerance.  In dialogue we recognize that while different from us, the ‘other’ 
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does not exist simply to exist.  Rather he or she exists as a person who has 
something to say to me...This is not syncretism.  Religious syncretism rests on 
the assumption that each of the participating parties has a positive contribution 
to make, and that these when collected and collated constitute a whole…For 
us [however], dialogue means that while we may recognize positive elements 
in another religion or even philosophy, these are always to be judged against 
our own beliefs.  We have no interest in forming another religion.  But we do 
have a great deal to say to one another.171 
 
This statement shows the extent to which the Orthodox hierarchs in the Americas 
were willing – even before the events of 9/11 that changed the social and political 
context in the United States dramatically vis à vis Islam – to dialogue with those of 
other religious persuasions.  Perhaps the Orthodox, who continued by the year 2000 to 
comprise less than 1% of the overall population in North and South American 
countries, learned from the twentieth century that isolation and efforts toward self-
preservation would neither strengthen their communities nor enable them to fulfill 
their mission to the gospel of Christ.  By urging their collective Orthodox flock to 
listen and learn from adherents of other faiths, while encouraging them at the same 
time to evaluate what they hear ‘against [their] own beliefs,’ these bishops discovered 
a way to combine true mission with sincere dialogue.   
 
STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUALS CONCERNING ISLAM 
 
There have been several Orthodox hierarchs who have been particularly 
outspoken in their views about the common bonds between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims.  Two of these individuals, Archbishop Anastasios of Albania and 
Metropolitan Georges of Mount Lebanon, were quoted several times in the previous 
chapter and will appear later in this chapter as well.  They were leaders among 
Orthodox Christians in the ecumenical movement and inter-religious encounters 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century and their work in these areas, though in 
somewhat different contexts and settings, has continued into the twenty-first century.  
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During the period of 1975-2001, two other individuals stand out because of their 
open-minded and outspoken views on Islam: Patriarch Parthenios of Alexandria 
(†1996) and Bartholomew I, Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox Church.  One can 
argue that because of the public and elevated nature of their positions as patriarchs in 
a line of succession that goes back to the original apostles of the Church, their 
opinions are especially authoritative with regard to what could be considered an 
‘Orthodox position on Islam.’172   
Patriarch Parthenios made numerous public statements in a variety of contexts 
about Islam and Muslims.  Having lived side-by-side with Muslims his entire life, his 
comments seemed grounded as much in personal experience as they were in 
theological conviction.  He was known particularly for being open and direct about 
his views towards Islam, and other religions for that matter.  For example, in one 
statement he said that: 
The prophet Muhammad is an apostle.  He is a man of God, who worked for 
the Kingdom of God and created Islam, a religion to which belong one billion 
people…. Our God is the Father of all men, even of the Muslims and 
Buddhists.  I believe that God loves the Muslims and the Buddhists…. When I 
speak against Islam or Buddhism, then I am not found in agreement with 
God…. My God is the God of other men also.  He is not only God for the 
Orthodox.  This is my position.173 
  
There is no distinction here between the God of Christians and the God of Muslims, 
nor is there any question about whether Muhammad was an inspired servant of God.  
Patriarch Parthenios makes it quite clear that he not only believes Muhammad to have 
been inspired, but also an “apostle.”  This is quite a statement, and it is in sharp 
contrast with much of the polemical literature from the Byzantine period, which often 
presented Muhammad as a hedonist and servant of the antichrist.174  Even in the age 
of ecumenical gentility and inter-religious politesse, few Orthodox leaders of such 
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stature have been willing to go as far as Patriarch Parthenios in extending the hand of 
friendship to Muslims.   
 Patriarch Parthenios was a devoted advocate of dialogue between Christians 
and Muslims.  He asserted that this was particularly incumbent upon Orthodox 
Christians because of their long history of living side-by-side with Muslims.   He 
articulated his position on this quite well, for example, in an interview with the Paris 
based Service Orthodoxe de Presse: 
Islam has a variety of aspects.  For me, the question of knowing whether Islam 
is or is not an inspired religion does not present itself – it is, of course, 
inspired.  It is a religion subsisting for centuries and, for us Middle Eastern 
Christians, omnipresent.  We have lived, and are still living, alongside Islam 
for centuries, and we must work together…. The Muslims are monotheistic: 
they believe in one God.  That is a fundamental fact that gives one courage for 
the dialogue.  And for us who is Mahomet?  Did he act contrary to God’s will?  
Mahomet is a man of God who made the desert Arabs believe in one God, 
capable of praying, fasting, loving their neighbor and working for good…. The 
only thing we have to do – and, historically speaking, we have done so on 
quite a few occasions – is to talk with Islam, to start up a dialogue…we know 
the Muslims and they too know us.  Let us work, without fanaticism, with love 
and faith in truth.175 
 
In contrast to the image that is so often depicted of the relationship between Christians 
and Muslims throughout history, Patriarch Parthenios paints a very different picture 
here.  He reminds those who will listen that there is a long tradition – in at least one 
rather important region of the Orthodox world – of living in peace with Muslims, 
talking with and listening to them on key areas of religious belief and practice, and 
working together to build a more just and humane world.  Clearly, Patriarch 
Parthenios saw his own ministry as a continuation of the respect and dialogue 
between Muslims and Orthodox Christians of previous generations in the Middle 
East, from the time Islam came on the scene in Arabia in the 6th century of the 
Common Era.   
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Patriarch Parthenios spoke with fervor when he called for dialogue and 
continual improvement in relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  His 
views and his words, however, seemed to be informed by more than just theological 
conviction and/or a fidelity to a long-standing tradition.  One statement, perhaps more 
than any other, gives a good indication that Patriarch Parthenios’ attitudes were 
formed at least to some extent from his personal encounters with Muslims.  In April 
of 1994, he delivered an address to a synod of Roman Catholic bishops (“The African 
Synod”) during session 6 of their so-called Special Assembly for Africa.  In his 
speech, he encouraged the Pope and the synod of bishops to, “be in touch, in dialogue 
with the people of Islam.”  He reasoned that: 
The people of Islam believe in one God.  In the Holy Koran we read about our 
Lord, and his mother, the Virgin.  The whole of North Africa belongs to the 
Arabs of Islam and we Christians meet them throughout Africa.  We have to 
live with them, in dialogue, in peace.  We must be together and to witness our 
Lord to them.  I speak as an African, as an African Orthodox Christian.  I was 
born in Africa.  I remember as a little boy seeing the people of Islam praying 
in a small room, every day, in the basement of my house.  They pray to one 
God.  I have lived all my life in Africa with Islam.  I love the people of 
Islam.176   
 
Patriarch Parthenios clearly had an intimate and long-standing relationship with 
Islam, extending back to his formative years as a young child.  His experiences living 
side-by-side with Muslims and worshipping in close proximity to them must have 
been positive ones.  Such experiences have not been uncommon among the Orthodox 
Christians in the Middle East and portions of Africa and this continues to be the case 
to the present day. 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I is another example of someone whose 
perspective and life’s work has been influenced by early exposure to Islam and 
encounters with Muslims from a young age.  Since as Ecumenical Patriarch, 
Bartholomew is in the public eye more than any other Orthodox churchman and 
91 
 
throughout his episcopacy has made numerous addresses and statements, there is 
ample opportunity to construct his views on Islam and his early experiences with 
Muslims.    
Patriarch Bartholomew, named Dimitrios Archondonis prior to ordination, was 
born in Turkey and was personally familiar with the often-contentious relations 
between Christians and Muslims in that part of the world.  Though he had a relatively 
peaceful childhood growing up on the Greek (Orthodox Christian) populated island of 
Imbros, the Cypriot crisis caused such enmity between Greeks and Turks that his 
entire family, along with many other Greeks, had to emigrate from their ancestral 
home.177  The Patriarch Bartholomew spent several of his early adult years in Europe 
studying and living in Switzerland, France, Germany, and Italy, where he completed 
his doctorate degree from the Oriental Institute of the Gregorian University before 
returning to Istanbul where he began his ministry as priest in 1969 and worked closely 
in subsequent years with the Patriarchate.178  From the moment he was enthroned as 
Patriarch in 1991, Bartholomew showed his concern for all people of Turkey and his 
commitment to inter-religious dialogue between Muslims and Christians.  In his 
enthronement speech he stated that he was, “a loyal citizen subject to the law of our 
country,” and stressed the importance that the Patriarchate, “remains purely spiritual, 
a symbol of reconciliation, a force without weapons,” which “rejects all political goals 
and maintains its distance from the deceiving arrogance of secular power.”  He went 
on to say that he would endeavor to promote healthy relationships with “the principle 
non-Christian religions.”179   
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I’s statements at his enthronement set the 
tone for a series of actions that demonstrated his generous spirit and fraternity towards 
Muslims, particularly his neighbors in Turkey.  He befriended many Muslim Turks, 
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inviting prominent businessmen, government officials, journalists, and artists to the 
Phanar and on some of his visits and goodwill missions across the globe.180  By doing 
so, he won the respect and trust of many Muslims in his native Turkey, where for 
some time there had been growing suspicion of the Patriarchate because of the 
tensions related to rising Greek and Turkish nationalism.   
Patriarch Bartholomew made it clear that his vision for the world would not 
include the destructive nationalism and religious fanaticism, which he admitted had 
done much damage within the Orthodox Church as they had to religious communities 
all over the world.  For example, in an address to an international audience in 1993 he 
said:   
[N]ationalism is a phenomenon with disastrous consequences.  The holy 
Orthodox Church searched long for a language with which to address 
nationalism, amid the strife and havoc this new ideology created in the 
Orthodox lands of Eastern Europe from much of the nineteenth century…. 
Today, more than a century later, nationalism remains the bane of our 
ecumenical Church.  It is time for us to begin to reconcile nationalism and 
ecumenicity.  They are not mutually exclusive.181 
 
Patriarch Bartholomew is speaking directly to the ecclesiological issue within the 
Orthodox Church of rising ethnic rather than religious affiliation.  In other words, 
thinking of oneself (and one’s community) first as a Greek, Serb, Russian, or Arab 
and second as an Orthodox Christian.  He argues here, and on a number of other 
occasions, that this tendency had weakened the unity and universality of the church.  
There is another subtle message here as well.  By identifying that the source of 
‘ideology’ of nationalism was something foreign in the traditional Orthodox lands, 
and was instead exported by the West, he makes it clear that he is unwilling to 
identify himself as the leader of Greeks in Turkey.   
Throughout his time as Patriarch, Bartholomew has tried to rise above the 
debates between Greeks and Turks, presenting himself as a citizen of the world in an 
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effort to lead by his example.  This can be seen in a 1997 address to the 
Turkish/Greek Business Council and the Young Businesspersons Association when 
he stated: 
Turks and Greeks have sinned against each other.  Even worse, like children, 
they have kept score of the pain and losses suffered…. I cannot accept what 
some say, that Greeks and Turks cannot get along any better than cats and 
dogs (if you will pardon the expression; it is not mine), that this is how it has 
always been, and that our enmity is a natural one.  In the first place, we are all 
members of the human race, not the animal kingdom.  And in the second, 
enmity is not something natural; rather, it goes contrary to the image and 
likeness of God in each and every one of us…. We are both God-fearing 
peoples, are we not?  The greatest challenge we face today comes from the so-
called Godless society, from those who leave no room for God in their daily 
lives…. We are proud to say that whether you are Christian, Muslim, or Jew, 
your efforts to reconcile Greeks and Turks make you children of God. 
 
Patriarch Bartholomew argues that pious Greek Christians and Muslim Turks have 
more in common with each other than they do with secularists in Turkish society.  In 
a subtle critique of the secularizing and westernizing campaigns of Mustafa Kemal 
(a.k.a. Ataturk), the father of Turkish nationalism, and those who have followed his 
example to the present day, he calls on Muslims and Christians to see their religious 
traditions as a unifying, rather than a divisive, force.   
While Patriarch Bartholomew is critical of secularizing tendencies, he also 
recognizes that religious fanaticism can be an equally dangerous force in society.  
This kind of extremism is another topic that he has frequently covered in addresses 
and statements to a variety of audiences.  For example, in Istanbul in 1995 he stated to 
an audience of business executives gathered at CEO International University: 
Some have pointed to the modern “clash of civilizations” as inevitable.  Yet 
we who live at the crossroads [i.e. Turkey] disagree – indeed, we are living 
proof that different cultures and different faiths can coexist in peace…. There 
has never been a greater need for spiritual leaders to engage in the affairs of 
this world.  We must take a visible place on the stage, especially because too 
many crimes today are taking place in the name of faith…. [I]t is time not only 
for rapprochement but for solidarity and cooperation in order to help lead our 
world away from the bloody abyss of extreme nationalism, fundamentalism, 
and intolerance.182 
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Patriarch Bartholomew presents the example of cooperation of long-standing between 
Muslims and Christians in Turkey as living proof that the notion of an inevitable 
“clash of civilizations” is an untenable theory.  In fact, he presents a much more 
hopeful future in which humanity – in part through the intervention of peace-loving 
spiritual leaders from around the globe – rejects the kinds of militant nationalism, 
religious fanaticism, and ignorant intolerance that caused so much agony and death in 
the twentieth century.  After referencing the historic example of the Muslim leader 
Mehmet II’s tolerance toward Orthodox Christians following the fall of 
Constantinople, Patriarch Bartholomew goes on to quote a Muslim Sufi to conclude 
his remarks on the importance of unity between people of different faiths.  He says: 
Although we may be of different faiths, we would like to offer you, like a 
spiritual father, some wisdom that we received from a Muslim mystic and 
humanist, the renowned Mevlana, who lived in the twelfth century:   
  
Become like the sun in your compassion and generosity; 
Like the night, cover up the shortcomings of others; 
As the rushing waters, reach out to the entire world; 
During moments of anger, at times of rage, become like a dead man;  
Become like the earth (humus) so people can stand firm on your foundation;   
And either become that whom you manifest, or manifest who you really are. 
 
Dear friends, we are convinced that there is more that unites the community of 
humankind than divides us…. We pledge to you today that the Orthodox 
Christian Church will do everything in her power to fulfill that vision.183 
 
Patriarch Bartholomew here demonstrates by example the kind of solidarity that he 
envisions, one in which a person cannot only acknowledge the spiritual insights of a 
pious person from another religion, but also benefit from them while practicing his 
own tradition.  He suggests that more than ever religious communities should reach 
out by faith to find the divine spark in each person, rather than constantly focusing 
inwardly, obsessing out of fear on self-preservation. 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I and Patriarch Parthenios of Alexandria 
established in a very direct way during the last quarter of the twentieth century that 
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Orthodox Christianity could find much common ground with Islam.  They showed 
through their words and actions their openness, solidarity, and genuine respect for 
their Muslim neighbors as well as the worldwide Muslim community.  As the first and 
second ranking hierarchs of the Orthodox Church (in the traditional sense), their 
opinions carried a great deal of weight and set the stage for a much more engaged and 
active conversation about Islam within the Orthodox Church a the turn of the century.  
To be sure, not everyone agreed with their assessment of Islam or the efficacy of 
inter-religious dialogue.  More will be said about that at a later point.  Still, because 
they were so outspoken on their views about Islam and Muslims and because they had 
such a wide, diverse audience, many Orthodox Christians and others began to think 
about Islam in a new and more positive way.  
 
ENCOUNTERS THROUGH THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES 
 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century there were a number of 
opportunities for and examples of encounters between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims.  The context, scope, and quality of the interaction varied a great deal, but it 
was clear that both Muslims and Orthodox Christians were engaging in serious work 
to build new and improve upon existing relationships, foster greater understanding, 
and address common concerns.  The period saw an unprecedented number of 
international and regional conferences and dialogues in which top Muslim and 
Orthodox Christian leaders were organizers, participants, and attendees.  There were 
two primary mediums through which these encounters took place: 1) direct Orthodox 
involvement in the activities of the World Council of Churches and 2) joint 
collaborations between the Al-Albeit Foundation and the Orthodox Center for the 
Ecumenical Patriarch.  The result was the establishment of more permanent, 
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organized channels for sustained dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
throughout the world.184   
Orthodox Churches and Orthodox Christians have been involved in the World 
Council of Churches from the Council’s inception.185  They have made important 
contributions to the WCC’s work such as: 1) the theme of “eucharistic ecclesiology” 
in the understanding of Church, 2) a renewed emphasis on the Trinity in the Christian 
faith, 3) a recovery of the patristic witness, and 4) a relational approach to spirituality 
that focuses on humans ‘growing into the likeness of God.’186  Though Orthodox 
participation in the Council’s work with non-Christian religions was perhaps less 
visible than, for example, with the Faith and Order Commission, a few individuals 
made particularly significant contributions during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century.   
Before turning to the work and writings of these individuals, however, it is 
important to understand the somewhat tumultuous relationship that the Orthodox 
Churches have had with the World Council of Churches over the years, particularly 
during the 1990s.187  During that period – despite the fact that one of their own, 
Catholicos Aram I of the Armenian Orthodox Church, served as moderator for the 
WCC – several Orthodox Churches and a number of Orthodox leaders questioned 
whether continued involvement in the Council could be justified.  Their concerns 
ranged from moral and doctrinal positions of certain member churches to the 
methodologies, working style, and procedures of the Council in general.188  Other 
members of the Council recognized that the Orthodox had some legitimate concerns 
and convened in 1999 the first meeting of a Special Commission on the Orthodox 
Participation in the WCC.189  As of this writing, it remains to be seen whether certain 
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changes recommended by the Central Committee will be enough to satisfy the 
Orthodox members’ most pressing concerns.   
Alongside the escalating concerns of the Orthodox within the WCC, yet in 
some ways independent from them, a growing sentiment of anti-ecumenism was 
expressed in various ways by a small but vocal minority within certain Orthodox 
circles during the last quarter of the twentieth century.  These general attitudes, held 
by Orthodox Christians in various regions of the world, were often due to the internal 
social-political problems, rising nationalist tendencies, and increased isolationism of 
some Orthodox Christians in the face of growing pressures from modernization.  
Though this topic will be addressed in greater detail in the next two chapters, at this 
point it would be useful to mention the following as contributing factors to this 
minority sentiment of anti-ecumenism: 1) anti-Westernism – particularly in response 
to the proliferation of exported American media and culture in most parts of the world 
by the 1990s, 2) international milleniarism in the years preceding 2000, as promoted 
by certain monks from Mt. Athos, old calendarist Greeks, and some members of the 
Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, and 3) persistent anti-Romanism based 
on an unwillingness to forgive and work through past transgressions of the Pope, such 
as the so called ‘Uniatism’ in several traditionally Orthodox lands.190  An example of 
this would be the Monastery of Sts. Cyprian and Justina in Greece, which – along 
with its voice in the West, the Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies in California 
– organized a series of seminars called “Convocations for Orthodox Awareness” with 
the expressed purpose of, “inform[ing] the Faithful in a responsible and sober manner 
about the burning issues of our Faith, and especially about the deadly peril posed by 
the heresy of our age, the panheresy of ecumenism.”191  As will be seen in chapter 
five, the efforts of this group and others relating to the WCC, and inter-religious 
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relations for that matter, have continued and in some areas increased following the 
terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001.      
Returning now to Orthodox participation in the WCC’s work with non-
Christian religions, three individuals stand out in terms of having made particularly 
significant contributions and in developing an Orthodox position on inter-religious 
dialogue: Metropolitan Georges (Khodr) of Byblos and Botris (Mount Lebanon), 
Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos) of Tirana and all Albania, and Dr. Tarek Mitri 
(a layman from Lebanon).  By way of background, it is important to note that the 
contributions of these individuals paralleled the efforts on two levels of the Council: 
1) internal reflection among Christians about Islam and inter-religious dialogue and 2) 
actual encounter and dialogues – sponsored by the WCC – between Muslims and 
Christians.  Though the theological views of Metropolitan Georges and Archbishop 
Anastasios, particularly on the role of Orthodox christology and pneumatology in 
Muslim-Christian relations, were discussed extensively in the previous chapter, this 
next section will examine their specific contributions, along with that of Tarek Mitri, 
in the context of the work of the WCC.   
Metropolitan Georges grew up in a Christian neighborhood of Tripoli, which 
has always been a very religiously diverse city, so from his youth he lived alongside 
Muslims.192  Though he, along with Patriarch Ignatius IV of Antioch, made important 
contributions in his youth to the church through the Orthodox Youth Movement (MJO 
– movement de jeunesse orthodoxe), it was clear that he would be ‘a voice of 
regeneration in the Arab world’ for all Arabs – Muslim and Christian alike.193  
Metropolitan Georges’ early experiences of encounter – both in his thought and in 
living presence – with Islam and Muslims gave him an authenticity which was greatly 
respected by other members of the WCC.194  Though his addresses at the first WCC 
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sponsored dialogue in 1969 (in Cartigny) and at a 1971 meeting of the WCC Central 
Committee (in Addis Ababa) had established him as one of the early pioneers of the 
Council in Muslim-Christian dialogue, he continued to play an important role as a key 
Orthodox participant during the last quarter of the twenty-first century.195 
On the level of Christian reflection about Islam, Metropolitan Georges added 
several points during this period to the ones he had already made about christology 
and pneumatology in his famous article from 1971, ‘Christianity in a Pluralistic 
World – the Economy of the Holy Spirit.’196  For example, he argued in an article on 
the relationship between Christian witness and dialogue that Christians had the duty 
of looking for the ‘traces of Christ’ in Islam.  He said: 
What strange destiny leads Isaac and Ishmael to confront each other in the 
utter helplessness of Orthodox Christians?  I believe that the Church can speak 
to the heart of Islam only to the extent that it is really poor, free from any 
ethnic pride or intellectual superiority, free from its own pain.  I for one, know 
that Muslims have shown great receptivity to all dialogues carried on during 
the last decade.  But what really matters most for us is the search for the traces 
of Christ in the Koran as well as in the tradition of Islam, specifically within 
the Sufi heritage….The Koran is Trinitarian rather than anti-Trinitarian.  Many 
biblical notions are scattered in this book.  Much undescribable beauty adorns 
the Muslim ascetic heritage.  And finally, how many edifying souls have been 
baptized, not by the Church, but by the Church’s Bridegroom, as Nicholas 
Cabasilas so rightly puts it.197 
 
He emphasizes here the importance of humility for the Christian participant in 
dialogue, a theme often present in Orthodox spirituality.  Also, he suggests that it is 
possible for a Christian to read the Koran from a Trinitarian perspective, but on a 
spiritual instead of dogmatic level, in order to sense the presence and work there of 
Christ, through the Spirit as sent by the Father.  Metropolitan Georges also suggests 
that the Christian can benefit a great deal through discovery and dialogue with the 
Islamic mystical tradition (Sufism, or as Muslims call it, tasawwuf).  He was 
convinced that Christians could and should find a way within their own scriptural and 
theological tradition to recognize God at work within Islam and the lives of Muslims. 
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 Metropolitan Georges’ insistence that the WCC needed to develop a ‘theology 
of religions’ was criticized at various times by other members of the Council, who 
suggested that dialogues could be more productive if the Muslim and Christian 
participants would focus on humanitarian action, social justice, and peace efforts.198  
These individuals felt that Metropolitan Georges’ approach was often too theological 
and abstract.  However, in a statement to a WCC consultation on the theology of 
religions, he made it clear that he was not suggesting abstraction or religious 
syncretism.  He argued instead that true dialogue could only take place through the 
interaction of persons: 
Let me first suggest that what is more important than living faiths is living 
people whose depth are known to God, and who are capable of manifesting 
God to us…. Facing other religious structures and people, our spiritual 
endeavor invites an attitude of meekness, patience which is an imitation of 
God’s patience.  It is an attitude of eschatological expectation, a desire to eat 
the eternal passover with all people.  The non-Christian is as unique as a 
Christian, equally loved by God, possibly a source of edification for fellow 
human beings and a place of Epiphany.  We go to them with the humbleness 
of the poor.  We are vulnerable before them, ready to receive even Christ for 
them.199 
 
This approach, along with his earlier statements from 1969-1971 brought to the 
surface, through the context of Muslim-Christian dialogue, some longstanding 
internal barriers among Christians to successful engagement with those of other 
religions.   
For too long, and to the detriment of the WCC, member churches had 
struggled to truly commit to a theology of religions because they had refused to let go 
of their theological agendas, particularly with regard to mission.   This had been 
particularly marked in the case of relations between western Christians and the 
Muslim world.  With a long history of distrust and misperceptions going back to the 
time of the Crusades, many Christians had a difficult time admitting that Islam could 
be an alternative path to salvation.  Perhaps for this reason – even though as Peter 
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Riddell assesses the chosen topics were often ‘current and also touched upon certain 
controversial features [of Muslim-Christian relations]’200 – the WCC dialogues with 
Muslims during the last quarter of the twentieth century only achieved limited success 
because the Christian side had not clearly asserted how Islam could be a viable path to 
God.201   
For Metropolitan Georges, who had himself as a Lebanese Christian lived 
side-by-side with Muslims his entire life, the answer was clear.  He could not 
conceive of how a Muslim or a Christian could deny the possibility of salvation 
within the other’s tradition.  For example, at a dialogue meeting in 1987 at the 
Orthodox Academy of Crete in Kolymbari, which he led alongside his Muslim co-
chair, Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi, he stated, “A person who claims to be religious 
condemns himself to hell if he does not see, in love, the light of God on the face of 
one who is different.”202  Metropolitan George, throughout all of his work with the 
WCC, has been a longstanding supporter of real-life encounter between Muslims and 
Christians.  Unlike many of his detractors – who were concerned that he had gone too 
far in his efforts to make room for Muslims in the Divine plan of salvation – 
Metropolitan Georges had been in close contact with Muslims from childhood.  These 
experiences, perhaps more than anything else, shaped his views on Islam by enabling 
him to see God at work in the lives of his neighbors.  He demonstrated through his 
own example how Orthodox Christians, many of whom have lived a peaceful co-
existence with Muslims at the very least up to the last century, could serve as a bridge 
between Western Christianity and Islam.  His writings and attitudes show that the 
shared history between Eastern Christians and Muslims in certain regions of the world 
should be understood as a gift and an opportunity.  Metropolitan Georges challenges 
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his fellow Orthodox Christians to rediscover this gift and grow in their knowledge and 
love of God by encountering Him at work in the lives of pious Muslims.   
Far too often Orthodox Christians in this postmodern age have lamented the 
loss to the Muslims of their glorious past (Byzantine) civilization and have dwelt on 
what they have described as a subsequent period of ‘occupation’ under the Ottoman 
Turks.  What they have neglected to realize is that this type of thinking stems more 
from an imported concept of nationalism, as they have applied it to understand their 
past in a ‘modern’ way, than it does from an honest assessment of the positive and 
negative features of their history since the fall of the Christian centers of the East to 
Islam during the Muslim conquests.  More will be said on this theme in the next 
chapter.  Metropolitan Georges’ contributions to the WCC during the period under 
examination were important, both to the Protestant and Orthodox members of the 
council, because they demonstrated in a profound way the fruits of humility, honest 
self-examination, charity, and love with regard to encounter with those of other 
religions.203   
Where Metropolitan Georges presented to the WCC a theology of religions 
and showed a way to positive Muslim-Christian relations through discovery of a 
shared history and civilization, Archbishop Anastasios found points of contact 
through a rediscovery of mission as expressed through the Orthodox Christian 
tradition.  Like Metropolitan Georges, Archbishop Anastasios had already been 
involved in the ecumenical movement for many years by the time the WCC began to 
seriously address the question of inter-religious relations.204  He had been wrestling 
for some time before this, though, with the relationship between dialogue and 
mission.  His interest in mission began in the year 1959 when he helped found 
"Porefthentes" ("Go Ye"), “a missionary movement whose goal was to rekindle the 
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missionary conscience of the Orthodox Church, as well as to educate the non-
Orthodox world about the rich missionary heritage of the Eastern Church.”205  After 
setting out as a missionary in East Africa a few years later, he contracted such a bad 
case of malaria that he decided to leave Africa and devote himself instead to serious 
academic study of missiology.  At the same time, he took up studies in the history of 
religions, pursuing what had been a growing fascination with non-Christian 
religions.206  It was through the convergence these two interests that he became 
involved in the WCC’s work relating to other religions.    
Archbishop Anastasios played a key role as an Orthodox participant in a 
follow-up conference (Zurich 1970) to the first international multi-religious dialogue 
(Ajaltoun 1970) sponsored by the WCC.207  He also delivered an address at the 
second international multi-religious dialogue at Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1974.208  Like 
Metropolitan Georges, Archbishop Anastasios posed essential questions that helped 
the Council formulate a position for interacting with people of living faith and 
ideologies as it began its first phase of dialogues with Muslims during the period of 
1969-1975.   
It was during the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, that 
Archbishop Anastasios was able to articulate in the context of his work with the WCC 
and inter-religious dialogue his resolution of the inherent tensions between dialogue 
and mission.  In 1988 the WCC’s Commission on World Mission and Evangelism 
(CWME) organized a series of events to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 
important World Mission Conference at Tambaram in 1938.  Soon after, and in 
relation to these events, the WCC organized an inner-Christian dialogue at 
Mahabalipuram on the topic of mission and dialogue.  Archbishop Anastasios was 
104 
 
serving as moderator of the CWME at that time and therefore played a central role in 
the discussions that took place.   
In an important presentation that he made to fellow members of the Council, 
he reminded his audience that Orthodox Christians have a somewhat unique view of 
both mission and dialogue because of their theology and history.  He stated that:  
Christians in the west, having lived for many centuries in a more or less 
homogenous religious world, face the religious pluralism of our century as a 
new factor, threatening or challenging.  We are reminded, however, that the 
[Eastern] church has faced pluralism for the last twenty centuries…. In the 
Orthodox world we have no decision of an official ecclesiastical body on this 
matter.  The eastern church has allowed wide margins for personal freedom in 
thought and expression within the from of the living tradition.209 
 
In other words, diversity has always been inherent part of the religious experience, 
both internally and externally, of Orthodox Christians.  This, along with their 
theology that has required consensus and conformity in much fewer areas than in the 
traditions of Roman Catholicism or Protestantism, has allowed for greater flexibility 
in relations with other religions, according to the Archbishop.   
He went on in his address to discuss what he believed to be the essential 
aspects, historically and theologically, of the Eastern Orthodox view of other 
religions.  He then concluded that: 
Dialogue can contribute to transplanting new seeds from one culture to 
another and to bringing into maturity existing dormant seeds in the field of old 
religions.  Religions are organic wholes but, as they are experienced by living 
human beings, they are “living wholes” in development and evolution.  They 
have their own internal dynamism.  They receive influences, absorb new ideas 
coming to their environment; they adapt themselves to new challenges. 
 
Building on this notion that dialogue is essential, in part because it helps human 
beings of various religious traditions meet the new challenges faced by each 
generation, Archbishop Anastasios asserted that it could be constructive in fostering, 
“world peace, world justice, human dignity, the meaning of development, of human 
existence and history, and [the] natural environment.” 
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  Archbishop Anastasios also made the point that Christian mission is naturally 
connected to dialogue and that it is not in any way diminished because of it.  He 
cautioned those who might be tempted to forget about mission in their dialogue with 
non-Christians in this way: 
[N]obody has the right to minimize difficult issues in order to be courteous.  
Nobody would like a superficial type of dialogue.  In the last analysis the 
essence of the religious problem is the issue of Ultimate Reality, of Ultimate 
Truth.  And nobody has the right or the interest to castrate this force of human 
existence in order to assure a peaceful co-existence in the name of a unifying 
common denominator, an attitude that contributes to an ideological smoothing 
down…. the essential contribution of Christians is not to avoid, but to point to 
their own particularities and deeper spiritual experiences and certainties.210    
 
Speaking, perhaps, to certain members of the Council who had in some ways 
abandoned mission for dialogue – in part because of criticism they had received over 
certain attitudes and practices of western missionaries during the colonial age – the 
Archbishop asserts here that it is possible to convey one’s unique Christian views and 
experiences while also humbly opening one’s ears, mind, and heart to someone of 
another religious tradition. 
In his efforts to express his strong conviction about mission as an inner-
necessity for the Christian, the Archbishop stated that: 
In mission we proceed to the testimony of a personal experience and of 
certainty.  We witness our faith not as a concept or even mental discovery, but 
as a gift of God’s grace.  An underestimation or suspension of this personal 
witness would mean negation of the gospel.  The final aim is to share in his 
life and glory.  It is about a personal knowledge that comes through love 
(agape)…. If we believe that the most precious gift is this being in Christ, we 
cannot keep this deep experience for ourselves.211 
 
In this way, he was able to resolve the tension that some had felt – and that he himself 
had endured as a missionary and a student of both missiology and the history of 
religions – in their efforts to balance the two important Christian notions of mission 
and dialogue.  Only by entering into the self-emptying love of Christ through “sincere 
self-criticism and repentance” could the Christian, according to Archbishop 
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Anastasios, enter into true dialogue with people of other faiths in order to “live their 
mission in Christ’s way.”212 
 Archbishop Anastasios continued to pursue these dual themes of mission and 
dialogue in his work with the WCC in the last decade of the twentieth century.  
Though he had not originally been scheduled to speak at a consultation he had 
planned to attend in 1993, at the last minute the organizers invited him to present his 
views on other religions from his Orthodox perspective.  The meeting – held in Baar, 
Switzerland in 3-8 September and referred to as Baar II – brought together members 
of the Council who had been involved in a significant way with inter-religious 
dialogue.  Its purpose was to assess the WCC’s progress and positions from the time 
of Baar I consultation, which had been the first major attempt to clarify the ‘where the 
churches [in the WCC] stand’ on the question of the theology of religions.213  
Archbishop Anastasios wisely framed the problem, which had not been adequately 
resolved by the Council in the years since his 1988 address, at the beginning of his 
presentation: 
[H]ow can we Christians, while remaining faithful to our Christian principles 
and love for Christ, encounter and understand theologically the other 
religions?  This burning question – for all present in this room – has been for 
many years not only an intellectual problem, but also an existential challenge, 
sometimes very painful.214 
 
He planted the seed here for the notion he developed throughout his presentation that 
part of the difficulty for many western Christians in the Council in reconciling 
mission and dialogue had been their very different experience from Orthodox 
Christians with those of other religions, and particularly with Islam.   
As he went on with his address, he moved closer to what he believed was at 
the heart of the problem for some members of the Council.  Again, referring to his 
own experience, he said: 
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Speaking more personally in this short meditation on the Orthodox spiritual 
and theological experience, I would like to note…. Christians in the East have 
often lived within societies having cultural, linguistic and religious pluralism.  
Thus they developed an attitude of respect, tolerance and understanding 
towards other religious experiences…. Since for us Christ is the absolute one, 
there is no need to diminish the others in order to exalt his magnificence.  His 
greatness, always revealed in the mystery of humility and love, does not 
despise anyone and anything, but shows the truth that exists even in the most 
simple inspiration within the history and the world.215 
 
The implication here was that Christians of the West, unlike Christians of the East, 
have not always enjoyed such positive interaction with non-Christians and that this 
was due in part because of their less than stellar notions of the theology of religions.  
In referring to those who might “diminish the others [non-Christians] in order to exalt 
his [Christ’s] magnificence,” he subtly brings to the surface common attitudes and 
practices of many Western Christians in the not so distant past.   
This reality was something certain Protestant members of the council had had 
difficulty facing, because it challenged them to critically reassess the behavior of their 
churches relating to non-Christian religions and their thinking generally about 
mission.  For so much of their history, Western Christians (both Catholics and 
Protestants) have perceived themselves to be engaged in a struggled for the hearts and 
minds of non-Christians:  From the time of the Crusades when they were literally at 
war with Islam, through the colonial period when they were actively involved in 
converting non-Christians of all sorts to the Christian religion and civilization, and up 
to the twentieth century when their governments forced peoples of all creeds and 
cultures into the quasi-Christian (at least some would see it this way) political 
construct of the nation-state.  The Archbishop’s address gently pointed out how this 
history had contributed to continued problems in the WCC’s dialogue efforts with 
Muslims. 
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Archbishop Anastasios, while reminding his audience of the ways in which 
Christians (Eastern and Western) can learn from the mistakes of their past in relating 
to other religions, went on to propose another notion that he thought might help the 
Council come to terms with the tensions posed by the concepts of mission with 
dialogue.  He used the Greek term martyria to further support his assertion that 
Christians needed to do a better job of entering into the ‘mystery of Christ’s humility 
and love’ towards all people.  He stated first that, “the Triune God…embraces all 
people, the whole creation in a mysterious way, not clearly revealed to us…. 
[Therefore we Christians should] keep our eyes, our thoughts and hearts open this 
reality, to this mystery,” and then brought in the notion of martyria.  As he put it: 
I have always experienced difficulty with the word “mission.”  Even as a 
member of the Commission for World Mission and Evangelism (CWME), I 
had proposed the word “martyria,” which I find clearly in the New 
Testament…[quotes Acts 1:8].  I saw something, I know something and I give 
my witness, my martyria; I am so sure of this witness that I am even ready to 
give my blood: not to give my blood in war, but to give my blood and accept 
suffering for my weakness and my own certainty.216 
 
Having established a foundation for why Christians should engage in ‘mission’ – 
because they have seen and know something about Christ and therefore must share 
what they have experienced with others – he went on to assess how they could go 
about this task.  He stated:   
Everything that [the Church] possesses or bequeaths is on behalf of the world 
of humanity.  Witness can start in silence through participating in the pain of 
others…. Mission cannot be confined to offering education, health-care and 
means for external development.  It has to offer to everyone, especially to the 
poor and the oppressed, the faith that every human being has in Christ a 
unique value, that being is created in the likeness of God that our destiny is to 
become Christ-like, to partake in his divine glory.217   
 
Archbishop Anastasios provided an alternate perspective to the Council, which in 
many ways was a distinctly Orthodox contribution,218 on what it means to be involved 
in mission.  He asserted that fulfilling the Great Commission (Matthew 28.19-20) has 
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less to do with programs and activities than it does with relationships and attitudes.  
One must first cultivate an intimate relationship with God, which will naturally cause 
a person to reach out to others in order to spread the divine love throughout the world.  
Archbishop Anastasios showed through his work with the WCC during the years 
covered in this section how engaging in dialogue with peoples of other faiths is an 
appropriate and important way through which Christians can build relationships with 
those whom Christ loves and through whom the Holy Spirit is at work. 
Perhaps no Orthodox Christian was able to have such a direct impact on the 
WCC’s reflection and interaction with Islam during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century than Tarek Mitri, a layperson from Lebanon.  Where Metropolitan Georges 
contributed a theology of religions to the WCC and provided a reminder about the 
shared history and civilization of Orthodox Christians and Muslims, and Archbishop 
Anastasios offered solutions to issues associated with relationship between dialogue 
and mission, Dr. Mitri organized a number of encounters through which he and the 
other participants were able to delve fully into some of the most pressing issues of 
concern to both Christians and Muslims.   
 The World Council of Churches was very eager to appoint Tarek Mitri as its 
Programme Secretary for Christian-Muslim Dialogue to fill the spot of the previous 
director Stuart E. Brown because as a Lebanese Christian he had substantial 
experience with Islam and contacts with Muslims.  Though Ulrich Schoen 
provisionally headed the directorship for two years, Dr. Mitri became director in 1991 
and served until he resigned his post in 2006.   After receiving his doctorate from the 
University of Paris, Dr. Mitri had developed somewhat of a reputation for himself as a 
specialist in history, sociology, and Muslim-Christian relations long before the 
Council seriously considered him as a candidate for the Program Secretary post.  He 
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had held academic positions at Université Saint Joseph in Beirut and Balamand 
University, worked for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch on church and 
interfaith issues, and participated in WCC conferences on inter-religious dialogue and 
contributed to its publications.219  Additionally, since the Council had long viewed as 
significant the contributions of the Orthodox to its dialogue efforts with Muslims – 
because of figures such as Metropolitan Georges and Archbishop Anastasios, as well 
as the long history of Orthodox Christians living side-by-side peacefully with 
Muslims – Tarek Mitri was seen as an excellent choice to lead the sub-unit’s efforts 
into the next century.220   
What is interesting in looking at Tarek Mitri’s body of work for the WCC 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century is that even before his appointment as 
Programme Secretary he had identified three of the most crucial issues relating to 
Christian-Muslim relations, which then played out as central themes in the dialogues 
sponsored by the WCC during the first decade of his tenure with the Council.  
Looking at future prospects and common perspectives for dialogue from the vantage 
point of 1987 he suggested that Muslims and Christians should focus their attention 
on: 1) a “rediscovery of the national bond and its cultural foundation,” particularly in 
nations with significant Muslim and Christian populations; 2) “a renewed, concrete 
approach to the complexities of religion and state in a pluralist society,” and 3) “a 
commitment to the human rights of individuals as well as communities.”221  Though 
Tarek Mitri’s contributions to the WCC were many and his written work vast, the 
analysis that follows will examine his efforts, and by extension that of participants at 
WCC dialogue meetings, in these three important areas.  It will be noted that Dr. 
Mitri’s diligent efforts marked both significant progress for the WCC in the latter part 
of last century and a key Orthodox contribution to Muslim-Christian dialogue.   
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The first area on Tarek Mitri’s agenda had to do with Muslims and Christians 
rediscovering a common “national bond” and “cultural foundation” upon which to 
build improved relations between their two religious communities.  Though he 
acknowledged that there had been any number of flawed examples of nationalism in 
the past, Dr. Mitri emphasized that Muslims and Christians should look to some of 
this modern notion’s positive aspects as well.  He said for example that: 
[A] number of attitudes implicit within it [nationalism] remain not only valid 
but desirable.  A less alarmist analysis of the “Islamic Awakening,” a 
commitment to dialogue and an awareness of the depth of the socio-cultural 
collective identity which transcends confessional barriers, can open the way 
for broad cooperation between Christians and Muslims…. [There is a] need 
for greater attention to the cultural content of the common identity and an urge 
to rehabilitate the idea of nationhood.  Cultural Arabness should accommodate 
differences and be aware that the greatest moments in the Arab history 
benefited from pluralism.222 
 
Here we see an attempt by Dr. Mitri to persuade Arab Muslims and Christians (many 
of whom are Orthodox) to look to their shared Islamicate Civilization as inspiration 
for a modern nationalism, with an emphasis on religious pluralism.  In doing so, he 
implies that nationalism itself should not be seen merely as a tool of the West for its 
modernization programs, but as a concept that in some respects has roots in early 
Arab and Islamic thought, which envisioned a just society in which religious diversity 
would be protected.   
Tarek Mitri’s reputation and diverse contacts among Muslims and Christians 
in the Middle East enabled him to afford the WCC some unique opportunities in the 
mid-1990s.  As a native of Lebanon, Dr. Mitri as able to witness both the terrible 
destruction to his country from the intense conflicts during 1975-1990 and the coming 
together of Muslims and Christians of various sects to rebuild their nation after this 
period of civil war.  He saw some of the positive fruits of the exchanges and 
interactions after the conflicts at his own Orthodox University of Balamand, where in 
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1995 the institution had established its Centre for Christian-Muslim Studies in order 
to sponsor an ongoing education programme and opportunities for regular 
consultation between Muslims and Christians from Lebanon and around the globe.   
Lebanon seemed to be a bright spot and a place where Dr. Mitri’s hopes for a 
rediscovery of the common “national bond” and “cultural foundation” between 
Christians and Muslims seemed to be coming together.  For example, he stated the 
following in an issue of Current Dialogue from the period: 
[M]uch is presently said about a renewed vocation for the country as a 
privileged space for Christian-Muslim encounter and dialogue.  This is often 
expressed as reaffirmation of a sort of historical role in bridge-building 
between Muslims and Christians that many Lebanese like to attribute, not 
without reason, to their country.  Such a reaffirmation is manifested by an 
increasing number of initiatives in dialogue and cooperation motivated by a 
national discourse praising the riches and promises of a “shared living.” These 
initiatives, whether they engage actively in a “dialogue of ideas” or not, often 
state the primacy of the “dialogue of life.”223 
 
Because of his faith in the Lebanese as examples for others, as well as other pragmatic 
reasons, Dr. Mitri’s office at the WCC sponsored two important encounters in 
Balamand, Lebanon during the summer of 1997: 1) A Colloquium on Mutual Views 
and Changing Relations between Christians and Muslims, 27-29 August 1997, which 
evaluated Christian-Muslim dialogue over the previous 30 years and focused on 
prospects for the future and 2) A Consultation on Cooperation in Christian-Muslim 
Studies, 29-31 August 1997, at which 17 institutions of higher learning from 5 
continents were represented.  Having long been a critic of the WCC’s past dialogues, 
which because of their structure and focus he claimed had gained little credibility 
among Muslims224, these two events gave Dr. Mitri the opportunity to bring a 
representative and significant group of scholars and leaders together to discuss the 
important issues of everyday life that constantly influenced dialogue. 
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 A second area of concern for Tarek Mitri when he began his work on the staff 
of the WCC, was the relationship between religion and the state in the modern 
pluralistic societies.  Though much of his work and that of other dialogue participants 
touched on this theme, at least five of the dialogue meetings that occurred from the 
period of 1991 to the end of 2000 dealt directly with issues associated with the topic: 
1) Religion, Law, and Society (November 1993 in Nyon, Switzerland); 2) Religion in 
the Contemporary World (November 1996 in Teheran, Iran); 3) Religion and Co-
Citizenship (October 1997 in Cairo, Egypt); 4) Religious Freedom (July 1998 in 
Beirut, Lebanon); and 5) Christian-Muslim Conference on Communal Tensions 
(November 2000 in Limassol, Cyprus).  Though these meetings covered a variety of 
topics a nearly constant feature had to do with communal and political majority-
minority relations and the issues associated with religious freedoms and limitations.   
Because the discussion of religious freedom inevitably involves the legal 
system and its implementation in a giving country, the colloquium in 1993 (along 
with a related one that had taken place the previous year in Geneva) served as a 
foundation for the further discussions that ensued in the other meetings mentioned 
above.  It also resulted in the publication of a book, edited by Tarek Mitri, which 
addressed the issues relating to Muslim-Christian relations because of calls by some 
Muslims for greater implementation of Islamic Law (Shari’ah) in various parts of the 
world.  In the introduction to the text, Dr. Mitri mentioned that part of the reason for 
sponsoring such as gathering was to clarify for both Christians and Muslims both the 
barriers to the establishment of a “coherent system [of Islamic law] that they 
[Islamists] can immediately apply.”225  Dr. Mitri concluded that though in many ways 
it was just a start on a number of fronts, the contributions of the participants were able 
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to address some of the key barriers to dialogue on issues germane to relations between 
religion and the state.  He said:  
Many Christians do often think that Islam, in its claim to embrace all aspects 
of life, favors a “theocratic” model similar to that which is familiar from the 
history of Christendom.  Many Muslims, on the other hand, are inclined to 
suggest that Christians today have been led, through a socio-historical process 
which has been resisted but ultimately accepted, to reduce their religion to a 
strictly spiritual and private affair.  The former position fails to recognize that 
religious authority and political power need not be amalgamated in Islam…. 
The latter position likewise falls short in failing to admit that Christian faith 
cannot be isolated from the realms of society and politics…. It is hoped that 
such an unprecedented Christian-Muslim discussion [inspired by the questions 
posed at the colloquia], initiated by the WCC, will enrich and stimulate the 
much-needed dialogue at the national level.226 
 
Here we see another example of Dr. Mitri trying to reach out to Muslims and establish 
the credibility of the WCC dialogues.  He knew that it is a fact that within the great 
diversity of Muslim responses to modernity and of views on the relationship between 
religion and the state, most Muslims would agree that Islamic law should play a more 
prominent role in society.  It was, therefore, a brilliant move for Dr. Mitri to choose 
shari’ah as one of the key topics in the WCC sponsored dialogues.  This gave him, 
and the Council, the opportunity to make a statement about the intention of the WCC 
in its Muslim-Christian dialogues, as well as dispel misunderstanding on both the 
Muslim and Christian side of the dialogue.    
A third key theme that Tarek Mitri addressed during the last decade of the 
twentieth century through his work with the WCC, is human rights.  Through Dr. 
Mitri’s leadership, the WCC initiated two dialogues in successive years on the topic 
of human rights: 1) Religion and Human Rights (November 1994 in Berlin) and 2) 
Towards a Christian-Muslim Statement of Principles on Human Rights (September 
1994 on Malta).  A few years later, the WCC sponsored another consultation to deal 
specifically with the question of Religious Freedom (July, 1999 in Beirut, Lebanon).   
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After announcing that the participants in dialogue in 1994 had, “affirm[ed], 
together, principles of common citizenship, religious liberty, dignity of the person, the 
rights of women”227 – all on the basis of “justice and equality” – Dr. Mitri continued 
to address human rights on subsequent occasions.  On this theme he often urged 
participants in dialogue to be patient, because of the level of complexity associated 
with it and the challenges faced in bringing any sort of resolution.  Addressing why 
the question of human rights has been one of the “thorny and lively, issues” on the 
Christian-Muslim dialogue agenda, Dr. Mitri stated: 
[H]uman rights, including community rights…are entangled in a dual 
problem.  On one hand, they are selectively instrumentalized in the broader 
context of domination.  On the other hand, a number of countries invoke the 
right to cultural difference in order to justify despotism and repression in the 
“developing” world.  Moreover, human rights advocacy is confined, at times, 
to intra-Christian and intra-Muslim solidarity.228 
 
In other words, the lack of coordinated effort among Christians and Muslims in 
certain parts of the world to come up with a shared religious basis for human rights 
had actually enabled oppressive national leaders to exploit religion to divide, 
discriminate, and deny rights and privileges to their citizens.     
 Dr. Mitri noted also in summing up the dialogues that had taken place up to 
the mid-1990s that: 
[The] universality [of human rights] remains in question until it is possible to 
reconcile individual rights and community rights and look upon them in 
relation to duty.  Such an understanding would be the basis of a Christian-
Muslim commitment to defend human rights, including minority rights, 
wherever they are violated or threatened.229 
 
Here Dr. Mitri emphasizes the importance of Muslims and Christians working side-
by-side as world citizens to protect the uniqueness and value of each human person, 
made in the image of God and reaching full potential as he or she relates to others in 
community.   
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 Continuing with this theme at the end of the century, Tarek Mitri took the 
issue of human rights even further by venturing into the often-troublesome areas of 
religious plurality and minority rights.230  In discussing the question of religious 
plurality, Dr. Mitri suggested that more than ever before religions could be a 
significant catalyst to bring people together.  He said: 
[I]n a religiously plural context, whether rooted in history or recent, a 
secularist option continues to be widespread.  Religions are seen as divisive.  
Such an assumption is, more than ever before, questionable.  Failing to 
recognize the power of religious identity, and the sense of meaning it gives in 
a world threatened by its loss, may defeat its own purpose, that of integration 
and the consolidation of civil and political rights of all, across the boundaries 
of religious affiliation.231 
 
Here he argued that religion would continue to be significant for the human 
community, as it would provide meaning and a sense of identity in a way that nothing 
else could.  Contrary to the general secularist opinion of some, however, Dr. Mitri did 
not feel that increased religiosity would automatically lead to civil or political strife.  
In fact, he tried to make the case that as adherents of various traditions grow in 
knowledge and practice of their own religions, they will at the same time grow closer 
to those of other religions.  In other words, many if not all of the world’s great 
religions, in their most authentic expressions, reach out to all human persons, 
regardless of their religions orientation.   
Dr. Mitri went on to caution his audience, however, in the same presentation 
by saying that: 
At present, many examples suggest that living together across religious 
differences has to be constantly reconstructed and its model reinvented.  This 
reconstruction and reinvention is not only a matter to be negotiated by actors 
in a particular local or national context.  It is affected by the global power 
relations.  It will have to be discussed whether and in what ways inter-
religious dialogue and cooperation could contribute towards changing them.232   
 
In other words, the best path to strengthening the role of religion in society and 
bringing the religions together might not be readily apparent.  Dr. Mitri argued that 
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the complexity of this question was in large part due to the simultaneously local and 
global concerns that were often found to be in conflict with each other.  He, therefore, 
suggested that fruitful inter-religious dialogue in the twenty-first century would 
increasingly need to be flexible in its structure in order to adapt to changes on the 
local, national, regional, and international levels.  He did not, however, find such 
dialogue to be insignificant in terms of the power play on the world stage.  In this, he 
presented a hopeful picture for the religions, indicating that together they could 
influence significant change, even in an age dominated by secularism.   
 One further item that Tarek Mitri addressed in his presentations in 1999 was 
the question of minority rights in a Christian-Muslim perspective.  From the time of 
the cold war there had always been a fundamental disagreement between capitalist 
and socialist or communist nation-states on the question of human rights.  The former 
had almost exclusively emphasized the civil and political rights of individuals (as 
expressed in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), whereas the 
latter had wanted to add to this things like the right to education, physical sustenance 
(food), and a fair work environment (as expressed in the U.N. Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights).  The debate and variation on emphases with regard to 
human rights continued well beyond the cold war and found its way into the inter-
religious dialogues of the WCC in the late 20th century.  Tarek Mitri realized that 
some of the issues, in fact, had become significant barriers to progress in inter-
religious dialogue, particularly in the area of Muslim-Christian relations.  Likely for 
this reason, he tried to dissuade participants in dialogue to avoid the usual dead-end 
rhetoric surrounding human rights and religious persecution by focusing instead on 
the victims themselves.  He said, for example: 
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[T]here are forces in the West, religious and political, which try to deal with 
the issue of religious persecution in a way ensuring that concern for human 
rights, including religious freedom, takes precedence over ideological and 
political motivations.  We are aware that such forces underline that the defense 
of religious freedom is indivisible, no matter who the victims or the 
perpetrators of its violation are.  But the punitive logic which is increasingly 
invited does not promote tolerance, mutual trust and inter-religious harmony.  
In most cases, it does not help the victims of persecution, which it claims to 
help.  A logic of empowerment of the victims, a strategy of prevention through 
consciousness-raising, dialogue and inter-religious cooperation, is more 
effective.233 
 
Dr. Mitri spoke eloquently here about the ways that religious minorities, which would 
include Eastern Christians living among Muslims, have suffered because of the 
shortsighted policies of Western governments and organizations.  For so long, in fact 
centuries in some cases, the intervention of foreign powers, even of the same religion, 
has proven to be detrimental locally to the religious minority community.  Despite the 
good work of the WCC, Tarek Mitri reminded participants that inter-religious 
dialogue is often most needed and effective on the local level, among neighbors.     
The participation of Metropolitan Georges, Archbishop Anastasios, and Tarek 
Mitri in the work of the WCC with non-Christian religions during the last quarter of 
the twentieth century was of great significance.  Their tireless efforts during that 
period, to which one could add as well their continued work to the present day, and 
commitment both to the WCC’s objectives and to their partners in dialogue 
strengthened the Council’s reputation worldwide.  It also helped establish a 
theological and practical framework for Orthodox Christians to engage in dialogue 
with those of other faiths.  Drawing upon the historical and natural amity between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims, they were particularly able to establish important 
bridges between Christianity and Islam, setting the stage for a new era of inter-
religious dialogue sponsored by the WCC as well as any number of other organized 
bodies, whether religious, diplomatic, or humanitarian.  There were others as well 
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who worked in tandem with and parallel to the WCC during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century in order to establish more permanent, organized channels for 
dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims throughout the world.  In fact, a 
very significant partnership emerged which merits close examination and, thus, will 
be the focus of the final section of this chapter. 
 
THE ORTHODOX CENTER FOR THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH  
 
The most focused and sustained dialogue between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims during the last quarter of the twentieth century occurred through a joint 
venture of the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (based in Amman, 
Jordan) and the Orthodox Center for the Ecumenical Patriarch (based in Chambesy-
Geneva, Switzerland).  The vision was to establish more permanent, organized 
channels for serious interaction and discussion on topics of mutual interest to 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims throughout the world.  Though the conferences 
included a diverse group of participants, based on their expertise on the topics chosen 
for each colloquium, continuity was maintained as well through the oversight and 
presence of Metropolitan Damaskenos Papandreou of Switzerland (on the Christian 
side) and His Royal Highness Prince El-Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan (on the Muslim 
side).  This was a profound and serious effort to engage in academic dialogue over the 
long-term and one could assert that it was inspired in large part by the friendship and 
respect between these two men.  Metropolitan Damaskenos characterized it this way: 
We met as old friends and discussed serious matters candidly…. [O]ur 
willingness to contribute constructively to the achievement of our joint 
objectives illuminates occasional shady areas with the radiance of the common 
spiritual values of the two major monotheistic religions.234   
 
In other words, their faith and commitment to a shared vision brought them together 
and sustained their efforts in organizing these events, every year or two between 1986 
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and the end of the century.  The venture persevered despite the Gulf War, which 
Metropolitan Damaskenos admitted, “stole away some of the original enthusiasm 
regarding the prospects of the dialogue.”  He credited his friend, H.R.H. Prince El-
Hassan, for keeping the vision alive during such dark times: 
Without his unshakeable insistence on the idea of the dialogue’s necessity we 
should confess that its continuation, particularly following the Gulf crisis, 
would have been fraught with problems, not to say impossible.  We thank him 
for his faith in the vision which maintains the bridge of our common hope in 
use, and gives us all the strength to carry out our duty with responsibility 
towards ourselves and also towards other people.235  
 
The warm sentiments expressed here show once again the significance of a friendship, 
nurtured by the faith of a Muslim and a Christian as they worked side by side to serve 
God together, despite the differences between their respective religions.    
These Muslim-Christian consultations alternated locations between Amman, 
Jordan and Chambésy, Switzerland or one of the cities that serve as main centers of 
Orthodox Christianity.  Though a full scholarly analysis of these events and their 
significance has yet to be written, they have been summarized and addressed briefly 
in two articles.  The first was written by Gregorios Ziakas and was titled, ‘The 
Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and the Dialogue with Islam,’ Phanari: 400 
Chronia (Istanbul: Ecumenical Patriarchate, 2001), 575-725 (in English and Greek) 
and the second was by George Papademetriou titled, ‘Two Traditions, One Space: 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Dialogue,’ Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, v. 15, n. 1 55-64, January 2004.  This study will not summarize yet again 
the events that took place.  However, for convenience the reader will find below (in 
Table 1) some basic information about the sponsored colloquiums from when they 
began in 1986 to the end of the century:236 
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Table 1: Dialogue Sponsored by the Orthodox Center for the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute from 1986-1998 
  
Date  Location Title/Theme Report/Publication Overview 
17-19 
Nov. 
1986 
Chambésy, 
Switzerland 
Authority and 
Religion  
Episkepsis, 17(368) – 
Geneva, 1986 
Historical and 
contemporary views of 
authority and use of 
power in the two 
traditions. 
20-25 
Nov. 
1987 
Amman, 
Jordan 
Models of 
Historical Co-
existence 
Between 
Muslims and 
Christians and 
Future 
Prospects  
Documents of Muslim-
Christian Dialogue, 59 
(Amman: Aal al-Bayt 
Institute for Islamic 
Thought, 1987) 
Analysis of periods of 
peaceful co-existence 
between the two faiths 
to extract enduring 
criteria. 
12-15 
Dec. 
1988 
Chambésy, 
Switzerland 
Peace and 
Justice in the 
Traditions of 
the Two 
Monotheistic 
Religions 
Episkepsis, 20(411) – 
Geneva, 1989 
Examination of peace 
and justice building on 
findings and proposals 
from previous 
consultations. 
10-14 
Sept. 
1989 
Istanbul, 
Turkey 
Religious 
Pluralism  
Episkepsis, 20(426) – 
Geneva, 1989 
Pluralism as 
something that 
enriches the faith of 
all. 
26-28 
July 
1993 
Amman, 
Jordan 
Youth and the 
Values of 
Modernization  
Episkepsis, 24(494) – 
Geneva, 1993 & Youth 
& the Values of 
Modernization 
(Amman: Royal 
Academy of Islamic 
Civilization Research, 
1994) – papers 
The “role of religion 
in appeasing the spirit 
of conflict and in 
propounding the value 
of moderation in the 
relations between 
nations.” (Ziakas 
paraphrasing Met. 
Demaskinos) 
8-10 
Sept. 
1994 
Athens, 
Greece 
Education for 
Understanding 
and 
Cooperation   
Episkepsis, 25(510) – 
Geneva, 1994 and D. 
Papademetriou, 
Theologia 69(2): 1998 
Fostering common 
spiritual values and 
dialogue through 
education. 
 
3-5 
June 
1996 
Amman, 
Jordan 
The 
Philosophy of 
the 
Educational 
System in 
Islam and 
Christianity 
Episkepsis, 27(532) – 
Geneva, 1996 and The 
Educational Systems 
in Islam and 
Christianity (Amman: 
Royal Academy of 
Islamic Civilization 
Research, 1997) – 
papers 
Addressing the 
“various distortions 
and entrenchments of 
the historical past,” as 
perpetuated (too often 
by formal & informal 
education) through the 
generations. 
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3-5 
June 
1997 
Istanbul, 
Turkey 
Perspectives of 
Cooperation 
and 
Participation 
between 
Christians & 
Muslims on 
Threshold of 
the of the 
Third 
Millennium 
 
Episkepsis, 28(545) – 
Geneva, 1997 
An analysis from 
Muslim and Christian 
participants of past 
examples of 
coexistence between 
the two religions on 
the local, regional, and 
international levels. 
10-12 
Nov. 
1998 
Amman, 
Jordan 
Muslims and 
Christians in 
Modern 
Society: 
Images of the 
Other and the 
Meaning of 
Citizenship  
Episkepsis, 29(563) – 
Geneva, 1998 
Changing views in 
religious self-identity 
and images of the 
religious other.  
Nationalism and 
protections for those 
of all religions within 
a society. 
 
 
It would be useful at this point to give a brief presentation and analysis of 
some key extracts made by Metropolitan Damaskenos throughout the course of the 
colloquiums.  This would be advantageous both to see if one can perceive a 
progression in the thought of the primary Orthodox participant in this joint venture in 
dialogue and to give some idea of Metropolitan Damaskenos’ contribution generally 
as one of the key Orthodox leaders engaged in dialogue with Muslims during the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. 
The following quotation is from the very first official consultation lead by 
Metropolitan Damaskenos and H.R.H. Prince El-Hassan.  In just a few words it 
outlines the basic tenor that the Metropolitan envisions for the proposed series of 
dialogues.  He states simply that:  
[T]his interreligious collaboration, based on reciprocal respect, should exclude 
all syncretism as well as any attempt to impose one religion over others.  We 
are persuaded that by partnering in the work of God we can progress in this 
ministry in common with all men of good will who devote themselves to 
research and true peace for the good of the human community.237 
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In other words, the Metropolitan first wants to put to rest any suspicions and 
accusations that the encounters would be for the purpose of creating some kind new 
religion that would combine watered-down versions of both Islam and Christianity.  
Secondly, he clarifies that it is not only possible, but imperative that Muslims and 
Christians – particularly those engaged in the colloquiums – work together in joint 
service to the one true God.  By extension, he notes as well that they ought not just 
work with each other for the common good, but also alongside any person, regardless 
of religious orientation, who strives to increase good will among all peoples.   
Skipping forward to the third consultation, from which the next quotation was 
selected, one can perceive that Metropolitan Damaskenos and the group that he and 
the Crown-Prince represent are trying to make sense of the ups and downs of the 
relationship between Orthodox Christians and Muslims throughout history.  The 
Metropolitan says that:    
Over the course of history, relations [between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims] have known fluctuations, but there has always been a great desire 
for peaceful coexistence.  The experience of history confirms it and the 
sources have conserved relatively rich material for continued research – 
notwithstanding any temporary crises – on the peaceful coexistence between 
Christians and Muslims.238 
 
One can see here that he feels it important to make the case that overall relations 
between Muslims and the Christians of the East have been positive, open, and 
peaceful.  He also encourages participants to consider the more negative examples 
and experiences as isolated events, both from a geographical and historical 
perspective, and to continue to search for positive examples upon which to further 
build constructive relations and dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.   
By the time this group of Muslim-Christian interlocutors met for their forth 
encounter, it seems they had begun to identify some common goals, or at least some 
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common foes.  Setting the tone through the opening address to the participants, 
Metropolitan Damaskenos put it this way: 
It is not conceivable, nor desirable to ignore our differences and feed the 
ambition to create a supra-religion, in the sense that all the differences would 
disappear as by a miracle.  Our goal is first to better understand our 
differences in order to then accept each other and finally to respect each other.  
It is precisely that spirit that should prevail in these encounters between 
Muslims who want to understand Christianity and Christians who desire to 
comprehend Islam: respect for the other, respect for ourselves, and respect for 
God.  This rapprochement will make us capable, I am sure, of becoming aware 
of what is at the heart of a church and a mosque – that humility through which 
man recognizes his nothingness – both the realization of being profoundly 
human and that the danger of our era is found less in the conflict between the 
Gospel and the Qur’an but rather in the harmful idolatry of materialism, which 
in our day represents the major menace in both the East and the West.239 
 
It seems that his first objective is to set the group apart from others at the end of the 
twentieth century that were in the habit of taking an essentialist approach to religious 
dialogue, glossing over the very real differences that make each religion distinct from 
another.  Indeed, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, even the World Council of 
Churches had from time to time been accused of succumbing to this temptation.  The 
Metropolitan’s second point, however, goes a bit deeper by identifying a common 
value and conversely a common enemy for both Muslims and Christians.  He argues 
that materialism, and the spiritual void caused by modernity that it attempts to fill in 
the human heart, should be fought by Muslims and Christians alike.  In fact, he 
implies that both religions collectively serve their calling by providing an antidote to 
materialism, which is presented as a kind of malignancy that feeds on a person’s soul.   
With the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and the advent of the 
Gulf War toward the end of the century, it is no wonder that Metropolitan 
Damaskenos and the other organizers of this series of consultations were feeling 
anxious about the future of such gatherings.  It seems that in many ways, both to each 
other and to their co-religionists at home they had to defend the validity and 
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usefulness of Muslim-Christian dialogue in a world where Islam and Christianity 
were reputedly warring forces or at least fueled the opposing parties of the wars in 
several places around the globe.  Responding particularly to the atrocities perpetuated 
by Orthodox Christians (and other Christians) against Muslims and vice versa in the 
Balkans at that time, Metropolitan Damaskenos had this to say during the sixth 
consultation: 
If our religions demand respect for the principles of moderation and if our 
faithful desire peaceful coexistence, then how does one explain the persistence 
of a religious tolerance?  The response to this question, for sure, should not be 
limited to invoking certain political ends or certain traumatizing historical 
experiences on both sides…. [W]e are obliged to bend ourselves in common to 
our own responsibilities and omissions of simple habit – knowingly or 
unknowingly…. We lose our way by the local or conjunctive crises by 
devoting ourselves to the simple confrontations and in that way lose the 
unique chance to witness together to the common and abysmal spiritual 
problems of contemporary man.  By behaving this way, we have arrived at the 
point where our religions, in lieu of being the only authentic and viable 
solutions to the problems, have themselves become the part of the problem.240 
 
Then at the seventh consultation he said: 
[I]t is our duty to describe the fundamental objectives of our interfaith 
dialogue clearly, so as not to lose our way in senseless vacillation between 
problems and objectives.  If we do not know in what direction we wish to 
proceed, we will need five times the strength in order to arrive there, where 
our common duty calls us.  Put otherwise, we must, at the very least, describe 
the main orientation of our common duty, even though the objective 
preconditions may not yet be in place for us to follow through, or to realize it 
in fact.241 
 
In both comments one can see the Metropolitan pleading with the participants at the 
colloquium and beyond to do some self-analysis in order to discover the ways in 
which their own attitudes and actions (or lack of actions) might have a bearing on 
what was going on around them.  He emphasizes that though perhaps not caused by 
Islam or Christianity per se, the horrible violence and mayhem witnessed in the 
Balkans and the Middle East at that time where indicative of a deeply imbedded 
spiritual crisis among those who claim allegiance to Islam or Orthodox Christianity.  
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Speaking most pointedly to those of his own tradition, he challenges his fellow 
Christians to identify the ways in which this toxic misuse of religion had entered the 
churches and to discover how to remove it.  He also urges the participants not to be 
discouraged by what is going on around them.  He asks them to remember their long-
term goals and objectives for their common work, even when conditions might delay 
any meaningful implementation.  This point is repeated by the Metropolitan with even 
more specificity at the eighth colloquium, in which he states: 
[This] interreligious dialogue between Orthodoxy and Islam attempts – with 
tenacity and a sense of continuity, despite adverse local and international 
conditions – to set in place not only the historic models, but also the future 
perspectives of Christians and Muslims in common effort to bring to the 
foreground the common spiritual values of the two religions, values that are 
necessary to defend peace, social justice, and human rights on the local, 
regional, and global levels.242 
 
Metropolitan Demaskenos identifies here at least three values shared by Christians 
and Muslims: peace, social justice, and human rights.  He again affirms that these 
three do not change, even when the temporary and often localized crises are fueled by 
violent reprisals, injustice, and suspension of individual rights in the name of religion.  
Turning finally to the very last gathering of this group of Muslims and 
Christians prior to the close of the century, it is worth pondering the following 
selection from a speech by Metropolitan Damaskenos.  With the new millennium 
directly in front of them, the Metropolitan asked his participants in the dialogue to 
consider the question of identity as it relates to religion, both within the context of 
their own nations as well as from the global perspective.  He put it this way: 
[O]ur interreligious dialogue constitutes an elegant and persuasive response to 
doubt [about the possibilities for peace], as well as to the aspirations of our 
times…. [The topic of this] ninth meeting [between Orthodoxy and Islam]…, 
“Muslims and Christians in Modern Society: Images of the Other and the 
Meaning of Citizenship,” [poses] a difficult question, because in addition to a 
purely religious perspective it contains aspects that proceed from the image 
that each of us have of believers of the other religion in modern society, 
Christian or Muslim, and that of the citizenship of Christians and Muslims 
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living in the same state, in which the nationalized will is preponderant.  
Nevertheless, interreligious dialogue can also be a guide for examining these 
parallel problems implied in our religious identity.243 
 
In other words, how can one maintain his or her unique religious identity, while also 
acknowledging the validity of another religion as practiced by his or her neighbor?  
He implies that inter-religious dialogue can provide an opportunity to go beyond 
twentieth century notions of pluralism in civil discourse, leading to a higher path of 
self-awareness and mutual respect among all people.   
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 Despite several tragic and senseless conflicts within nations, which because of 
the religious undercurrents severely strained relations between Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims, Orthodox leaders made a number of positive statements about Islam 
and engaged in constructive dialogue with Muslims during the period of 1975-2001 
(up to the terrorist attacks in the United States in autumn of that year).  A consultation 
of the heads of most of the Orthodox churches throughout the world, as well as the 
Standing Conference of the Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas, set inter-
religious dialogue as a priority and urged Orthodox Christians to reach out to their 
Muslim neighbors.  Individual hierarchs as well, such as Patriarch Parthenios of 
Alexandria and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, made numerous public 
statements about Islam and Muslims, noting especially the common bonds between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims.   
Orthodox Christians were meaningfully engaged in dialogue with Muslims 
during this period through the activities of the World Council of Churches.  Three 
individuals were especially active – Metropolitan  Georges (Khodr) of Lebanon, 
Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos) of Albania, and Dr. Tarek Mitri (a layman from 
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Lebanon) – both in the internal reflection among Christians about Islam and inter-
religious dialogue and in actual encounter and dialogues with Muslims.  An even 
more focused and sustained dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century occurred through a joint venture of the 
Aal al-Bayt Institute (based in Amman, Jordan) and the Orthodox Center for the 
Ecumenical Patriarch (based in Chambesy-Geneva, Switzerland).  On the Orthodox 
side of this effort was Metropolitan Damaskenos, who worked diligently to establish 
and sustain more permanent, organized channels for serious interaction and discussion 
on topics of mutual interest to Orthodox Christians and Muslims throughout the 
world.   
How is one to assess these declarations of Orthodox Christians on Islam and 
their engagement in dialogue?  Returning to a question posed at the end of the 
previous chapter, can it be said that they have maintained continuity with their 
dogmatic and theological principles vis à vis Islam and their relations with Muslims?  
Is there any sense in which they break new ground in this area?  On the first question, 
there appear to be no breaks with the theological principles discussed in the last 
chapter upon which Islam and engagement with Muslims can be seen in a positive 
light.  However, many of the statements discussed in this chapter – perhaps because of 
their public nature to mixed audiences that could have included both Muslims and 
Christians of various persuasions – seem to point more so to the responsibility of 
Orthodox Christians to promote peace, tolerance, reconciliation, and fellowship 
among those of all religions, especially in the face of extreme nationalism and 
fundamentalism.  On the second question, from the sources covered in this chapter 
there were at least two key examples of Orthodox theologians taking their 
understanding of Islam and their responsibility to work together with Muslims to a 
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new level.  The first is in a statement by the Standing Conference of Canonical 
Orthodox Bishops in the Americas urging Orthodox Christians to “deepen [their] 
theological understanding…. [to] recognize…the ‘other’ does not exist simply to 
exist.  Rather he or she exists as a person who has something to say to me.”  Here we 
see the first hint of what will be noted in the next chapter as a prominent theme 
among Orthodox Christians in recent years: that engagement with Muslims is 
essential to the search of Orthodox Christians for their identity in the postmodern age.  
The second example is from a statement by the late Patriarch Parthenios of 
Alexandria in which he states that the, “Prophet Muhammad is an apostle….a man of 
God, who worked for the Kingdom of God…. [and that] Our God is the Father of all 
men, even of Muslims.”  In this way, Patriarch Parthenios uses the traditional 
Christian paradigm of apostleship to illustrate the degree to which Orthodox 
Christians should see their Muslim neighbors not just as friends but also as teachers, 
through which by the Holy Spirit divine wisdom can be obtained.  Both examples 
break new ground in the sense that Islam is presented truly, and in a tone to be 
received by modern ears, as part of the divine economy for salvation. 
This chapter has demonstrated that as Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
focused on improving relations between them and worked together during the last 
quarter of the twentieth century to promote their shared values and cooperation 
between all peoples, they built upon their long history of peaceful coexistence and 
mutual respect.  In doing so, they seemed to realize that not only could they deal with 
some of the pressing challenges of the day – such as religious fanaticism, war and 
civil conflicts, human rights abuses, and religious discrimination – but also that 
together they were experiencing many of the same issues in this postmodern period 
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because of the historic, religious, and cultural bonds that seemed to pull them together 
in a new way.                         
Orthodox Christians on the individual and communal level began to reevaluate 
and rediscover the place of their religious heritage in their identity.  Looking to the 
past and ahead to the future they started to realize that their relations with Islam and 
Muslims were significant in all of this.  The next chapter will take a closer look at the 
question of identity as it relates to Orthodox Christians and their relations with 
Muslims amidst the challenges and potentials of this postmodern world.  
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Chapter 4: Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and 
Identity 
 
 
Intoxicated with science, proud of our power over the elements, we 
human beings have put our trust in our knowledge of the laws of nature, 
expecting peace and happiness to come from them.  But it hasn’t 
happened.  Knowledge, when in the grip of that animal nature of ours 
with its reasoning powers, has not saved civilization, but has become its 
memento mori, its sword of Damocles.  And the fault for this lies not in 
knowledge itself, nor in reason which is God’s gift to us, but in the 
eclipse of the spirit which has not been able to withstand the force of the 
beast…. Today we are beginning to understand that, however much the 
world has gained, it has lost even more.  Now the time of decision and 
choice has come…. [An] invincible power of good is rooted in human 
nature, in our divided and contradictory selves, and is nourished from 
the same source which created, sustains and gives life to the universe.  
That power for good is waiting for us.  It has revealed itself to us.  Now 
it’s our turn to respond.244 
 
These words are taken from a meditation by the late Fr. Alexander Men on ‘the 
presence of evil and violence in the world’ in the context of the late twentieth century.  
They sum up so well the feeling of loss experienced by many people of religion in the 
postmodern world, but also give a message of hope that it is not too late to respond.  
The modern period, with its designs for modernization on a world scale, had some 
particularly challenging moral implications for religion generally.  These included at 
least the following: 1) blind faith in science and technology at the expense of 
established beliefs systems, procedures, and institutions, 2) subordination of ethics 
and beauty to efficiency, 3) disengaging of human thought from ultimate questions, 4) 
autonomy of natural sciences from life-orientational traditions, 5) the 
compartmentalization of human beings into various aspects of life and areas of 
specialization, 6) the introduction of an unquenchable thirst for all that is new, based 
on the belief that materialism is the key to happiness, and 7) dehumanization caused 
by extreme individualism and the severing of traditional familial and communal 
bonds.245  In the postmodern period, however, that is generally following the Second 
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World War, one began to see a breaking of the spell of modernity.  As the human 
community emerged from the ashes of the great world wars, many began to 
acknowledge the tragedy and failure of the twentieth century, much of which had 
been based on the philosophical systems developed in Western Europe during the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment.  Though all of this continues to play out today 
and most likely will continue for several generations, the last quarter of the twentieth 
century marked at least subtle but significant changes around the globe, including: 1) 
a new ambivalence toward science and technology, 2) a reevaluation of the ends and 
means of modern economic systems, 3) an increased interest in environmentalism 
(and ‘saving the planet’), and 4) the return of religion to public life.  Several 
prominent religious figures, including a number of Orthodox Christian and Muslim 
leaders, have taken it upon themselves to help shepherd the human community in this 
direction.   
This chapter will examine some of the particular challenges Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims have commonly faced because of their unique histories, and 
their relationship to each other’s community throughout the period of great change 
they and the world experienced over the past few centuries.  One of the primary tasks 
has been to reevaluate and rediscover the place of their religious heritage in their 
identity, as individuals and communities living out their faith amidst the challenges 
and potentials of this postmodern world.  The chapter will focus on the ways in which 
Orthodox Christians have attempted to do this over the past several decades and will 
examine what this has meant in terms of their understanding of their relationship to 
the Orthodox Church, to each other, to other Christians, to other religions, to their 
neighbors, and to society at large.  A secondary theme will be to consider whether 
Muslims, particularly those from the Middle East, may have gone through, and 
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continue to experience, a similar reality as they have attempted to rediscover 
themselves and their religious heritage.  To the extent that Eastern Orthodoxy has had 
some of its institutions and worldviews severely challenged in the face of modernity, 
it may well be that there has been a parallel ‘crisis’ in Islam over the past few 
centuries.   This possibility will be explored in this chapter as well as the degree to 
which the responses among Orthodox Christians and Muslims to these realities may 
have been similar with comparable results.   Finally, the last section of the chapter 
will examine how an honest assessment of the relationship (past and present) with 
Islam and Muslims could be beneficial for Orthodox Christians in their quest for their 
identity for today and for future generations. 
 
CHANGING VIEWS OF THE CHURCH 
 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, in an address to a mixed audience at the 
British Museum in London in the autumn of 1993, used a couple of figures from 
Greek mythology to make an important observation about Orthodox Christianity.  He 
spoke of Mnemosyne, or Memory, along with Clio, the child of Mnemosyne and the 
muse of history, to make the point that his church, the Orthodox Church, was 
experiencing an internal crisis.  Though, according the Patriarch Bartholomew, the 
crisis was born both from outside the Church and from within, he asserted that the 
solution could only come from Orthodox Christians themselves.   He stated 
emphatically, “We [that is, all Orthodox Christians] must recover our Orthodox faith 
and heritage and proclaim its virtues.”246  In other words, Orthodox Christians must 
recover their identity.  Specifying the Mother Church (the Ecumenical Patriarchate) as 
the ‘repository of memory,’ the Mnemosyne, of the fullness of faith that once was the 
norm, Patriarch Bartholomew outlined the ways in which that memory had been 
obscured through a distortion of its history (represented by Clio) during the modern 
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period with the rise of the West to world hegemony.  For example, in making the 
distinction between spiritual history, which is timeless and eternal, and secular 
history, which is subject to changes in interpretation from one generation to the next, 
he said that: 
The Church protects and defends our spiritual history.  But the Church has 
somehow been marginalized and excluded from secular history – at great cost 
not only to Greek Orthodoxy but to the entire human family…. The history 
and life-giving legacy of Orthodox Christianity have been lost in the waters of 
oblivion.  The reasons for this are complex.  They have to do with the 
predominance of the West since the Renaissance.  We must remember that the 
victor writes the history.247 
  
After identifying that in large part Western historians were to blame for downplaying 
the significance of the East Roman Empire, and its religion (Orthodox Christianity), 
after the fall of Rome to the barbarians in 476 CE, he went on the make the following 
conclusion: 
We live in a world dominated by the West and by Western ideas.  We admire 
those ideas and admit their power.  Yet there must be a way for us to do this 
without betraying our own history.  We must summon Clio to speak her truth, 
which is stronger than any power.248 
 
Though on the surface, this statement appears to have the purpose of laying blame on 
the West for problems of Eastern Christendom, a closer examination indicates that 
Patriarch Bartholomew has another goal in mind.  His main critique, it seems, is not 
of the West, Western historians, or Western Christianity, but rather with Orthodox 
Christians themselves.  He laments their forgetfulness of certain essential elements of 
the Orthodox heritage, their selective memory of their own histories, and their 
willingness to be seduced by the ideas and paradigms of modern Western civilization.       
 Patriarch Bartholomew and other Orthodox theologians of his generation have 
consistently called Orthodox Christians to do a full assessment of their tradition, 
particularly in terms of what has taken place over the past several hundred years.  In 
doing so, he and others have expressed a sense of loss, that by some way their own 
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religion and destiny as a people have been powerfully changed by an outside force, 
which could be conveniently labeled ‘the West.’  How does one explain this rise of 
Western Civilization and its ability to assert such influence on Orthodox Christianity, 
as well as many other religions and cultures of the world?  Some of the reasons for the 
massive shift in power that took place on the world stage – transforming large 
sections of the globe into ‘modern’ societies based on Western values – were covered 
already in chapter one of this study.  It will be useful at this point, however, to 
highlight certain aspects of the transformation, particularly from the vantage point of 
Orthodox Christianity.  This is important because, as will be seen in the following 
pages, Christians of the East experienced, interpreted, and reacted to the changes that 
were taking place much differently than did their Protestant and Roman Catholic co-
religionists.  One could argue, in fact, that in some ways the divisions between 
Eastern and Western Christianity, which began with the great schism in the eleventh 
century, were exacerbated by the events of the modern period.  On the other hand, the 
pervasiveness of modernity enabled Christians from around the world to come 
together in new ways, making an opening for healing, unity, and renewal of the faith.   
 From the point of view of identity, it could be said that the modern period 
marked the beginning of a crisis for Orthodox Christians primarily because it 
seriously challenged for the first time a basic organizational principle of the Eastern 
Church.  Going all the way back to 381 CE, Orthodox Christianity had operated under 
an ecclesiological framework that presupposed a certain relationship between the 
leaders of the Church (especially the Patriarch of Constantinople) and emperor of 
Byzantium.  The basic assumption was that the two would work harmoniously 
together (the Byzantine term for this was symphonia) to establish and maintain a 
righteous and just civilization for the benefit of all.  Even when the Byzantine Empire 
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fell to the Ottomans in 1453, this notion of symphonia did not go away.  In fact, as 
John Meyendorff pointed out, the ecclesiological framework of the Church was 
indeed not severely challenged until the modern period.  He began with a question: 
Did this entire Byzantine imperial framework disappear when Byzantium fell 
under the Turks?  It did not.  It only took different forms, and this is why the 
Byzantine model of church organization and mentality continued to flourish: 
monasticism, spirituality, martyrdom.  Also the medieval concept of pentarchy 
was maintained and even extended in the case of the establishment of the 
patriarchate in Russia…. It is only in the past one hundred and fifty years that 
Byzantine civilization really collapsed in the most drastic, revolutionary and 
universal way and was replaced with a variety of ideologies, in various 
combinations, which dominate our own societies today.  They are all 
connected with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution…. [in] forms 
utterly incompatible with the mental and social structures of the Byzantine 
Middle Ages.249 
 
Meyendorff asserts that under the Ottoman Turks, the Orthodox Church was able to 
function relatively well without any major adjustments, because Ottoman rule did not 
alter the basic, foundational structures and assumptions of the Church.  Though as 
was already discussed in chapter one, the fact that the Patriarch of Constantinople de 
facto took on the role of emperor, as well as religious leader, did bring about a 
number of negative consequences, the arrangement did afford basic continuity to the 
Church in most matters.     
Returning once again to the comments of Patriarch Bartholomew, one can see 
that he echoes Meyendorff’s notion that the Byzantine ideal did not suffer 
significantly under the Ottomans.  He says, for example: 
Western civilization found it difficult to comprehend the mysticism of the 
East, which felt the presence of our Lord Christ, the Theotokos, the myriad of 
angels and thousands of saints.  We must also decry the simplification of 
Byzantium as “Greek.”  The Roman Empire was ecumenical…. [T]he 
ecumenical idea, the notion that held together the diverse Christian 
communities under the rubric of Rome, was reinforced under the Ottomans, 
whose own empire, let us remember, was also multiethnic and often 
tolerant.250 
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Patriarch Bartholomew speaks fondly of an ‘Orthodox ecumenical civilization,’ and 
implies that, though outwardly having been dealt a death blow with the 
Enlightenment, it still has the potential to transform the Orthodox Church from within 
in the postmodern age.  This point aside, he again affirms the idea that Ottoman 
civilization reinforced for Orthodox Christians a number of their ideals and did not 
challenge the basic notions upon which their Church was established. 
 Even among those who see the Byzantine and Ottoman periods in a less 
favorable light – particularly with regard to just how multiethnic, tolerant, and 
ecumenical they may have been in comparison to modern democracies – there is still 
a basic acknowledgment that the Byzantine ideal was essentially present until the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire in the last century.  An example of this can be seen in the 
comments of Aristotle Papanikolaou in an article in which he investigates the 
compatibility of Eastern Orthodox Christianity with democracy: 
Most of the traditional Orthodox world after the fifteenth century fell to the 
Ottoman Empire, and Orthodox Christianity was a minority religion within an 
empire that embraced Islam as its state-sponsored and culturally dominant 
religion.  This occupation shielded most Orthodox countries from confronting 
the political philosophies and reforms of the Enlightenment…. After World 
War II, with the exception of Greece, most Orthodox countries fell under 
communism, further delaying Orthodoxy’s confrontation with modern 
democracy.  Now that communism has fallen and the Greek monarchy has 
also fallen, the question becomes whether the Orthodox churches can embrace 
modern democratic institutions, together with the inherent notions of church-
state separation and multiculturalism….251 
 
Though it seems by the way he is framing the central questions of his article that 
Papanikolaou is a greater proponent of certain Enlightenment ideals and modern 
forms of democracy than either John Meyendorff or Patriarch Bartholomew, he is 
essentially in agreement with them on the point that the Byzantine ecclesiological 
framework was not significantly questioned until relatively recently.   
138 
 
 If the above assertions are correct, one has to ask what it was about the 
modern period and the rise of the West that proved to be so difficult that it thrust the 
Orthodox Church into a kind of crisis.  What were the challenges and why were they 
so much more severe and fundamental than even those experienced by Orthodox 
Christians as they lived for centuries under Muslim rule?  How did this impact their 
identity as individuals, as communities, as the Church?  Though few Orthodox 
Christian leaders would comment on these questions without acknowledging that the 
changes that have taken place in the modern period have had many positive 
advantages for the Orthodox and all of humanity, they have identified several areas as 
being particularly problematic and challenging for the Orthodox Church.   
SECULARLISM AND WORSHIP 
 It is often said that the most important factor that determined the survival of 
the Orthodox Church through the difficult periods of its history, particularly under 
Muslim rule and atheist Communism, was its worship.  Despite the many negative 
requirements and restrictions imposed upon them at various times in their history, it is 
said that the fact that Orthodox Christians could still celebrate the liturgy – and that 
they did so consistently and with devotion – is the reason that the Church was not 
extinguished during its darkest times.  A number of Orthodox theologians have made 
the point, however, that though the new freedoms of religious expression during the 
modern period brought immediate benefits to the Church, modernity itself posed a 
new threat, albeit more subtle and often under the radar screen, with the potential of 
being much more damaging.  This threat is often identified as ‘secularism’ or the 
‘secularization of the Church.’   
Secularism has its roots in the French Revolution at a time when in Western 
Europe it seemed so important to liberate the people from the tyranny of the 
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institutional Church.  To move forward into the future, it seemed imperative to 
separate church and state, clergy and laity, science and theology.  Another basic 
assumption was that the individual should have full freedom of choice with regard to 
religion, occupation, who to marry, where to live, and any number of other matters.  
The consequence was that ‘enlightened’ individuals began to consider religion as (at 
most) one aspect or category of one’s life along with many others.  For example, it is 
not uncommon today to hear people speak of their various ‘lives,’ that is their, “home 
life, sex life, spiritual life, leisure life, and work life.”  In other words, one can choose 
to be religious, just as long as it does not spill over too much into the other categories 
or spheres of life.  This view of religion is widely accepted today, even among many 
Orthodox Christians who would consider themselves religious, spiritual, and/or 
regularly practicing the traditions of their Church. 
For a growing number of Orthodox theologians, however, secularism is seen 
not as a force that liberates human beings and allows them to better practice their 
religiosity, but rather as a force that undermines true faith.  They have argued that this 
is particularly problematic for Orthodox Christianity because of its ‘sacramental’ 
character.  At the end of the twentieth century, Alexander Schememann articulated 
this view with perhaps more success than anyone else: 
[S]ecularism…is the root of the deep spiritual crisis of Orthodox.  And 
nowhere is this crisis more visible than in the strange “religionless religion” 
which seems to permeate our Church life.  The reduction of the Church to 
material, organizational, and legalistic preoccupations and concerns at the 
expense of religious and spiritual ones…. [O]ne becomes truly apprehensive 
about the future of our Church, whose leadership and members alike do not 
seem to realize the scope and depth of this crisis.252 
 
In other words, Orthodox Christians, in his view, had become so distracted with the 
‘things of this world’ that they has lost sight of their mission to the world as the 
witnesses to ‘God’s eternal Kingdom.’253   
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Schmemann described an even more insidious problem at the core of 
secularism, which he believed if left unchecked could lead to disastrous consequences 
for Orthodox worship: 
Secularlism, I submit, is above all a negation of worship.  I stress: – not of 
God’s existence, not of some kind of transcendence and therefore of some 
kind of religion.  If secularism in theological terms is heresy, it is primarily a 
heresy about man.  It is the negation of man as a worshiping being, as homo 
adorans: the one for whom worship is the essential act which both “posits” his 
humanity and fulfills it.254 
 
Schmemann felt that the secular worldview of modern man was problematic because 
it promoted a distorted view of humanity’s nature and purpose.  He argued that the 
relegation of religion, particularly the primal act of worship itself, to only one portion 
of a person’s life had led to an imbalance, causing not only any number of individual 
neuroses but also an unparalleled kind of sickness in the entire cosmos.  As a 
renowned specialist of ‘liturgical theology’ (a term which he coined), he resisted the 
pressures from those who suggested that he should try to modernize his Church’s 
worship.  He wrote: 
[W]e do not need any new worship that would somehow be more adequate to 
our new secular world.  What we need is a rediscovery of the true meaning 
and power of worship, and this means of its cosmic, ecclesiological, and 
eschatological dimensions and content…. [O]nce it becomes again the source 
of an all-embracing world view and the power of living up to it – then and 
only then the unique antidote to “secularism” shall be found.255 
 
Orthodox worship, according to Alexander Schmemann, was important not as simply 
an aid to strengthen a person’s rational beliefs about God and faith, but as a source of 
power and a window into the true knowledge of the Divine.  He clearly articulated 
what many Orthodox theologians have found to be problematic with secularism, 
especially with regard to its tremendous potential to negatively impact Orthodox 
worship.   
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THE RISE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS 
 
 Related to the notion of secularism and the secular worldview of modern man 
is the remarkable shift over the last two and a half centuries in society’s understanding 
of man himself.  The ways in which human persons think about themselves and relate 
to each other has changed drastically with modernity and there have been particular 
consequences from this for the Orthodox Church.  Orthodox theology has always 
emphasized the sacredness of the human person.  Stressing humility, the Orthodox see 
all persons as equal and important in the eyes of God.  Within the church community, 
therefore, the emphasis is on how each person, whether clergy or laity, has a unique 
role and particular spiritual gifts as ‘members of the (one) body of Christ.’   
 By extension, the Orthodox take a holistic approach to human activity, in that 
a person’s actions are evaluated in terms of how they relate to other people and to the 
rest of God’s creation.  Therefore, unlike in Western Christianity where, particularly 
in the modern period, there is a great emphasis on personal sin, in Orthodox theology 
no sin of an individual is considered in isolation, as it is believed that all sin can have 
universal significance as well, since it can throw someone else’s life and even the 
entire cosmos out of balance in some way.  The Biblical phrase, “to whom much is 
given, much is required” is taken to heart, such that each member of the Church has a 
responsibility for sanctifying the entire world, including nature and history.  This 
notion is ritualized, in fact, at every Divine Liturgy at which the priest, raising the 
bread and wine to the heavens, declares, “[we] offer thine own of thine own on behalf 
of all and for all.”  The Orthodox understand this to mean that Christ offers himself 
for the life of the world and Christians, therefore, offer themselves – by the power of 
Christ through the work of the Holy Spirit – in service to each person and every living 
thing in the creation.  
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 The Orthodox Church acknowledges that this is a lofty goal, and there is a 
great degree of sympathy for human failings.  Sin, hamartīa in Greek256, means 
‘missing the mark’ and the Orthodox Church, particularly through its long history of 
monasticism has evolved a highly developed understanding of the human psyche, as 
well as the vices and virtues of human behavior.  Mysticism, therefore, is not 
something only accessible to ascetics.  The average Orthodox Christian integrates 
ascetic effort into the normal cycles of life and everyone is encouraged to strive for 
theōsis (deification), since the aim of every life should be union with God.  The 
Orthodox speak of ‘entering creatively into the life of the Trinity’ in order to spread 
the love found there throughout the entire world.  Again, this is a tall order, but the 
Orthodox are fond of saying that one ought at least be on the path.  Salvation is seen 
as a continuum, a journey – ‘I was saved, I am being saved, and I will be saved.’257  
 All of these concepts are important to understand in order to appreciate the 
challenges for the Orthodox Church in relation to the rise of the individual and 
personal freedoms ushered in by modernity.  One consequence has been that as 
Orthodox Christians have ‘modernized,’ the traditional familial and communal bonds 
underlying the Church have rapidly eroded, often leaving a void and a sense of 
loneliness in the hearts of individuals.  By way of reaction, on one extreme, many 
have held on tenaciously to the cultural traditions of their particular ethnic community 
to fill the void.  Others, often the youth, have left the Church altogether, so as to be 
unencumbered by its rules and obligations in order to find fulfillment in the various 
pleasures offered by modern life.  The Church has tried to respond, with only limited 
success, by finding ways to ‘improve its image’ and relevancy, using pastoral 
methods to reach out to those who have felt disconnected from the community.   
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 Orthodox theologians have also tried to identify the forces at work in society 
at large, in order to challenge certain notions within modern culture that may be out of 
line with the Orthodox understanding of personal freedom and responsibility.  For 
example, Costa Carras has given some perspective on the increasing rhetoric 
associated with ‘individual rights’ and ‘freedom of expression’ by saying that: 
[E]xternal constraints on human beings have now been lifted – except for 
small and shifting minorities – to a degree inconceivable in any previous 
period, but even the possibility of gradually acquiring internal freedom is 
widely questioned.  This freedom from external restraint, the only worthwhile 
freedom in practice rather than theory for most modern libertarians, had led to 
an increase in altruism…however…has not resulted in that degree of personal 
engagement with others…that one would have anticipated…. Instead, an 
emphasis on increased consumption and satisfaction of the senses has become 
the dominant note in society…. [For example,] certain types of advertising, as 
also of sadistic and pornographic imagery, are defended as expressions of 
freedom of action, but are more accurately to be seen as attempts to profit 
from the enslavement of human fantasy….in the name of freedom of action 
for their initiators, [they] actually reduce the freedom of the recipients.258 
 
This is a clear example of an Orthodox theologian attempting to defend his Church’s 
understanding of the sacredness of the each person, human relations and true freedom 
in the context of community, and love for one’s neighbor.  Modernity has given 
Orthodox Christians new ways of expressing individual freedoms, but has also limited 
their ability to relate to each other and all human beings as persons, as it has tempted 
them to give themselves over to the vices of modern life. 
TECHNOLOGY 
 A third area of modern life that is commonly identified by some Orthodox 
theologians as being problematic and challenging for the Orthodox Church is 
technology.  No one would deny the many benefits from the discoveries of science, 
which have improved lives by reducing the ill effects of sickness and disease, enabled 
new possibilities for human communication, and increased human knowledge in any 
number of areas.  What some Orthodox theologians have identified as problematic, 
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though, are the overall consequences of life in a technicalized society.  They have 
argued that each new invention, mechanism, or product must tap into the natural and 
human resources of the planet.  They claim that modern man has done so in blind 
faith, often with little (if any) consideration of the impact upon human beings, 
animals, or the earth.  This point of view can be seen in the following comment of 
Alexander Men: 
We human beings thought that technology, comfort and a life which would 
guarantee the best possible conditions of work and rest, would solve all 
problems.  But the example of the highly developed countries has shown this 
to be an illusion.  The example of these countries shows us vividly what 
moral, cultural and ecological dangers technical civilization is fraught with, 
and where satiety, ‘ethical materialism,’ and ‘consumerism’ will lead.  Of 
course it’s a good thing that people should be well fed and clothed, should 
have adequate housing, and be able to use modern technology in their daily 
lives.  But to make of these things the only ideal is to diminish the purpose of 
life, and to lead people to the dead-end of materialism.259 
 
Fr. Men points out the underlying philosophical assumptions about science and 
machines that were ushered into every day life by modernization, and shows how 
such thinking has had dire consequences in society.  One wonders if in speaking of 
the “highly developed countries” he is subtly trying to argue that traditional Orthodox 
lands have maintained a higher standard of moral and ethical behavior than those 
(Western or Westernized) countries of the world that are thoroughly modern. 
 Another voice on the topic of the ill affects of unbridled technological 
development is Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos).  He gave the following 
warning about the misuses and abuses associated with technology to an audience at 
the International Interfaith Conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1974: 
If we continue to abuse nature rather than “use” it, there is a danger that the 
development of our technology will lead us to terrifying feats of self-
destruction.  Christianity delivered humanity from the fear inherent in magical 
beliefs and from the deification of nature…. [It] also encouraged the 
development of science.  In the end, however, modern humanity has lost any 
and all sense of the sacred and in fact has already arrived at the opposite 
extreme, gazing at nature with impious eyes that lack respect and are often 
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filled with hostile cynicism rather than love.  We have thus become 
increasingly alienated from nature; we behave like robbers of nature, shutting 
ourselves away in our man-made hideouts.  But nature, too, can retaliate.  
Some reconciliation between humanity and nature is urgently needed.  It is 
time we understood that nature is something sacred.260 
 
A quarter of a century later, Archbishop Anastasios’ words seem to be a prophetic 
warning against the now much discussed and real consequences from global warming.  
Though his comments are clearly spoken out of love and concern generally for 
humanity and nature, they also give some indication of his concerns for the challenges 
posed to the Church because of the misuses of technology.  He observes the changes 
that have taken place as a theological problem as well as a humanitarian one.  His 
words challenge the Orthodox faithful to rediscover the sacramental nature of their 
traditions, as it organically connects humans with nature and balances human 
necessity and respect for the created order. 
GLOBALIZATION 
 When Orthodox theologians speak about globalization they often present it in 
both positive and negative terms.  As Metropolitan Paul (Yazigi) of Aleppo put it, 
“globalization is a two-edged sword: it can bring benefit or harm.”  It can help to, 
“insure the rights of man and an honorable life to all people,” but it can also lead to, 
“exploitation on the level of tyranny,” when “profit controls the path of economy, 
then relationships will definitely be colored with deceit.”261  The globalization of 
society has broadened the potential of the Church to fulfill its mission by spreading 
the Gospel message and performing good works throughout the world.  It has also 
given Orthodox Christians and peoples of all cultural and religious backgrounds a 
greater opportunity to understand each other in the so-called “global village” that is 
modern life for many.  While affirming this, Orthodox theologians have also been 
quick to point out as well that globalization, “seems to be in danger of turning into a 
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definite nightmare…. [It is] accelerating daily and…[its] final outcome is still 
uncertain.”262 
  Orthodox authors often point to the economic impact and related 
consequences of globalization when they speak of its negative aspects.  For example, 
Emmanuel Clapsis wrote: 
The staggering statistics of increased poverty and social inequality that the 
World Bank has provided us elevates social inequality as one of the central 
moral issues of our times.  While it is difficult for a theologian or for the 
churches to make a judgment on matters of economics, it is important to insist 
upon the socially contested and historically open nature of all forms of 
political and economic ideologies, “globalization” foremost among them…. 
For the Orthodox Church, economic progress is morally justifiable only when 
all the members of the global community participate in it and benefit from 
it…. The [Orthodox Church and other] churches, through the World Council 
of Churches and through the witness of their specific traditions, participate in 
the search for alternative visions to economic globalization.263 
 
Clapsis points to the increasing gap between the rich and the poor of the world 
brought about by the globalization of commerce, which benefits disproportionately 
wealthy and powerful nations (or even common unregulated, multinational 
corporations), often at the direct expense of those who or poor, powerless, and 
isolated.  When Clapsis says that globalization is desirable only “when all the 
members of the global community participate in it and benefit from it,” he is making a 
generalization about morality and ethics and is not implying that Orthodoxy endorses 
one particular economic system over another.  In fact, Orthodox theologians would be 
skeptical of any claims about an economic system that by design could guarantee a 
level playing field for trade and ensure economic equality throughout the world.  
Despite the numerous benefits of globalization, including increased opportunities for 
international cooperation and trade, many have noted that it has actually increased 
dehumanization and negative consequences associated with business transactions.   
147 
 
 In the typical Orthodox fashion of trying to find hope in any dire situation, 
Metropolitan Paul of Aleppo argues that what appears to be the unstoppable force of 
globalization need not be seen as a completely undesirable trend.  He asserts that if 
Orthodox Christians are open and allow the Holy Spirit to work through them, 
globalization can be a powerful tool through which to transform the world.  He says: 
Today globalization is in need of the spirit more than the machine.  It needs to 
care for the big universal causes more than networks and economical 
organizations.  We mean to focus and emphasize on the role of the Church and 
theology.  Globalization is a deaf trend and its tools are dry machines that 
await the blow of the divine Spirit to create a “civilization.”  The most 
important question is, “Who are they?” And from where are we to receive the 
prophets of the New Millenium as trumpets of the divine Word in the 
civilization of the machine?  Where are these voices that we make man the 
lord of civilization and its goal, and not its servant in order not to impose a 
new cult: “The cause of the new machine”….  It is inevitable that economic 
globalization will bring with it a cultural globalization.  Here lies our 
responsibility to make out of this universal culture a modern and human 
language through which the Spirit conquers over matter.264 
 
Here we see an allusion to what some have called the “McDonaldization” of the 
world, in which “globalization leads to homogenization” and the “collapse of all local 
cultures into a global culture,” based in large part on the values of the modernized, 
Western, and capitalistic world.265  Though this is not directly implied by 
Metropolitan Paul – who himself seems to see positive potential through utilizing the 
“modern and human language” developing in global culture – there are some circles 
in Orthodox Christianity that are very concerned and quite vocal about the dangers of 
a homogeneous, global culture. 
 Addressing this fear, Emmanuel Clapsis, while acknowledging the impact of 
this concern on identity issues for Orthodox Christians living in the postmodern 
world, asserts that globalization is more complex and less insidious than it may seem.   
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He says: 
[G]lobalization creates a network of cultures and does not lead to a single 
culture that embraces everyone on earth and replaces the diversity of cultural 
systems that have flourished up to now…. [It] is an uneven process, far more 
complex than can be grasped in the single story of the unilinear advance of 
Western culture.266 
 
Clapsis’ argument is similar to Metropolitan Paul’s in that it encourages Orthodox 
Christians not to despair in the face of globalization, but rather to look for ways to 
utilize it for the good.  He encourages Orthodox Christians to participate in the 
“movement of resistance against the perils of economic globalization” in order to 
“provide opportunities for the structural transformation of the world [not] in a 
fragmentary way, but… grounded in, and motivated by, a new vision of what it means 
to be a human person in a globalized world.”267  Again, the emphasis is on finding 
one’s identity, or rediscovering it in the case of the Orthodox Christian, in the 
postmodern context.  As with the other theologians mentioned thus far, Clapsis seems 
to acknowledge there are resources to tap into for this within the theological, spiritual, 
and liturgical heritage of the Orthodox Church. 
NATIONALISM 
 More than any other theme related to the causes and consequences associated 
with modernization, nationalism has been on the agenda of most Orthodox 
theologians as they discuss their Church, their identity, and their future.  Since 
Orthodox Christianity claims to be universal, nationalism, at least in its modern 
incarnation, has been a particularly divisive force within Orthodoxy worldwide.  John 
Meyendorff writes: 
[The Orthodox Church] must face the challenge of the modern world.  In order 
to make their message meaningful, the Orthodox must learn to live these 
problems from inside, not externally…. [H]istorical Orthodoxy, that is, the 
various nations which formerly made up or still make up the Orthodox world, 
have much to ask forgiveness for.  Granted their history has been a particularly 
tragic one…. External factors…[such as foreign invasions and communism] 
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explain, perhaps, the present weakness of Eastern Christianity.  But there are 
also other weaknesses for which the Orthodox have only themselves to blame, 
in particular, the bane of excessive nationalism which has resulted in the 
harmful isolation of Orthodox churches from each other.   The future of the 
Orthodox Church and its spiritual influence is now clearly at stake….268   
 
Meyendorff acknowledges that Orthodox Christians were in a sense swept away by 
modernity, particularly the notion of nationalism.  He argues that by allowing 
themselves to be seduced by nationalism they have not only weakened the Church by 
dividing it, but also have cut themselves off from their greatest allies – each other – in 
the fight for survival under the pressures of the modern world.  It is interesting to note 
that Meyendorff observes that the all too typical response of the Orthodox to the 
‘crisis’ of modernity is to blame the “external factors” – such as Islam or the Muslim 
invasions – instead of taking a close look at themselves and whether they have been 
true to their religious heritage.   
 How did this happen, though, and why was nationalism such a compelling 
force within Orthodoxy?  Though there were likely a number of factors, it is 
interesting that it seems it can be explained in part, and ironically so, from the way the 
Church had been so open historically to the various cultural, linguistic, and ‘national’ 
(in the pre-modern sense) customs that were represented among the ‘peoples’ who 
made up the universal Church.269  From the time of the early Church, through the 
Byzantine period, and up to the brink of the great period of transformation with 
modernity, there seemed generally a balance between the particularism of various 
‘cultural expressions’ and the universality of the religion.   There was an important 
shift, however, in the modern period that tipped the scales toward what would from 
then on be known as nationalism at the expense of the Church, and the faith generally.   
Several Orthodox theologians have noted that because of the way a number of the 
‘Orthodox countries’ came into existence in the modern period, many Orthodox 
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Christians began treating their nationality and their religion as almost synonymous 
terms.  For example, in the quotation below Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew 
comments on the trend and gives some insight into why it is so problematic:  
The notion of “people of God” was confused with the nation, which 
considered itself as elect, vested with a quasi-messianic mission…. [T]hese 
ideas remained within the collective memory and gradually turned into 
obsessions….270  
 
Nationalism, so long frustrated by centuries of subjection to more or less 
multi-national empires, now tried to appropriate Orthodoxy, to turn it into its 
instrument, to instill in it its hatreds, its fears, its phobias.  Orthodoxy has 
often become the sign of belonging, a little bit like Judaism in the State of 
Israel.  One can love the forests of one’s native land, the singing in its 
churches and the light of candles, without ever having read the Gospel.  One 
can call oneself Orthodox (specifying also the nationality) without any 
awareness of being a Christian.  One can even call oneself Orthodox while 
remaining an atheist!271 
 
In other words, Orthodoxy was taken captive by nationalism, though Orthodox 
Christians themselves were often willing hostages.  The rapid transformations brought 
on by modernization in traditional Orthodox lands, struck fear and anxiety in the 
hearts of many Orthodox Christians.  For this reason, according to Patriarch 
Bartholomew and others, they clung to what gave them comfort in troubled times.  
They jumped on the train of nationalism without questioning where it was going and 
this led to tragic results for the Church, which is still reeling from the rapid changes 
that seem to be chipping away at its foundations.     
 One particularly pressing question has been the relationship of Orthodoxy and 
democracy, which was mentioned briefly above.  Following the fall of communism, 
more parts of the Orthodox world seemed to turn to some type of democracy in its 
modern form in order to address various issues with their political systems.   This 
continuing trend has caused some to look to the Byzantine past for a paradigm to 
apply to current realities for the Church.  Others, however, have looked more 
critically at historical relations between the Orthodox Church and the Byzantine state, 
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hoping to learn from the mistakes of the past in order to create a better future for 
Orthodox Christianity in the new millennium.  As Aristotle Papanikolaou pointed out 
in his article on Orthodoxy and democracy, the former position has been argued by 
Stanely Harakas and the latter by Vigen Guroian.272  Papanikolaou analyzed the two 
points of view in this way and then presented his own, slightly different proposal: 
The fundamental flaw with Harakas’s method is that it seems to imply that 
because symphonia was the model in the Byzantine past it should exist as the 
norm for Orthodox understandings of church-state relations in the present 
situation.  There is no attempt to try to justify symphonia as being 
theologically normative.  In this sense, the past, as Guroian argues, is not 
sufficient justification for guiding the Orthodox today and may even lead the 
Orthodox to continue their mistakes…. Guroian’s rejection, however, of any 
notion of public morality ultimately leads him to sectarianism….273  
 
[I]nsofar as the notion of a politically and religiously diverse community is the 
necessary result of the church as an eschatological community in the world, it 
is not a contradiction for the church to attempt to missionize the world and 
simultaneously recognize the need for a common good around which diverse 
groups unite to form a community…. In the end, the understanding of 
“church” in the Orthodox tradition as an eschatological community through 
the eucharistic worship demands engagement in both types of activities.274   
 
Papanikolaou implies that too often the Orthodox have looked to the Byzantine past 
through rose-colored glasses and have not done enough critical analysis to properly 
apply the theological tradition of the Church in the modern context.  Like Guroian, he 
suggests looking to the sacramental foundations of the Church for answers to the 
question of relations between Orthodox Christianity and democracy.  Though these 
points seem valid and in line with some of the comments of theologians discussed 
already in this chapter, Papanikolaou’s final conclusion that modern democratic forms 
of government are necessarily the “most consistent with [the Orthodox Church’s] own 
theological principles,” is much more questionable and open for debate.275 
 There has been much talk within the Church about how to respond to 
nationalism, since the nation-state principle of organization has now spread (often by 
force) throughout the globe.  Some Orthodox theologians have said that there is plenty 
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of room within the Church for diversity and even though the modern notion of 
nationalism has been destructive in many ways, nationalism in a more generic sense 
need not be feared, They would say, in fact, that it has been beneficial at times for 
Orthodoxy.  Metropolitan Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia made this point in his famous 
work, The Orthodox Church, when he said the following: 
Certainly this close identification of Orthodoxy with the life of the people, and 
in particular the system of national Churches, has had unfortunate 
consequences…. [Orthodox Christians] have often confused the two and have 
made the Church serve the ends of national politics…. Nationalism has been 
the bane of Orthodoxy for the last ten centuries.  Yet the integration of Church 
and people has in the end proved immensely beneficial.  Christianity among 
the Slavs [for example] became in very truth the religion of the whole people, 
a popular religion in the best sense.276  
 
Metropolitan Kallistos clarifies here that the roots of the national Churches – that is, 
the Greek Orthodox Church, the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox 
Church, etc. – extend back to many centuries before the modern period.  He also 
proposes through his example of the conversion of the Slavs to Christianity in the 
tenth century that an entire people could be transformed by religion.  It seems that 
Metropolitan Kallistos, at least, (and one could point to numerous other examples) 
believes that religion and nationality can be compatible, as long as the former is not a 
slave of the latter.  Still, the Orthodox Church continues to search for a way to resolve 
this among its people and within its own hierarchical structures.   
ECCLESIOLOGY 
 There are at least three important questions that Orthodox Christians have had 
to face as they have addressed the challenges to the Church posed from secularism, 
individualism, modern technology, globalization, and nationalism.  Each question has 
to do with recovering an authentic identity in this postmodern era.  The remainder of 
this chapter will assert that an important component of each question for the Orthodox 
has to do with a rediscovery of their (historic and current) relationship with Islam and 
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Muslims.  In order to work out their identity and move forward in a healthy way, 
Orthodox Christians must fully come to terms with Islam.277  The three key questions 
are: 1) What is the role of the Holy Spirit in terms of the evolution of the Church and 
the relationship between Orthodoxy Christianity and Islam?; 2) What is the role of the 
ecumenical patriarch – who is positioned in a predominantly Muslim country and 
does not have the backing from an Orthodox political leader – in the world today?; 
and 3) What is the continued relevance of the Byzantine model for church 
organization?                       
 On the first question, John Meyendorff acknowledged in a presentation he 
gave to a primarily Orthodox and Roman Catholic audience at a colloquium in Italy in 
1980, that the typical “Orthodox concern for continuity [with the past] easily 
transforms itself into frozen conservatism of almost anecdotal character” and that 
“blind fear of any change leads to a gradual drifting into sectarianism.”278  He 
proposed, therefore, that at least in the dialogue between Roman Catholicism and 
Orthodoxy, Christians should look at the “role of the Holy Spirit in history, i.e., the 
issue of continuous revelation or doctrinal development.”  He argued that the, “forms 
and structures of the Church can and should adapt themselves to the changing 
conditions of history,” and that based on this understanding Orthodox Christians 
could recognize the work of the Spirit within the Roman Catholic tradition.  He 
cautioned, though, that, “historical change [ought to] be evaluated in terms of its 
consistency with tradition, and only secondarily in terms of its relevance to the needs 
of the historical moment when it occurs.”279  Though this is a very important 
observation and Meyendorff himself did write a key article on the relationship of 
Orthodoxy and Islam during the Byzantine period280, he did not do a sufficient job of 
applying his own logic about the work of the Holy Spirit in history to Islam and 
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relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the postmodern world.  
Hopefully the current generation of Orthodox theologians will take the lead of 
Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos) and Metropolitan Georges (Khodr), as 
discussed in chapter two of this study, in extending the role of the Holy Spirit to apply 
to other religions and in particular to the historical relationship between Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam. 
 The question of the role of the ecumenical patriarch in today’s world has been 
at the heart of the discussions on the renewal of Orthodox ecclesiology, which were 
fervently pursued during the twentieth century, but have yet to be fully resolved.  
Numerous Orthodox theologians – especially Georges Florovsky, Nicholas Aranasiev, 
John Meyendorff, Niko Nissiotis, John Zizioulas, John Erickson, and Thomas 
FitzGerald – have addressed the issue in their work on ecclesiology.  After 
recognizing that Orthodoxy’s theological tradition had uncritically adopted (especially 
in the eighteenth century) important aspects of Roman Catholic scholasticism – a 
trend that Georges Florovsky referred to as a pseudomorphōsis281 – they then 
attempted to reframe leadership and authority in the Church by talking about 
‘eucharist ecclesiology.’282  This was the idea that the identity of the Church is rooted 
in the eucharistic assembly, for in the words of Metropolitan Georges (Khodr), “The 
Church is not a society but rather a gathering.”283  Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) 
wrote: 
…the eucharistic nature of Ecclesiology…. [in which] the principle of the 
‘one’ and the ‘many’ is fundamental [because]…. There is a single Eucharist 
in the universal Church, and nevertheless this unique Eucharist is as the same 
time many Eucharists…. The one and the many exist simultaneously, just as 
they do in the very Being of God as Trinity and in the Person of Christ as a 
spiritual Being…. [though] the nature of the Eucharist points to the 
simultaneity of the local and the universal in ecclesiology….284 
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The eucharistic assembly reveals the Church as both local and universal.  These 
simultaneous aspects are also played out in a very real way in the Church through the 
ministry of the bishop, particularly the ecumenical patriarch who is considered in the 
Orthodox Church to represent the first among equals among the primates, or ancient 
patriarchates of the Church.285   
 Orthodox theologians have identified a number of reasons why the Church 
today clearly needs the kind of leadership that can only be provided by the ecumenical 
patriarch.  First and foremost, is the functional and symbolic role that his office brings 
to uniting the various national churches into the “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic 
Church,” which is proclaimed at each Divine Liturgy of the Orthodox Church.  
Without his leadership, it would be nearly impossible for Orthodox Christians to 
present a united witness in the ever-changing modern world, a world beset with 
serious challenges to the Church.  The proof of this is the progress that has been made 
toward the convening of a forthcoming, and much anticipated, Great Council of all of 
the Orthodox Churches (and perhaps even Rome if the East and the West can 
somehow achieve reunion).  The various Pan-Orthodox conferences and commissions 
convened in efforts to plan for a future Great Council would not have been possible 
without the direct leadership of the ecumenical patriarch.  As one Orthodox 
theologian put it, the key functions of the ‘first bishop’ are to assure that “a constant 
consultation and conciliarity takes place between all Orthodox Churches” and that 
“ecclesiastical order…be secured.”286   
 It was one thing for the ecumenical patriarch to exercise this universal role in 
the Church with the power of the Byzantine Emperor – and in many ways by 
extension the Ottoman Caliph – behind him.  It has been quite another for him to 
exercise his roles and responsibilities under the pressures and new challenges imposed 
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on him by modernity.   Several Orthodox theologians have argued that the Church has 
in many ways had to make a paradigm shift in the way it thinks about its symbolic 
leader, the ecumenical patriarch, and, therefore, the way it thinks about itself.  In other 
words, it has had to be in constant dialogue with itself, in terms of how it should 
understand its past, present, and future.  One can see this type of critical analysis 
demonstrated by John Meyendorff as he evaluated the relationship of the ecumenical 
patriarch and the emperor during the Byzantine period:  
[The] imperial Byzantine framework… involved positive and negative 
consequences.  For example, on the negative side, one can refer to the cultural 
rebellion against Byzantium of the non-Greek speaking Christians of the 
Middle East – Egyptian Copts, Armenians, Syrians – which led into the 
monophysite schism.  On the positive side, one must recognize the tremendous 
success of Byzantium in converting, educating and civilizing the Slavic 
nations of Eastern Europe, which are thus indebted to Byzantium not only for 
the content but also for the forms of their Orthodox culture.287   
 
Meyendorff was one of the great proponents of the ecumenical patriarch as leader of 
the Church in the modern world, but he recognized that the patriarch’s role would 
need to be redefined in some fashion to meet the current challenges faced by 
Orthodox Christianity.  He recognized that there should be continuity with the 
positive aspects of the Byzantine legacy.  At the same time, he also acknowledged 
that the realities of the modern period had in a way freed the Church from the 
confines of the Byzantine system, putting Orthodox Christians in a better position to 
learn from their past mistakes.   
 It seems that at least the current ecumenical patriarch, Bartholomew I, agrees 
that it is essential for the Church to discover a new and improved identity for his 
office, as well as a new definition of primacy.  Based on a number of interviews and 
conversations with him on this topic, Oliver Clément summed up Patriarch 
Bartholomew’s views in the following excerpt:   
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Constantinople’s weakness on the material plane, its poverty, ensures its 
impartiality and, paradoxically, increases its prestige.  The ecumenical 
patriarch has no pretensions to being a “universal bishop.”  He claims no 
dogmatic infallibility, no direct jurisdiction over all the faithful.  He has no 
temporal powers.  As a center of appeal whose aim is to preserve the faith and 
unity of all, his primacy consists not in power, but in a sacrificial offering of 
service, in imitation of the One who came not to be served but to serve…. His 
service is one of initiative, of coordination and presidency, always with the 
accord of sister Churches.  An ever-changing form of creative self-offering, 
which, dare we say, must be earned, primacy derives from the very structures 
of the Church and is indispensable to ensure the unity and universality of 
Orthodoxy…. Finally, it offers recourse for communities in exceptional or 
dangerous circumstances.288 
 
It is important to note that Clément’s comment about the patriarchate’s weakness 
today is a reference both to its lack of adequate financial support and its position in a 
predominantly Muslim country, under a secularized Turkish government that has been 
hostile at times (more so even than the Ottoman Caliphate) to its work and very 
existence.289  Clément does not assess these realities as signs of weakness, however.  
In fact, he argues that Patriarch Bartholomew’s inward and outward humility have 
actually given him more credibility as a world leader, not only to Orthodox 
Christians, but also to other Christians, international organizations, the scientific 
community (he has been nicknamed the “Green Patriarch” because of his support of 
environmentalist causes), foreign governments, and those of other religious traditions.  
Patriarch Bartholomew has truly led by example, but not all Orthodox Christians have 
been willing to follow his lead.  They have had difficulty with his openness to 
ecumenism and outspoken support of and engagement in inter-religious dialogue, 
especially with Islam.  The concerns over the role of the ecumenical patriarch, 
therefore, appear not to reside within the current patriarch himself, since he seems to 
have a pretty clear understanding and vision of how he should aspire to lead and what 
he should strive to accomplish.  
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 The third important question on ecclesiology for Orthodox Christians concerns 
the continued relevance of the Byzantine model for church organization.  As was 
already discussed in chapter one, the Orthodox Church was able to continue to 
function, albeit under some measure of constraints, under the same ecclesiological 
framework for much of its history, even under Muslim rule.  It was only with the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century that the model of symphonia was 
significantly questioned.  In many ways their, one might say forced, revisiting of the 
notion of symphonia has been at the heart of the identity crisis experienced by the 
Church and by Orthodox Christians around the world.  Though in one sense the 
Orthodox Christians living in so called diaspora290 have had to define and redefine 
themselves daily, in the main the identity crisis has been felt most strongly by those 
Orthodox Christians around the Mediterranean who had once been under Ottoman 
rule.  It was from this area that a number of new states and national churches formed, 
as various ethnic communities broke away from the Ottoman Empire during the 
modern period, or in the case of the Ecumenical Patriarchate had to renegotiate its 
universal function within the Church while at the same time learn to function as one 
of the religious leaders within the newly formed Turkish state.        
The Balkan region in the southeastern part of Europe serves as a good 
example of the difficulties Orthodox Christians have had in forming a healthy self-
concept, as the region has been transformed over the course of the past two centuries.  
As was mentioned in chapter one, beginning in the nineteenth century, the peoples of 
the Balkans won their independence from the Ottoman Empire and formed their own 
nations.  In doing so, they established for themselves national churches based on the 
Byzantine concept of symphonia for church-state relations.  Even though they drew 
upon this traditional ecclesiological framework as they built their new national 
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churches, in reality their identity was formed to a greater degree, and to some extent 
unknowingly, by the Western model of nationalism.  In an introduction to a project in 
Bulgaria that studied identity and Muslim-Christian relations, Jorgen Nielsen wrote:  
The Balkan region of Southeastern Europe is replete with the raw material of 
ethnic conflict.  More than most parts of Europe it has been a region of human 
mobility and mixing throughout its history…. The regular and repeated mixing 
of population groups over the centuries and millennia, not to mention regular 
metamorphoses of one ethnic identity into another, makes any attempt at a 
“racial” analysis of the Balkans an absurdity.   
 
But this was precisely what was placed on the political agenda during the 19th 
century as the region increasingly fought over before the Ottomans, Habsburgs 
and Romanovs, with the help of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, began to 
absorb Central European concepts of nationhood.  In the Balkans, in many 
other places, the introduction of the discourse of nation and the nation state 
stands as an almost impenetrable barrier in time.  It acts somewhat like a 
polaroid filter by which all previous history is interpreted and mobilized for 
the absolute and exclusive use of the nation project in the present. 
 
The tribal groupings of the Roman period become “proto-nations.”  
Communities which were defined by religion in the Ottoman period became 
“oppressed nations,” Bosnian Muslims have to be “really Croat” or “really 
Serb”…. All the events of the past, which had nothing to do with “nations,” 
are revived and become the weapons of a contemporary political game.  The 
past becomes myth and thus becomes distorted present.291    
  
As Nielsen points out, Orthodox Christians – as well as other Christians and Muslims 
in the region – began to conceive of themselves first in terms of their religious and/or 
ethic identities (Serbs, Bulgarians, Croats, Greeks, Turks, or Bosnians, Orthodox, 
Sunni Muslim, Roman Catholics, etc.) and only in a secondary sense by the way they 
were a part of any universal religious community.  This changed their very concept of 
what it means to be an Orthodox Christian (of for that matter a Muslim), how they 
view their Church, and how they conceive of their relationship, both past and present, 
with their non-Orthodox (often Muslim) neighbors.   
Returning to the question of ecclesiology as applied in the conditions 
described above, one has to ask whether the Byzantine model for church organization 
was indeed applied in the Balkans, as many Orthodox Christians believe?  Or, by 
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contrast, was this too part of the national myths that were created, but in reality suffer 
from a severe disconnect with the past?  Though the Balkan region has its own 
particularities, Orthodox Christians in other parts of the Mediterranean have in their 
own way been asking the same basic questions about the Byzantine legacy of 
symphonia.  Is the Byzantine framework of church organization and church-state 
relations still tenable in this postmodern world?  Is it desirable based on the 
application of Orthodox ecclesiological principles to today’s realities?  If so, to what 
extent has their national church lived up to the Byzantine ideal?  How does 
democracy fit in and what form might it take?  Now that the honeymoon period has 
worn off for the various national churches – and some have experienced in a 
particularly strong way the downside of nationalism through the bloody civil wars in 
Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia or the dire consequences of the political 
controversy over Cyprus – there are more questions than answers for Orthodox 
Christians.   
It seems more important now than ever for the Orthodox Christians to do some 
soul-searching in order to rediscover their true identity and that of their Church.  
Because of the historical relationship that Orthodox Christians have had with Muslims 
and the way they collectively have traveled side-by-side into modernity, it seems key 
that Orthodox Christians come to terms with this reality as they move forward in their 
quest for a healthy self-concept in the postmodern age.  If they neglect this important 
aspect of their past and present, their view of themselves will not be based on truth 
and love, and they will likely continue to suffer both individually and collectively 
from the psychoses and spiritual illnesses that plague modern man.  This at least was 
the point Patriarch Bartholomew seems to have been making during an important 
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speech at an international conference when he quoted the famous psychologist Carl 
Jung, who said: 
Among all my patients in the second half of life…every one of them fell ill 
because they had lost what the living religions of every age have given their 
followers; and not one of them has been really healed who did not regain his 
religious outlook.292  
 
He seems to have used this remark from Jung to convince his audience that it is 
essential for Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and others not to give in to the forces of 
modern life that would compel them to repress their religious outlook and history.  
According to the Patriarch, Orthodox Christians must work with those of other faiths, 
in particular Muslims because of their long-standing relationship between Orthodoxy 
and Islam, in order to “balance secular humanism and nationalism” and “temper the 
mindless pursuit of modernity” with “spiritual humanism and ecumenicity” by being 
“united in the spirit of the one God.”  In his view, only this will bring the kind of 
spiritual healing described by Jung. 
 The final section of this chapter will include a more complete analysis of the 
ways in which an honest assessment of the relationship with Islam and Muslims is 
essential for Orthodox Christians in their quest for their identity for today and for 
future generations.  It will also indicate how they could go about making this 
assessment, including ways in which they would benefit through dialogue with the 
Islamic traditions and with Muslims themselves.  First, however, it will be useful to 
briefly examine how Muslims have experienced a very similar reality to Orthodox 
Christians in their attempts to rediscover themselves and their own religious heritage.  
Like the Orthodox, who have had their institutions and worldviews severely 
challenged by modernity, Muslims have experienced a parallel ‘crisis’ over the past 
few centuries.   Moreover, they have in many instances responded to this crisis in 
similar ways, with comparable results to those of Orthodox Christians.    
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PARALLEL CRISIS IN ISLAM 
 
This next section will build on the historical background information covered 
in chapter one.  It is intended to be a very broad overview of the trends in Islamic 
thought and practice in the modern and postmodern periods based on a synthesis of 
information from a variety of accepted sources.  The emphasis will be on how 
Muslims have responded to the various changes and circumstances in which they have 
found themselves over the past two or three centuries.  In this sense, the following 
section argues nothing new, particularly in the field of Islamic Studies.  What is new – 
at least in terms of what will be asserted – is the way in which the experiences of 
Muslims and Orthodox Christians are connected and, perhaps, derive from or are in 
response to the same realities that they have collectively faced in the modern and 
postmodern periods.   
By summarizing some of the most noted works in Islamic Studies today, one 
could make certain generalities about the Muslim experience.293  Using very broad 
strokes to represent the entire history of Islam, it is possible to divide it into three 
major epochs: 1) the golden years – from the rise of Islam (in 622 CE) through to the 
end of the age of the Rashidun (the four ‘righteous’ caliphs, up to 661 CE), 2) the 
period of world dominance (from the seventh through the seventeenth centuries), and 
3) the modern period (from the eighteen century to the present).   Within this, one 
could also add that there were two events that inaugurated major crises within the 
Islamic community (the Ummah): 1) the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century 
and 2) the rise of the West, beginning in the eighteenth century (the latter being 
experienced most dramatically by Arab Muslims).   
During the centuries that followed the first great crisis, Islam was able to 
recover in large part due to the ability of Muslims to convert their Mongol overlords 
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to Islam.  Though Islam as a religion and a civilization was able to survive – and even 
thrive as it built up three great regional powers (the Safavi, Ottoman, and Mughal 
empires), which peaked in the sixteenth century – there were important consequences 
that would contribute to the degree of which it felt the second major crisis.  The 
devastating blow of the Mongol invasions remained for generations in the historical 
memory of Muslims.  The realization that a catastrophe of such magnitude could 
happen to the people of God caused at least some to be more introspective.  The result 
was a tipping of the scales from what was once a synthesis and parity between ‘Shar’i 
consciousness’ (following Islamic law) and Sufism to a more prominent focus on the 
real and the here and now than on Sufi speculations.294  As one scholar of Islam put it, 
this “conservative spirit” was an important theme of the pre-modern age that had a 
great impact on how the people of the Muslim world responded to the realignments of 
power during the modern age.295 
In a similar fashion to Orthodox Christians, as described in this chapter, 
Muslims experienced the modern period and the rise of the West as a kind of identity 
crisis.  In their case it was the second great crisis of Islamic history.  Here is how one 
Muslim scholar described the consequences of modernization: 
Two almost distinct species of homo sapiens appear to be evolving…. [For 
example,] it would be difficult to explain to the proverbial Martian that those 
people living on the continent of Africa and those on that of north America 
belong to the same species…. The problem with [Western] civilization is the 
hole where the heart should be, the vacuum inside; there is no moral 
philosophy or set of principles that drives it.  What gives it its dynamic energy 
is individualism, the desire to dominate, the sheer drive to acquire material 
items, to hoard.  Every technological development must be gathered into your 
home; it is the obsession to out-buy, out-eat and out-sex the Joneses next 
door…. Such frenetic energy keeps [this] society moving, but all the evidence 
– presented by its own analysis – suggests dissatisfaction and despair.   
 
For the African or Asian we met above, this [Western] civilization would, 
more likely than not, be seen as a kaleidoscopic jumble of caricatures and 
stereotypes…. [A]s it dazzles the African and Asian with images of plenty, of 
a cornucopia…it withholds access to them.  These tantalizing images [of 
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Western civilization] are thus no more than dangerous illusions for the 
majority of the people on the planet.  They cannot solve anything; but they 
can, through the envy and desire they spread, spoil a great deal of 
contentment, patience and balance – the virtues of traditional society which no 
longer have the power to soothe or mollify.  [Therefore] much depends [for 
the future of the world] on those who can build bridges between the two 
civilizations.296 
 
Notice here the echoes of the Orthodox theologians mentioned in this chapter in their 
analysis of the themes of secularism, individualism, personal freedom, technology, 
globalization, and (by contrast) traditional society and religion.  Admittedly, this is 
just one quote from one individual, but it encapsulates the sentiments of many 
Muslims as they have looked with anxiety and despair at the state of affairs for 
themselves, their families, and their religious communities.297    
It seems that Muslims today, much like Orthodox Christians, continue to be in 
the process of responding to the crisis of modernity, and the outcome of this for Islam, 
Muslims, and the rest of the world remains to be seen.  One aspect of their history – at 
least in many parts of the Muslim world with the most notable exception in what is 
now Turkey – which differs from that of Orthodox Christians and, therefore, has 
colored their response is that they had to endure the ill effects of colonialism by 
Western governments.  The colonial period and its aftermath caused, among other 
things, a dependence on Western expertise, upper class accommodation, a 
Westernized education system, and the demarcations of their nations through 
boundaries determined in large part on the interests of Western states.  The 
consequences of colonialism, in their intensity and longevity, have differed greatly 
from one region to another.  Suffice it to say, though, that the era left its mark and is 
still part of the discourse about the legacy of modernity and how Muslims should 
respond.   
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A theme that seems to be common among many Muslims is the notion that 
“Islam” is the answer to the pressures they feel from modernization.  In other words, 
there is general agreement, at least over the last couple of generations, that Muslims 
can rediscover their identity, position, and purpose in the world today by looking to 
their own religious tradition.  In practice, this has meant a number of things to 
different people, to the extent that while some have veered little from the traditions 
passed on to them from the previous generation, others have employed, in the words 
of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “completely non-Islamic categories of thought and action in 
the name of Islam and [have made] use of non-Islamic means to justify what they 
consider to be Islamic ends.”298 
Though such categorization can be essentialist and misleading, it might be 
useful for this discussion to point out at least five general trends in Islamic thought 
that represent the variety of responses among Muslims to the modern age.  First is the 
modernist who says that Islam must “modernize” to survive.299  This would include 
the Westernization of Islamic law, theology, schools, and political institutions.  
Second is the reformist who insists that Muslims must go back to the original 
teachings of the religions and bring the basic principles to modern Islam.300  The 
emphasis is on the restoration of Islamic law in order to modernize the religion 
without Westernizing it.  Third is the revivalist who attempts to implement the 
‘original teachings’ of the religion directly through a kind of cultural renewal in order 
to present an Islamic alternative to modernist acculturation.301  This is a kind of 
grassroots revival en mass that would transform social order in Muslim society one 
person at a time.  The revivalist can sometimes be puritanical with leanings toward 
extremism, but is nearly always rationalistic, despite the fact that some of the 
movements representing this trend are organized around the basic structure of the Sufi 
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orders.  Fourth is the mahdist (from the messianic deliverer at the end of time know as 
the Mahdi) who during times of great change and fluctuation in power alignments 
uses eschatological expectations to spur action.302  Charismatic leaders take advantage 
of periodic conditions of heightened expectations and claim to be the Mahdi (or at 
least hint that they might be the Mahdi or someone closely associated with him).  And 
fifth is the revolutionist who is a radical supporter of political as well as social 
revolution in the name of Islam, such that Islam becomes an ideology, not just a 
religion, philosophy, or worldview.303  The ends – always considered “Islamic” – 
justify the means and even though those of this persuasion are often adamantly anti-
Western, they base their methods on the “revolution,” a construct of European 
political philosophy. 
One can see that there is a great degree of divergence within Islam in terms of 
the ways Muslims have responded to the philosophical assumptions of modernity and 
modernization, which acts upon them.  This situation has presented a number of 
problems in Islam, not because the religion has a low tolerance for diversity, but 
rather because of the radical breakdown of traditional religious authorities and related 
institutions.  As Richard Bulliet put it: 
[T]he new religious authorities [that is, those who capitalized on the “media 
revolution” to “credibly cite Muhammad as their inspiration”]….304 [are] 
individuals whose religious credentials would have been laughed at in the 
eighteenth century.  Thus ordinary Muslims are understandably uncertain as to 
where true authority lies…. New ways must be found to credential and 
empower religious authorities.  Ordinary believers must be persuaded to 
follow the decisions of those authorities.  And people with inadequate 
credentials must be accorded a lesser standing.  Getting ordinary Muslims to 
accept a new authority structure, however, will depend on whether that 
structure is responsive to today’s moral, political, and social problems.305 
 
In other words, much like Orthodox Christianity that has been going through an 
ecclesiological crisis, Islam has suffered a similar fate.  Muslims are revisiting the 
significance of the Ummah and their relationship to it.  They are asking what it means 
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to be a Muslim in today’s world, as well as what is from Islam, or “Islamic,” and what 
is not.  They are looking for leaders who can give them some answers to these and 
similar questions.   
 On the question of nationalism, much like in Orthodox Christianity today, 
there is a tension in Islam between national and international expressions of the 
religion and how it should be played out in the world.  Even though there is no 
concept of “Church” in Islam and no direct debate relating to “primacy,” there is a 
parallel struggle to what is taking place in Orthodox Christianity in that there are 
those who are striving to assert themselves as leader(s) of the Muslim world.  
Individuals, governments, institutions, and organizations are all trying desperately, 
and simultaneously, to fill the leadership vacuum that was created when the office of 
caliphate (Khilafah) was abolished in 1924.  One scholar explained it this way: 
It is important to view the development of the institutions and organizations in 
the Muslim world against the background of their struggle for independence 
from the colonial powers and their search for an Ummah identity, especially 
after the fall of the Ottoman Khilafah in 1924.  Muslims were conscious of the 
educational and social backwardness of their community and the decline of the 
spiritual and moral aspects of Muslims in the world.  They discussed their 
problems at [the] national level and often took the opportunity to have 
discussions with other Muslims from various parts of the world in Makkah 
during the Hajj.  Even small conferences were held with a political agenda.  
After the fall of the Khilafah, the urgency to find an alternative increased.306 
 
Despite the fact that in the first quarter of the twentieth century the Caliph had very 
little real power or influence over Muslims throughout the world, the caliphate did at 
least serve a symbolic role as a unifying force for the Ummah.  Though there was 
really no dramatic, universal outcry when Mustafa Kemal (later known as, Ataturk, 
‘father of the Turks’) abolished the caliphate in 1924, over the years there has been a 
natural progression toward finding something or someone to fill the leadership role 
within the Ummah.  
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 Another pressing question with the rise of nationalism, particularly after the 
Second World War, throughout what at one time could be considered the great 
‘Islamicate Civilization,’ has been whether democracy, and the related notion of 
pluralism, can be considered Islamic.307  This, at least the pluralism piece, is germane 
to Muslim-Christian relations and inter-religious dialogue, because of the issues 
surrounding religious minorities in the number of relatively newly formed ‘Islamic’ 
nations.  Though Islam has a long history of interaction with other religions – 
something mentioned in the Qur’an itself and covered in great detail in shari‘ah – the 
modern notion of nationalism has forced Muslims to rediscover, reinterpret, and 
reapply their tradition’s position on how to treat non-Muslims in their midst.  Again, 
there has been a great variety of opinion on this topic, which has only highlighted the 
fact that Islam is struggling to find a new way of identifying and credentialing 
religious authorities that can provide a consistent position on these matters.  As with 
the other issues discussed above, it comes down to finding one’s identity, and that of 
the Ummah, in an age of homogenization and the decline of local cultures and this can 
only occur (at least in a healthy way) when one comes to terms with his or her 
neighbor. 
  
ISLAM AND A NEW ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN IDENTITY IN THE WORLD 
 
Orthodox Christians will likely, until the day that Christ returns in the 
eschaton, always feel a tension between living in this life and the life of the Kingdom 
of God, which is not yet fully realized.  It is often said that they are called to work out 
their salvation while living between these two worlds.  Summing up the thought of the 
famous Russian theologian, Sergius Bulgakov, on this point, Michael Plekon wrote: 
The Church of her very nature is inclusive, universal, intended to encompass 
all human beings of all time, since all “belong to Christ’s humanity.”308  There 
are therefore no limits to the Church for she is defined by both the Incarnation 
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and Pentecost.  But a Church of such heavenly beauty and glory, is also of 
space and time.  This Church is brought down to earth, to specific 
locations…to the entire expanse of human history, to the structures of law, 
power, hierarchy.309  The Church cannot “be understood outside of history, 
deprived of flesh and blood, torn away from place and time.”310  Yet the 
empirical, historical, institutional and canonical Church we experience will 
never perfectly coincide with the Church as divine-humanity, the former’s 
limits drawn humanly, relatively, imperfectly.  The will always be a “Church 
outside the churches,” (ecclesia extra ecclesias).311 
 
According to Bulgakov and Plekon, Orthodox Christians (and the Orthodox Church) 
must do everything in their power to reveal the divine spark in each person and each 
religion.  They suggest this is an important aspect of their mission as Christians and as 
members of what they believe to be the, “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church.”  
They point out that, after all, the individuals one encounters each day may very well 
be part of the Church of Christ in ‘eschatological’ terms.   
If indeed both Orthodox Christians and Muslims (particularly those of Arab 
descent) have experienced in similar ways the modern period and the rise of the West 
as a kind of identity crisis, would it not seem that through working together they could 
more easily discover meaning, purpose, and a way forward through the continued 
challenges of life in this postmodern world?  This has been the conclusion of a 
growing number of Orthodox theologians and leaders over the past few decades.  For 
example, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, who has been a strong supporter of and 
participant in Muslim-Christian dialogue, has taken a number of opportunities to point 
out the similarities of Orthodox Christians and Muslims in their quest to re-discover 
an identity: 
We must recover our Orthodox faith and heritage and proclaim its virtues…. 
[W]e must mention the similar treatment [in the modern period] accorded our 
Muslim neighbors.  They, too, have seen their faith dissected and their history 
disfigured.  For this reason, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is a sponsor of 
“dialogue of loving truth” between Muslims and Orthodox Christians.  We 
hope to put behind us what is unpleasant while putting forward the best values 
of humankind.  We have a sacred duty, especially in light of our 540 years of 
coexistence in a predominantly Muslim milieu, to affirm the Christian gospel 
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that we must love God with all our heart and love our neighbor as ourselves 
(Matt. 22:37-39).312 
 
Patriarch Bartholomew identifies together the experiences of Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims in the modern period and encourages them to look to their shared past as 
neighbors for resources as they move forward into the future.   
 Professor Astérios Argyriou has also effectively argued that Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims should work together in light of their shared experiences of 
modernity.  The following quotation from Professor Argyriou outlines some of the 
reasons for this, as well as the resulting temptations: 
Orthodox [Christians] and Muslims feel as strangers in the contemporary 
technological civilization, in the construction of modern societies, and in the 
values that govern our so-called Western world.  Historical reasons made it 
such that our communities did not participate in the construction of this new 
world that began to commence at the time of the Renaissance.  Furthermore, 
we share the sentiment that this world was constructed at our expense by the 
exploitation, colonial or otherwise, of our human and natural resources.  Also, 
we share the tendency to distrust the West (in the best case) or even to reject it 
completely (in the worst case)…. [We mutually] endeavor to return to our 
sources, to revive and to reactualize our (generally idealized) past.  This 
attitude does not signify however that we refuse to serve ourselves…of the 
acquisitions of the modern technological civilization (methods of 
transportation and communication, industrial products, arms, scientific 
knowledge, etc.)313   
 
Argyriou’s comments point to the generally contradictory and often self-deceptive 
attitudes shared by both Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the world today.  While 
on the one hand they rightly identify a number of things that emerged from the West 
that led to and continue to be the source of their internal crises, their attempts to 
rediscover their identities have often fallen short because they have not honestly 
confronted their past or present.  Argyriou goes on to point out that because of this 
dysfunctional relationship with modernity, too often Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims have succumbed to the temptation of fundamentalism and, despite their 
common history and parallels, have aggressively attacked each other (both in words 
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and in literal bloodshed).  He also shows, however, examples of a better way in which 
Muslims and Orthodox Christians have worked together constructively through 
dialogue and shared witness to God’s truth and salvation for the world.314    
 One can begin to see how Orthodox theologians and leaders have argued that 
dialogue with Islam and Muslims can benefit the Orthodox in their quest for 
rediscovered identity.  Together with their Muslim brothers and sisters they say, ‘We 
are in this together.  We have experienced a lot of the same things in the modern 
period and have struggled with similar issues.  Perhaps together we can find common 
answers and assist each other.’  Though Orthodox Christians have noted that in many 
ways they have more in common with Muslims than the West in their experience of 
modernity, they have also not neglected to reach out to other Christians, of both the 
Western and Eastern traditions, over the last several decades.  Indeed, as John 
Erickson has pointed out, the Orthodox participation in the ecumenical movement 
both resulted in and provided potential solutions to the increased identity crisis felt so 
strongly within the Orthodox Church.  In a critical assessment of his own tradition he 
said: 
In the 20th century, this identity has come into question.  The most 
conspicuous and most controversial aspect of this 20th-century challenge to 
our perceived identity has been ecumenism…. [W]e sometimes have presented 
and interpreted the history of the Church in ways too simplistic and 
triumphalistic to be taken seriously today.  They also raise some more 
fundamental questions.   Have we unwittingly mistaken a derivative external 
identity for the Church’s ultimate identity?  Have we allowed her living 
tradition to be replaced by traditionalism, i.e., a self-satisfied attachment to 
received forms which no longer serve and express her organic continuity as 
the Spirit-filled Body of Christ?  The two-fold dialogue in which we have 
engaged in the 20th century, with other Christians and with our own past, has 
indeed been unsettling…. But this two-fold dialogue must continue and indeed 
become bolder in the subjects which it decides to address.315   
 
Professor Erickson points out that the Orthodox have not done a good enough job of 
taking a self-critical look at their own history, practices, and attitudes.  He concludes 
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that as a result, they have distorted the essence of the Church by attempting to freeze 
it in time, rather than encourage and participate with the life-giving and dynamic 
energies of the Holy Spirit.  Professor Erickson suggests that in order for the Church 
to ‘express her organic continuity as the Spirit-filled Body of Christ,’ Orthodox 
Christians need to be in dialogue with the other Christian traditions.  His conclusions 
are insightful and inspiring and Professor Erickson has demonstrated through his 
tireless efforts the fruits of ecumenism, both for the Orthodox and for their Roman 
Catholic and Protestant co-religionists.  Does it not make sense, however, to speak of 
a three-fold dialogue instead of a two-fold dialogue?  Orthodox Christians ought to be 
in dialogue with other Christians, yes.  But is it not also appropriate for them to be in 
dialogue with their own past?  It seems, from what has been discussed in the 
preceding pages of this study, that to complete the picture, especially for the 21st 
century, Orthodox Christians must be in dialogue with Islam and Muslims.  In fact, 
because of their history with Islam and their continued co-existence in many parts of 
the Orthodox world with Muslims, it would be difficult for them to successfully 
engage their own past without having a full and honest appraisal of their relationship 
with Islam.   
 Orthodox writers of various sorts have almost unanimously condemned 
nationalism as a source of division, faction, and even heresy within the Church.  Too 
often, however, it has been acceptable to place the blame for the rise of nationalism 
upon Islam instead of on the acceptance by the Orthodox themselves of Western 
concepts and related modern forms of political organization.  This can be seen in the 
following comment from Basil Cousins, who in other regards is a respected scholar 
(especially of Russian Orthodoxy): 
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There is not the space to examine the reasons for ethnicity within Orthodoxy 
in general except to propose that the various ethnic Orthodox Churches 
evolved under the pressure of Islamic conquest.  The result is that it is 
commonplace in the West to find separate Russian, Greek, Serbian, etc. 
Orthodox Churches in the same city.316 
 
Cousins’ remarks about the impact of the Islamic conquests upon the Orthodox 
Church, are not that uncommon.  There has often been a disconnect for Orthodox 
Christians in their assessment of the past as it pertains to relations with Islam and 
Muslims.  In many ways, it is a prejudice that has been carried over from generation 
to generation, since the Orthodox first began to feel inspired and challenged by the 
modern notions of nationalism, individualism, and secularism. 
 This point was eloquently addressed by Tarek Mitri in a speech that he gave in 
the late 1990’s.  Breaking with status quo, he challenged Orthodox Christians (as well 
as Muslims) to take a critical look at themselves and their attitudes in order to 
discover their genesis.  He asked them to think carefully about what had informed 
communal memory and challenged them to be more faithful to themselves and their 
true heritage:    
It is not ancestral hatred that is the cause of wars, and the examples are 
many, but war causes hatred.  Ancestral hatred is, more often than not, 
fabricated rather than inherited.  It is in many ways a creation of 
modernity, and much less an expression of a continued history…. 
Hatred is inculcated as much, or even more, by a modern discourse 
than by memory.  It is often stirred up by radio broadcasts, articles in 
the press and television programmes than inherited from parents.  If the 
past does not meet the needs of the present, another one can always be 
invented…. [W]hen we observe the relationship between nationalism, 
ethnicism and religion, we see the latter functioning as a sort of 
diacritical mark.  There are conflicts between communities that have a 
religious past, but the religious content is of no or little relevance.  A 
religion in which people have little or no faith continues to define a 
community in which they have much faith.317 
 
With these words, which were part of his introductory remarks at a Muslim-Christian 
dialogue, Tarek Mitri sums up the challenges many Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
alike have faced as they have struggled to come to terms with their identity in the 
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modern and postmodern periods.  Unknowingly, they have allowed themselves to be 
influenced by notions foreign to their traditions and sometimes even deliberately 
misleading information about their shared past.  His conclusion is that the animosity 
often found between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, particularly in their 
traditional homelands, began in large part as the product of foreign invention – though 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims themselves in their respective communities have 
since perpetuated it.   
 Tarek Mitri’s notion about a ‘fabricated ancestral history’ introduced in the 
modern period to portray the relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims as 
generally antagonistic, raises some interesting questions.  For example, why have so 
many Orthodox Christians been willing to accept this distortion of their history?  
Also, why is Islam such a stumbling block for them today?  Could it be that it is not 
so much because they have difficulty accepting the fact that their ancestors lived for 
centuries under the dominion of Islam, but more so because they have had difficulty 
accepting the fall of their glorious Byzantine civilization?  As was demonstrated 
earlier in this chapter, Byzantium symbolizes much for the Orthodox, particularly in 
light of the fact that they are surrounded in their worship by Byzantine style (or at 
least Byzantine inspired) architecture, iconography, music, and even physical 
movements and gestures.318  Perhaps part of their difficulty in moving on is coming to 
terms with their deep sense of loss and confusion in the modern period over the 
eclipse of their Byzantine civilization.   
There is a certain finality about the effect of the modern world upon the 
Church that may be causing Orthodox Christians to question God in a new way, one 
very similar to the questioning of many Muslims in the face of modernity.  However, 
instead of causing them to be more introspective in order to resolve a kind of spiritual 
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crisis, some have been reactive, looking for something and someone upon which to 
place blame.  The result has been a certain amount of finger pointing at Muslims, 
making Islam the scapegoat for past and present problems of Eastern Christianity.319  
Though the Orthodox are known, especially in ecumenical circles, for their emphasis 
on the role and work of the Holy Spirit in the world, they have unfortunately not 
always applied this to their own history.  Few Orthodox theologians in the modern 
period have discussed whether the very existence of Islam and its impact on 
Orthodoxy over the centuries may have been for a reason and could perhaps be 
understood as part of the divine economy through the work of the Holy Spirit.320  
Perhaps it is no coincidence that Muslims and Orthodox Christians have found 
themselves to be neighbors and friends for so many centuries.  If the Byzantine 
civilization was challenged by Islamic civilization and both, in the broadest sense, 
have now been challenged by Western civilization, what does it all mean?  The basic 
question is a mysterious one: How has the Holy Spirit been at work over time?  
Related to this is the practical question: What should be the response of Christians 
(especially Orthodox Christians whose dogma underlines the significance of the Holy 
Spirit in the world) to all of this as they work synergistically with the Holy Spirit to 
bring about the will of God?   
 Based on what has been presented in this chapter about Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims in recent years, it seems that some of them share a basic cynicism about 
modernity and, though acknowledging certain benefits, have warned of the potential 
consequences of further modernization for humanity and the planet.  Many of them 
also seem to agree that spiritual and psychological problems in the postmodern world 
can only be addressed through a rediscovery and reapplication of true religion, as 
inspired by the Orthodox Christian and Islamic traditions, as well as other world 
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religions in their traditional forms.  This thinking has led some to bring to light the 
possibilities for Muslims and Orthodox Christians as they work together to solve key 
shared concerns, as well as critical issues of importance for everyone on the globe.   
 One example of this innovative way of thinking can be found in a question 
posed in an article from the year 2000 by Konstantinos Romanos.  In his article, 
Romanos criticized the conservatism of thought in Byzantine culture, which in his 
view never lived up to the potential it inherited from Hellenic culture, but he also 
praised Islam: 
Islam preaches the ‘middle course’ lying between the non-worldly 
transcendence  (“My kingdom is not of this world” – Jesus) and its opposite, 
the unbounded, materialistic secularism…. The development of science during 
Islam’s ‘golden age’ is linked through a powerful realism to the assertion of 
the physical world as a positive expression of the spiritual reality.321 
 
For Romanos, Islamicate civilization, prior to its ultimate breakdown with 
modernization, presented a particularly appealing model, because it supported the 
implementation of the highest Hellenic ideals in a much fuller way than by either the 
Byzantine or Modern Civilizations.  He went on to say: 
[T]heoretical Islam is considered by many researchers as the last glorious 
chapter of science of the Hellenistic world and as the lawful heir of the late 
Hellenistic culture which it developed in a creative way.  If one day, especially 
in the Mediterranean region, there is a fruitful dialogue between Orthodoxy 
and the Islam for peace and universality, beyond all fundamentalist 
fanaticisms and entrenchments, the vehicle of this dialogue cannot be other 
than the Hellenic Philosophical Culture, the only necessary and desirable 
mediation.  In the opposite case, as common ground of the two religions will 
remain the Jewish prophetic tradition which will continue to encourage its 
descendants in the anti-dialogical stance of the zealot and of non-tolerance.322 
 
Romanos suggests that it is essential that Orthodox Christians continue to be in 
dialogue with Muslims and to learn about true Islam in order for them to find their 
true identity in the “Hellenic Philosophical Culture,” a legacy shared by both Eastern 
Christianity and Islam.  It seems that what Romanos has in mind here is not the 
modern concept of Greek nationalism that harkens back to Ancient Greece while 
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often completely ignoring Hellenized and Byzantine Christianity.  Instead he is 
suggesting instead something similar to what the Orthodox theologian Georges 
Florovsky used to refer to as “Christian Hellenism” and the “patristic mind.”  This is 
the trend of early Eastern Christians to fully appropriate the best of Greek philosophy 
with the traditions embedded in Christian scripture and practice.323  Similar to 
Florovsky’s concept of being in dialogue with the patristic period of Orthodox history 
in order to creatively address the issues and problems of today, Romanos encourages 
Orthodox Christians to be in dialogue with Muslims and have an awareness of past 
relations between the two religions in order for both Muslims and Christians to better 
face the challenges of life in the postmodern world. 
 Another Orthodox theologian to raise some interesting questions relating to 
Muslims and Christians creatively working together to address shared concerns is 
Metropolitan Georges (Khodr).  As a Lebanese Christian leader, Metropolitan 
Georges has been at the forefront of the movement to bring together Christians of the 
various churches and denominations, as well as a pioneer in Muslim-Christian 
dialogue both in his own country and on the international level.  He has also been an 
advocate for Arabism, that is the rediscovery of the glories of the language, history, 
and culture of all Arabs and those they influenced over the centuries.  In a similar way 
to how one might be inclined to judge the Hellenistic tendency in Romanos at first 
glance, one might conclude that Metropolitan Georges is nothing more than an Arab 
nationalist like any other nation-loving patriot around the globe.  However, on further 
examination of his writings it becomes clear that he has a deep religious motivation in 
his advocacy for Arabism and that this inward drive leads him straight to an encounter 
with Islam: 
We must first understand that the Qur’an calls out to Christians.  It implies a 
relationship of dialogue with them.  A religious tradition truly faithful to the 
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spirit of Islam is inconceivable without a structure of dialogue with the 
indispensable academic instruments of today in every in-depth encounter.  The 
work is not possible except in a climate of scientific objectivity, of kindness 
and humility, qualities to which Muslims are traditionally accustomed.324 
 
Metropolitan Georges shows here his deep respect for the Qur’an and what he praises 
as its high values with regard to other religions, as it compels Muslims to be in 
dialogue with the Christians in their midst in the Middle East.  In this light, he 
encourages Christians to respond in a positive and open-minded way as Muslims ‘call 
out’ to them, as they are commanded by God through the Holy Book.  He also seems 
to be troubled as an Arab by those Muslims who today want to distort Islam and twist 
its history and teachings in order to support their (modern) ideology.   
 Metropolitan Georges argues for a rediscovery of traditional Islam by both 
Muslims and Christians, something that he seems to conclude will best happen when 
they are in dialogue with each other.  Why does he – a pious and outspoken advocate 
for the Christian faith – care so much about rediscovering true Islam?  The first 
answer is that, like a number of Arab Christians from various backgrounds, he 
acknowledges that both Christians and Muslims in the region share the historical 
legacy of their glorious Islamicate civilization that dominated the world for the better 
part of a millennium.  Metropolitan Georges goes a bit further than this, however, to 
argue that for Orthodox Christians of Arab descent there is an internal reason to 
rediscover with Muslims their shared legacy of Arabism.  He says: 
[T]he essential importance of Arabism for Eastern Christianity is that the Arab 
factor can constitute a ferment of ecumenism in the region.  To the degree that 
they [Arab Christians] are turned to their Syrian or Coptic patrimony to 
express themselves in an intelligible language, they have found an inspiration 
close to the Muslim sensibility.  They have helped to recreate a non-Greek, 
non-Latin – by all means Middle Eastern – Christianity that is in search of its 
own identity, for the enrichment at the same time of the [entire] Christian 
world by creatively positioning themselves to dialogue with the diverse 
religions of the Arab continent after becoming interiorly free of all foreign 
debts.325   
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In other words, Metropolitan Georges suggests that as Christians Arabs rediscover 
their identity, alongside and in conjunction with the Muslims in their midst, they will 
become a unifying force, bringing fractured humanity together – Eastern and Western 
Christians, Muslims and Christians, and those of the diverse religious and cultural 
backgrounds which make up the modern Middle East.  He concludes the ‘search for 
identity’ itself would be a liberating and cathartic experience of particular significance 
for both his fellow Arab Christians and Orthodox Christians worldwide.  At first 
glance, Metropolitan Georges’ conclusions seem far too idealistic, especially in light 
of the complexity of real issues on the ground in many Middle Eastern nations.  
However, one must admit that both the quantity and quality of dialogues that have 
taken place between Orthodox Christians and Muslims over the past few decades, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter of this study, have been fruitful well beyond the 
expectations of many. 
 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew is a third person who has suggested some 
creative possibilities for Muslim-Christian relations in the postmodern world.  Like 
Metropolitan Georges, he seems to suggest both a local and an international 
dimension:   
Christians – and Orthodox Christians in particular…ally themselves with an 
authentic Islam to overcome modernity “from the inside,” through a new 
cultural transformation…. A new form of secularism, rooted in Islam, would 
place the accent both on the rights of God and the rights of man.  It would not 
neglect the connection made by primitive Islam between the spiritual world 
and the profane, and it would rediscover the open, “pluralistic” character of 
the Umayyad period, which was so creative in art, thought, and science…. 
Contemporary Turkey seeks to find its place between God and man.  It does so 
with difficulty and pain, but it provides a model for both the Islamic world and 
for Europe.326 
 
It is interesting to note that what is proposed here is very similar to what has been put 
forward in various ways by a number of Muslim leaders as a response to modernity.  
Could a return to an earlier model of Muslim rule – especially if it was true to the 
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principles first established in Medina (something Islamic scholars refer to as the 
‘Medinan ideal’) – provide a viable alternative to modern notions of nationalism?327  
Patriarch Bartholomew asks this question and it is interesting to note that as the ‘first 
among equals’ in the leadership of the Orthodox world he answers it in the 
affirmative. 
 Perhaps one can account for some of his enthusiasm for ‘Muslim rule’ (in the 
idealized sense) in light of his position within Turkey itself.  Though Patriarch 
Bartholomew continues to have a significant amount of moral and spiritual influence 
in Orthodoxy, his ‘real power’ has been dramatically reduced, especially in his own 
country where the Patriarchate is threatened in various ways.  He may also be 
indirectly encouraging Muslims to take less of a fundamentalist view of their history, 
role in society, and relations with non-Muslims living in their midst.  Perhaps there is 
more to his comments, however.  It seems he sees a number of advantages and 
possibilities with a return to an authentic (and not just metaphorical) Muslim rule, 
perhaps in large part because of the fact that Islam has a better record than Western 
civilization (and for that matter even historic Byzantine civilization) of ensuring 
justice, freedom, and pluralism in society.  Patriarch Bartholomew seems to suggest 
as well in his remarks that working closely with Islam and Muslims to forge a better 
world might actually help the Orthodox with some of their own issues.  Perhaps they 
could begin to find that elusive identity after which they have sought for so long and 
maybe, if they could in some way reduce the divisive consequences of nationalism 
within the Church, they would be able to recover the ‘ecumenical ideal’ that they lost 
at some point on the road toward modernity.   
 One final figure worth noting is Catholicos Aram I of the Armenian Orthodox 
Church, who served for two terms as moderator (1991-2006) for the World Council of 
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Churches.  It was in this capacity that Catholicos Aram contributed in a very 
meaningful way to improving relations between Christians and Muslims.  Having 
himself lived side-by-side with Muslims, he was particularly sensitive to the 
challenges and potentials that both religious communities face in the postmodern 
world.  Though like many of the other theologians he was well aware of the unique 
affinities and common ground between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, Catholicos 
Aram made it clear that his intent was to build bridges between Muslims and 
Christians of all varieties, be they from the East or the West.  Likewise, in order for 
them to mutually address the key issues facing their communities, he encouraged 
caution without extremism.  He said: 
Incompatibilities and contradictions between religious norms and traditions 
and the trends and values generated by globalization and secularism are 
sometimes enormous.  We have reacted in different ways to this complex 
situation.  A rejectionist approach is risky.  We must be critical, but not 
aggressively reactionary.  We must not pretend that we can solve all the 
problems, cope with all the challenges and grapple with all the questions 
facing our religions.328 
 
Unlike those who would reject this current world completely, trying instead to 
recreate today some golden age of the past, Catholicos Aram emphasized the 
necessity of an honest and critical assessment of the past and present, as well as the 
possibilities for the future.   
 Catholicos Aram stressed that with the rise of fundamentalism, globalization, 
and violence on the world stage, the degree to which Muslims-Christians could come 
together in dialogue would be a determining factor in the ability of peoples of all 
faiths, as well as the non-religious, to choose life over all potential forms of death in 
the 21st century.  He spoke of them “journeying together” to promote a “dialogue of 
life” in order to “secure a peaceful world” by “transforming its values:”   
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For many centuries, Christians and Muslims have been in constant contact 
with one another.  Christian-Muslim relations have been marked by tolerance 
and tension as well as acceptance and rejection.  The world today is calling us 
to engage in a dialogue of life…. [W]e must journey together…. [as] we are 
bound to live together by building bridges of interaction, by moving from 
inter-relation to collaboration and from collaboration to community-building, 
by transforming stereotypes into better understanding and mutual trust and by 
translating our joint declarations to common commitments and actions.329 
 
One can see that Catholicos Aram feels strongly that Orthodox Christians – who have 
by far had the most experience living as neighbors and being in “constant contact” 
with Muslims since the rise of Islam – have a great responsibility to take the lead in 
Christian engagement with Islam.  He calls them to work with the greatest diligence 
on building authentic “communities” with Muslims, putting behind them what was 
bad and building upon what was good with the relationship in the past.  It could be 
argued that such a vision will not be achieved unless Orthodox Christians (and 
Muslims for that matter) can first see themselves for who they truly are – that 
complex mix of history, culture, traditions, and attitudes that have at least for many 
centuries now been worked out in relation to or in response to Islam.  Catholicos 
Aram alludes to this himself when he goes on to say, “First and foremost, we must be 
honest with and critical of ourselves, and then honest and critical of each other.  This 
is true dialogue.”  It remains to be seen whether this will occur among Eastern 
Christians. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 Catholicos Aram, Konstantinos Romanos, Metropolitan Georges, Patriarch 
Bartholomew, and others have suggested that much is at stake in how Orthodox 
Christians understand their identity and relate to Muslims.  They have encouraged 
their fellow Orthodox Christians to take a hard look at themselves and their views 
about their Muslim neighbors.  In chapter three it was noted that at least some 
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Orthodox Christians are breaking new ground by encouraging their faithful to ‘deepen 
their theological understanding’ and see Islam, in both its historical and modern 
expressions, as part of the divine economy for salvation.  In light of what has been 
presented in this chapter, perhaps they should be asking as well how the Holy Spirit 
may be leading them, alongside their Muslim neighbors, to new paradigms for 
humanity in the areas of politics, economics, religious pluralism, human rights, 
ecological conservation, and social justice.   
 Orthodox Christians have been noting the similarities between their 
experiences and those of Muslims in the face of modernization.  They have repeatedly 
raised concerns about the destructive aspects of modernization and the ways in which 
it has depleted their resources – spiritual and human, as well as natural.  It seems the 
more Orthodox Christians engage in dialogue with Muslims the more they are 
realizing the degree to which their shared experiences over the last two hundred or so 
years have led to the creation of distorted images of themselves, their communities, 
and each other.  Based on comments from Astérios Argyriou, Archbishop Anastasios, 
and others mentioned above it appears that at least several respected Orthodox 
theologians and hierarchs are shifting their thinking in order to, as Sergius Bulgakov 
put it, see a “Church outside the churches” so they together with their Muslim 
neighbors can feel empowered to present new and more positive models for future 
generations.  They seem to be concerned that, unless they make this happen, Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims will continue to be stuck, re-circulating their distorted 
identities both of themselves and of each other.   
 As one of the leading Islamic thinkers of today has said, “A victim mentality 
is the starting point of failure.”330  It seems quite plausible that a significant way in 
which a kind of victim mentality has been perpetuated during the modern period and 
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up to the present day, is through what Tarek Mitri called an “ancestral history [that is] 
fabricated [by modern discourse] rather than inherited [by memory].”  As he and 
others have argued, so often the animosity between Orthodox Christians and their 
Muslim neighbors, particularly in the modern Middle East, began as a product of 
foreign invention.  The evidence seems to support this conclusion.  Though perhaps 
unintentionally on the part of those who imagined them, Western constructs of the 
history of Muslim-Christian relations and of the Middle East - along with the 
imposition of its models of nationalism, ethnicism, and religion - initiated a process 
through which the mostly positive, shared experiences of generations past have faded 
in the collective memory of Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  It would be fair to 
say, in fact, that Orthodox Christians and Muslims have at times been active and 
creative participants in the process of constructing this rather foreign and self-
debasing interpretation of their own experiences.  The extreme example of the 
destructive nationalist tendencies in the Balkans is a case in point.  Yet, there are also 
more subtle ways in which Orthodox Christians may be passing forward unhealthy 
and distorted identity constructs of foreign origin.  As has been pointed out, even the 
most respected and well-intentioned Orthodox thinkers – such as John Erickson and 
Basil Cousins – can be prone to perpetuating incomplete or inaccurate images of the 
past as they relate to relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims. 
 John Meyendorff, Patriarch Bartholomew, and Ataullah Siddiqui have shown 
(respectively) that one of the most common and clear examples of the way Orthodox 
and Muslim societies have allowed themselves to be influenced by modernity is 
through their acceptance of nationalism.  As they have convincingly shown, the 
modern construction of the nation-state model in traditional Orthodox and Muslim 
lands has been a challenge because it is so different from the indigenous and historic 
185 
 
models for political organization in those parts of the world.  Still, it seems this 
modern, and essentially Western, concept of nationalism has been embraced across 
traditional Orthodox and Muslim lands, despite the fact that in many cases it has 
severely weakened the universal vision and applications of the respective religious 
traditions and has also led at times to stark divisions among peoples on the basis of 
language and culture.  As has been mentioned, this has led in some extreme cases to 
ethnic cleansing and other such horrors.  As several of the figures analyzed in the 
preceding pages have indicated, however, much of what has been accepted by the past 
few generations is now being reconsidered.  The new message is that Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims must emerge from their victim mentality to desist from 
continuing on the same old path that perpetuates falsehoods and distortions about their 
true heritage.  It seems to go even further, in fact, to argue that they must do this in 
order to be in continuity with the fullness of faith as passed on from generation to 
generation in response to the divine calling.  In other words, Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims must rediscover what is at the heart of their respected religious traditions in 
order to present a mutual, transformational vision for positive change to the world, as 
opposed to just reacting to it.   
 Returning once again to some of the statements of Catholicos Aram, one can 
find a proposed blueprint for constructing a vision and common course of action 
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the coming years.  Based on the 
arguments presented above, his notion of a “dialogue of life” (ref. on page 181) as he 
titled the concept in a lecture he delivered several years ago, could be one of the most 
promising strategies put forward in recent years.  His four recommendations – 1) 
building bridges of interaction, 2) moving from inter-relation to collaboration and 
from collaboration to team-building, 3) transforming stereotypes into improved 
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understanding and trust, and 4) translating joint declarations into common 
commitment and actions – if taken seriously by Muslims and Christians, could go a 
long way in helping them solve their respective identity crises in the postmodern age.   
 In the process of implementing these steps, it seems quite plausible that 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims may not only transform their present circumstances 
so as to envision a more attractive future for themselves and their children, but also 
recover certain significant aspects of their ancestral past.  For example, more and 
more Muslims might have an awareness of how the key, formative aspects of the 
Islamic tradition were developed in response to and in dialogue with the Eastern 
Christians who accounted for the vast majority of inhabitants in the central portions of 
the Umayyad Empire.  Orthodox Christians of that early era served as ministers for 
the Umayyad rulers, to the extent that, for a time, Greek was the official language of 
the Caliphal court, and Byzantine civilization contributed significantly to the 
emerging Islamicate civilization that eventually took its place in terms of influence in 
the oikoumene.  Even among the Abbasid rulers, who shifted the center of the empire 
to Baghdad and absorbed more and more elements of the wisdom traditions of Persia 
and India, there was a continued interest and dialogue with Eastern Christians which 
greatly informed the thought and categories of the early masters of kalam (the term in 
the Islamic tradition that most closely approximates the Christian notion of theology).   
For their part, Orthodox Christians might more readily acknowledge that life under 
Muslim rule following the fall of Constantinople had its benefits and advantages.  
Notwithstanding the dhimmi regulations and their consequences, Orthodox Christians 
were able to continue their religious traditions, in the main, preserve (in principle) 
their Byzantine model of administration within the Church, and live for centuries in 
relative peace with their Muslim neighbors.  As several of the above mentioned 
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authors have indicated by pointing to historic and present examples, neither Islam nor 
Muslims should be seen as enemies of Orthodox Christians – not now, nor in the 
historic past.   
 Much like Muhammad who purged error and polytheism from Mecca at the 
end of his life, Orthodox Christians and Muslims might ask themselves, “What 
changes of attitude, perception, and practices must take place in order for us to shatter 
the idols and false images we have created for ourselves – especially in relation to our 
brothers and sisters of the opposing tradition – and to authentically bring forward the 
truest and fullest expression of our faith in this postmodern age?”  If it is true that 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims have similarly gone through a kind of identity 
crisis, from which they have yet to fully recover, it makes sense that they could help 
each other along the path to self-discovery and rejuvenation.  One could argue, in fact, 
that they must work together if they are to be successful in reaching their respective 
goals, in fidelity to the core shared values of their religions.  Indeed, the stakes were 
raised significantly with the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 
2001 (as well as those later in Madrid, London, and elsewhere), which put Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims to the test.  The aftermath to and the repercussions from the 
horrible events that took place then had the potential to have a significant impact on 
relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims at the beginning of the new 
century.   
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Chapter 5: Changing Attitudes Following the 
Events of 9/11? 
 
 
[T]he present moment is marked by the pain that is felt by all humanity.  
Violence has spread beyond all imagination.  Today, of course, we are 
speaking especially of terrorism, which must be emphatically 
condemned.  But we also have to condemn the violence practiced by 
states against individuals and against other states and, above all, the 
violence done to the poor.  We must show our solidarity with the 
oppressed who are seeking liberation by resisting the occupiers, and we 
must work to halt the massacre of the innocent in all the countries where 
children and old people, or any human beings, are dying gratuitously.  
Justice, not vengeance must be done.  
 
In promoting this quest for justice, we must join with all men and 
women of good will, and especially with Muslims, eschewing thoughtless 
generalizations and primitive reactions.  Let us preach harmony among 
the nations and do all in our power to avoid a clash of civilizations 
between Muslims and the West.331 
 
The sense of urgency in this message is striking.  These words of Ignatius IV, 
Patriarch of Antioch and All the East, spoken to Pope John Paul II echo the darkness 
felt so deeply in the hearts of many in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the 
United States in on 11 September 2001.  They represent a yearning to assuage “the 
pain…felt by all humanity” in the months following the series of events that occurred 
on and around that day, which hence has been encapsulated in the reference 
“September 11th” or simply “9/11.”  The mood was so pervasive that many were 
turning to religious leaders, both from the East and the West, for answers to the 
questions that pressed on their hearts and minds: ‘Why did this happen?  Who did it 
and what does it mean?  Where will the violence strike next?  Could this be only the 
beginning of great and bloody struggle between Muslims and the West?  Where is 
God in all of this?’   
Fortunately, religious leaders throughout the world, including Patriarch 
Ignatius, responded to these concerns – often pointing out that the questions 
themselves ought to be adjusted somewhat – and the healing process was able to 
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begin.  However, in the atmosphere of the September 11th aftermath fear and anger 
led to cravings in some to lay blame and exact vengeance.  For them, old prejudices 
and negative feelings were rekindled.  Others, who feared that the consequences of 
hate crimes, racial profiling, and human rights violations would be worse than the 
carnage of the terrorist attacks themselves, chose to see 9/11 as an opportunity to 
promote peace and greater inter-religious cooperation, particularly between Christians 
and Muslims.332  For them, it was a time for dialogue and united action.  Of course, 
not everyone fit neatly into one of these two ideologically opposed camps.  Many 
simply were waiting for something or someone to provide some answers and help 
them feel safe once again.   
Many Orthodox Christians, particularly those living as minorities in primarily 
Muslim countries, felt the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  The 
events of 9/11 had an impact on relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
in that it put them face-to-face and challenged them to examine anew their respective 
(and possibly shared) identity, history, and religious convictions.  In terms of the 
relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, one could argue that they 
entered into a phase after 9/11 that is different in substance from the previous period.  
With this in mind, this chapter will be concerned with the months and years after the 
terrorist attacks in the United States in the autumn of 2001.  It will take a primarily 
chronological approach in order to capture to the fullest extent possible the context, 
intent, and meaning of the events, statements, and dialogues under examination.  
Though 9/11 itself, as well as what it still represents to the imagination, continues to 
loom as a dark shadow indicating what things have been and what they could be yet 
again, one should not assume that every statement or act is in some way a direct 
reaction to 9/11.  Life has continued and other big events, positive and negative, have 
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come and gone, informing (along with the memory of 9/11) the attitudes and 
judgments of those engaged in dialogue, peace-building efforts, and the quest for 
justice.  Therefore, every attempt will be made in this chapter to connect the various 
statements and events both chronologically and thematically in order to yield the most 
objective and fair assessment of the material at hand.     
 
INITIAL REACTIONS TO 9/11 
 
Two significant conferences in the autumn of 2001 - scheduled prior to but 
taking place just after the events of September 11th - included Orthodox Christian and 
Muslim leaders as key participants.  One took place in Sarajevo and the other was 
held on the campus of the University of South Carolina (U.S.A.).  Opening on 12 
September 2001, the Sarajevo conference was titled, “Christians and Muslims in 
Europe: Responsibility and Religious Engagement in a Pluralistic Society.”  Its 
objectives were to: 1) identify the challenges shared by Muslims and Christians living 
in a highly secularized and pluralistic Europe, 2) purify the memories of Christians 
and Muslims vis-à-vis each other in order to help them better work together toward 
justice and peace for all, and 3) promote their common values so that their 
communities could actively contribute to the construction of a better society.333  The 
participants, most notably on the Orthodox side was Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana 
and all Albania, were clearly shaken by the September 11th attacks and felt compelled 
to make the following statement: 
We are profoundly shocked by the tragic massacres in New York and 
Washington D.C., and we express our great pain and affliction for the 
hundreds of victims killed and injured.  We offer condolences to their families 
and friends.  We unanimously condemn this act of violence, as well as all 
destruction of human life, as a transgression of the will of God and a crime 
against humanity.  Recognizing the potential for violence that resides within 
each one of us, we pray that this senseless act would not provoke 
indiscriminant reprisals.  We commit ourselves, in the spirit of this conference, 
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to be instruments of dialogue, to contribute to the building of justice and 
peace, and to work toward reconciliation at the heart of our societies.334   
 
What is interesting about this is the way in which 9/11 seemed to heighten the 
significance of the work of the conference and that of its Orthodox, Muslim, and other 
participants.  Having watched before their eyes, as so many did on television screens 
throughout the world, the result of religious zealotry not kept in check by dialogue 
and peaceful human interaction, the participants seemed to be weighing the very real 
consequences of not acting on their stated goals and objectives.  True to both the 
Christian and Islamic traditions, however, they condemned the evil while recognizing 
the propensity for evil even in themselves, as well as every person.  They expressed 
their common prayer that all would refrain from senseless acts of revenge, based on 
generalizations about ethic identity, race, or religion. 
 Just over one month from the completion of the inter-religious conference in 
Sarajevo, a second important conference took place on the campus of the University 
of South Carolina in the United States.  The conference was titled, “Paths to the 
Heart: Sufism and the Christian East,” and though it followed the customary academic 
format, it was unique because of its subject, approach, and list of participants.  
Though others had previously suggested that the mystical traditions of Eastern 
Christianity and Islam should be seen as the most promising bridge for bringing 
together Christians and Muslims in this age,335 there had never been a gathering of 
scholars and religious leaders of this caliber to address the topic directly and in such 
depth.   
As with the one is Sarajevo, the conference took place in the shadow of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, so the reactions of participants to the events are in 
some ways as interesting and significant as the content of their presentations.   For 
example, one of the Orthodox panelists - Father John Chryssavgis, scholar and former 
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Dean at Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology - suggested that Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims engaged in dialogue, especially those in attendance at the 
conference, have an important role to play in combating all forms of hatred, 
extremism, and violence in the name of religion: 
The events of September 11th cannot help but be at the center of this 
conference, and what this conference is all about…. The desert tradition tells 
me that I do not know whether I am doing more for my brother when I pray 
for him, or when I offer him a plate of beans…. God will continue to do His 
work in Heaven.  We need to do our work here, to knock down barriers that 
we have set up, and that work, that activity, is not secular or merely political.  
It is deeply spiritual.336 
 
Drawing from the monastic tradition of the East, Fr. Chryssavgis challenged his 
audience to practice hospitality and humility toward each other in order that they 
might successfully “knock down [the] barriers” that lie between them.  Considering 
the tense environment in the United States in the weeks just after 9/11, such a goal 
was not an easy one to achieve, especially for religious leaders.   
 Bishop Kallistos Ware was another panelist to comment on the events of 
September 11th.  As someone who had already written extensively on the subject of 
mysticism within in his tradition and as one of the most widely-read authors on 
Orthodoxy in the English speaking world, it is perhaps no surprise that his response 
was of a spiritual and pastoral nature:       
When a tragedy happens such as occurred on September 11, one’s immediate 
reaction is to look for somebody to blame, and therefore to hate.  That is a 
natural reaction, but it is also a very dangerous one.  We fall into the trap of 
looking for someone responsible, a guilty person or group, whom we can then 
demonize and we think in terms of “them” and “us,” with a dichotomy and an 
opposition.  But when a disaster such as happened on the 11th of September 
occurs, surely our true reaction should be to say, “I too am to blame.  I too am 
responsible.  I should not blame other people exclusively, but search my own 
heart.”  Surely the meaning, or one of the meanings, of what happened on 
September 11 is that we should all repent.  If I had led a life of greater love 
and trust, would it have been exactly the same?  You may say, “Yes, it 
would,” but who knows, under the perspective of eternity, what all of us in 
this room have contributed in the world towards fear and alienation because of 
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our own narrowness? …So I think we have to say that we are all responsible, 
and that we should all repent.337 
 
Bishop Kallistos response to the September 11th tragedy is based on an important 
Orthodox theological affirmation.  Orthodox Christians emphasize that they must 
work out their salvation in relation to each other, to those outside of the Church, the 
earth, and the entire cosmos.  In the deepest sense, for the Orthodox there is really no 
such thing as individual sin, such that the consequence of a person’s selfish acts are 
experienced by him or her alone.  Bishop Kallistos applies this point to the 
abominable terrorist acts of 9/11 by pointing out that each person’s shortcomings have 
an effect on the forces and events of history.  Echoing the gospel admonition, ‘Let the 
one of you without sin cast the first stone,’ he suggests that instead of blaming the 
perpetrators of the attacks or those who initially set the idea in motion, one should 
think about how his or her ‘missing the mark’ (the literal sense of the word sin in 
Greek) had contributed in some way to these tragic events.  Likewise, he is subtly 
encouraging Muslims and Christians to redouble their efforts to work toward better 
understanding, build greater bonds of friendship, and find common areas of service to 
God and humanity in order to make the world a better place for all. 
 Just one week after the notable Paths to the Heart conference in the United 
States, an even more momentous event took place in Europe.  Patriarch Ignatius IV of 
Antioch met with the Pope six months after John Paul II had made his historic visit to 
Syria.  The Churches of Antioch and Rome had already had significant contact, in part 
because of Patriarch Ignatius’ openness to the Catholic world.  But the Pope’s visit to 
Antioch in 2001 and the much anticipated visit of Patriarch Ignatius to the Vatican in 
the same year were seen as a significant breakthrough in ecumenical dialogue 
between the Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church.   
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The Patriarch’s much anticipated visit became even more significant, 
however, in the aftermath of September 11th.  Patriarch Ignatius had already 
established himself as an outspoken advocate of Christian-Muslim dialogue.  
Respected widely in the Arab world, the Patriarch’s friendly relationship with the 
Pope presented a vehicle through which the Vatican could reach out to Muslims and 
Arab Christian in one part of its several-pronged response to the 9/11 tragedy.  For 
this reason, the Christian and secular media were particularly attentive to Patriarch 
Ignatius’ statements during his visit to Italy.  Already known for his candor and 
conviction the Patriarch did not disappoint.  When asked during an interview whether 
Arab Christians are anxious over the world crisis caused by the events of 9/11, he 
said: 
We share the fortune of our Muslim citizens.  A Christian cannot give his 
blessing to violence or terrorism.  We try to understand the reasons without 
justifying them.  The image that the U.S. government projects, perhaps 
unconsciously, gives the impression that it seeks hegemony in the world.  We 
hear talk about U.S. interests, but almost never about the United Nations.  We 
think something must change.  People go to war because there is an arms trade 
and poor distribution of wealth.  Then there is the problem of dictatorships, 
often supported by the West, which, even before being a world danger, 
terrorize their own people.  Terrorism must be suppressed wherever it is 
found, but the way of acting must change.  For a long time there has been talk 
of the terrorism of the Iraqi regime, and this might be true, attributing 
responsibility to a specific individual.  However, we then see that the planes 
strike everything and everyone except that individual.  We fear that the same 
thing will happen in other countries.338 
 
Much like Fr. John Chryssavgis and Bishop Kallistos Ware at the conference in the 
U.S., Patriarch Ignatius does not shy away from speaking the truth as he sees it for 
fear of appearing to be too political.  He places his own flock in the same boat with 
his Muslim neighbors in terms of the potential danger of a backlash from the United 
States with response to 9/11.  Taking the discussion above politics, he focuses on the 
spiritual and humanitarian problems at the source of the violence: 1) the continued 
hegemony of the West (particularly the U.S.) in the region, 2) the disparities between 
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the rich and the poor, 3) the propping up of dictators (in order to fuel a seemingly 
unquenchable thirst for oil and/or other natural resources), and 4) the unchallenged 
industrial-military complex of key Western nations and the resulting unbridled arms 
trade to and within Middle Eastern countries.   
 During his visit, Patriarch Ignatius proposed another way forward in which 
Orthodox Christian and Roman Catholic leaders could set the example for world 
leaders to follow.  As a response to those who would want to place Islam and 
Christianity in opposition and are quick to point out that religious buildings have been 
attacked by Muslim terrorists, he suggested the following: 
We must be able to distinguish between Islam and Muslim faithful, as well as 
Christianity and Christian faithful.  Perhaps the remedy is knowledge.  Islam 
should not be something foreign to Christians and vice versa.  For example, in 
my patriarchate, Muslims and Christians together form one nation that is not, 
must not be, either a church or a mosque…. Instead of thinking of the Muslims 
who set fire to our churches, we think of those who ran to put it out.  Violence 
is defeated by justice and love.339 
 
Once again, the Patriarch avoids placing blame on Islam or Muslims for the upheavals 
in his region.  He chooses instead to focus on the ways in which Christians and 
Muslims have found and will continue to find ways of working together, despite the 
destructive forces in the world whose malevolent acts threaten to pull the divinely 
created human community apart. 
 Addressing Pope John Paul II directly during the visit, the Patriarch continued 
with this theme, carefully avoiding any blaming of Muslims and humbly 
acknowledging that Christians too must guard themselves against the temptations of 
the troubled beginning to the twenty-first century: 
 Your Holiness, 
 
The present troubles may last and bring yet more affliction.  The churches are 
called to become more eloquent in their witness, more urgent and more 
effective.  Our most ardent desire is to call together in prayer and fasting all 
those who wish to live as Christians according to the gospel, asking that God 
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may have mercy upon us and grant us strength to resist the power of evil 
which seems to be gaining an ever-greater hold on humanity.340 
 
Patriarch Ignatius calls Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians to commit 
themselves to peace and courageously speak out against those who would seek 
retaliation for the September 11th attacks through indiscriminant violence toward 
Muslims, or anyone who might fit the racial and ethnic profile of the 9/11 terrorists.  
He acknowledges that the challenges are great, but that Christians in humility and 
through God’s power, can find a way to lead humanity through this difficult time.  
 Perhaps the most significant of all initial reactions to 9/11 among world 
religious leaders was the “Brussels Declaration,” which was issued as a result of a 
two-day interfaith conference on 19-20 December 2001 in Brussels, Belgium.341  The 
gathering took place at the invitation of His All Holiness Bartholomew, the 
Ecumenical Patriarch, and Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, 
and was attended by eighty of the world’s key Christian, Muslim, and Jewish leaders.  
A number of world leaders sent letters indicating their support of the effort.  The list 
included: Pope Jean Paul II, President George Bush of the United States, King 
Muhammad VI of Morocco, Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, Secretary General 
of the U.N. Kofi Annan, and Madame Nicole Fontaine, President of the European 
Parliament.        
The Brussels Declaration reaffirmed the statement made in the preceding 
decade at similar gatherings such as the 1994 Bosphorus Declaration that “a crime 
committed in the name of religion is a crime against religion.”342  Likewise, the 
participants challenged the erroneous “clash of civilizations” theory on relations 
between Muslim and Western nations, first put forward by Samuel Huntington and 
later circulated, with their own permutations, by certain religious and political leaders, 
as well as academics in response to 9/11.  The Brussels Declaration states: 
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We unanimously reject the assumption that religion contributes to an 
inevitable clash of civilizations.  On the contrary we affirm the constructive 
and instructive role of religion in the dialogue among civilizations.  We urge 
those who shape public opinion to avoid putting at risk the good relations and 
peaceful cooperation of all people through the projection of extremist religious 
views as representative of authentic religious belief.343   
 
It is clear that these key religious leaders, with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew at 
the forefront, wanted to send a clear message that religion is a force for good in 
society and that it should not be dismissed as something that will inevitably lead to 
violence.  They seemed to be calling on the media, certain politicians, and ‘the 
experts’ to desist from constructing artificial portrayals of the world’s religions, and 
especially Islam, based on the views expressed by a few extremists.   
 Patriarch Bartholomew set the tone for the entire conference through his 
opening address by showing how the sacred scriptures of Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam all support peace and do not promote violence.  He also went on to identify 
several figures from the Orthodox tradition, most notably Saints John Chrysostom and 
Basil the Great, who through their words and actions, set an important foundation for 
peace among all peoples.  After carefully setting out his evidence, the Patriarch made 
the following conclusion to conference participants: 
Their example [i.e. the ‘wise leaders of history’] should inspire us.  For we 
also have a role to play today to develop a mutual sincere respect and peaceful 
cooperation for the promotion of the peace of God – firstly peace in people’s 
hearts – in the world.  The creative co-existence among believers of diverse 
religions, which existed in the past and continues to exist in our day in many 
countries (especially in the Middle East), constitutes a model that can be 
applied across the globe.  We, the religious leaders, should place ourselves at 
the top of the effort to bring about peace and should not sit at the tails of the 
politicians.  In addition, we should not hinder peace by preaching fanaticism 
and intolerance.344     
 
Here we see Patriarch Bartholomew calling the religious leaders of the Abrahamic 
religious traditions to set a stellar example of tolerance, pluralism, dialogue, and 
peacemaking for rest of the world to follow.  He suggests that it is up to them, not the 
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political leaders of nations, to combat the forces of fanaticism and intolerance 
strengthening around the globe.          
 The participants in the conference seemed to agree with the Patriarch’s vision 
for moving forward.  They affirmed his various calls for peace and tolerance and said 
that “in unity, solidarity, and love” they would commit themselves to: 
[1] Engage educators, members of the media, policy-makers, and other 
individuals, as well as institutions of civil society in order to enhance 
understanding of religious communities and their beliefs...; [2] support 
ongoing and new inter-religious and cross-cultural initiatives, including youth 
initiatives in as many regions as possible throughout the world….; [3] 
continue our dialogue and encourage all efforts to promote collaboration 
among our three religions…; and [4] foster communication networks that 
promote the exchange of views and ideas on a regular basis.345 
 
The goals were clear.  They decided to take on the responsibility to correct 
misconceptions about each other’s religions, which were even more prevalent 
following 9/11.  They also re-committed themselves to dialogue and opening new 
areas for common service in order to model for the world a collaborative spirit, 
genuine respect for the other, and the efficacy of listening to each other’s cares and 
concerns.  It was likely not an easy task to bring together the Brussels Declaration so 
soon after 9/11, but the efforts of those gathered in Belgium at the invitation of 
Patriarch Bartholomew in December of 2001 gave hope to those stuck in a track of 
despair from the day of the attacks.   
 
THE DIALOGUE CONTINUES  
 
In addition to the various efforts and gatherings that essentially represented a 
response to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, it is worth pausing for a moment to 
consider the progress of at least one long-standing effort of dialogue between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  Chapter three mentioned that a series of 
colloquiums, inaugurated in 1986 and continuing steadily through the end of last 
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century, were held through a joint venture of the Al-Albeit Foundation (based in 
Amman, Jordan) and the Orthodox Center for the Ecumenical Patriarch (based in 
Chambesy-Geneva, Switzerland).  The vision was to establish more permanent, 
organized channels for serious interaction and discussion on topics of mutual interest 
to Orthodox Christians and Muslims throughout the world.  Each conference included 
a diverse group of participants, though a constant at each event was the presence of 
Metropolitan Damaskenos Papandreou of Switzerland (on the Christian side) and 
Prince Al-Hasan Bin Talal of Jordan (on the Muslim side).   
At the turn of the century, Patriarch Bartholomew renewed his commitment to 
sponsor regular and significant Muslim-Christian Dialogue conferences.  He shifted 
the responsibility for these efforts was shifted from the Orthodox Center for the 
Ecumenical Patriarch outside of Geneva to the Office of Inter-religious and 
Intercultural Relations of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Brussels and plans for the 
next conference were set in motion under the direction of Bishop Emmanuel of 
Reghion following the September 2000 visit of the Patriarch to the King of Bahrain, 
Shaikh Hamad bin-Isa Al Khalifa.   
The tenth session of the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Conference was titled, 
‘The Role of Religion in Peaceful Coexistence,’ and was held in Manama, Bahrain 
from 28-30 October 2002. 346  The event included a diverse group of participants of 
“more than 150 religious leaders, scholars, government and non-profit organization 
representatives.”347  Unlike the previous nine sessions in which the speakers were 
essentially Eastern Orthodox or Muslim scholars and clerics, the list of participants in 
this session included, “Muslims speakers from throughout the Muslim and Arab world 
and representatives of the Orthodox and Oriental Churches, the Roman Catholic and 
Protestant Churches from Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and India.”  
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During the nine working sessions over the three days of the conference, the 
participants came to an agreement on a number of principles that would foster 
peaceful coexistence simultaneously on the local, regional, and international levels.  
Based on the principles they identified, they further made the following 
recommendations: 
1. The need to launch a constructive dialogue among the faithful of all divine beliefs 
so as to bring about the cooperation essential for laying the bases of international 
peace and coexistence and ensuring the security and safety of individuals and 
communities.  
2. Absence of conflict among civilizations, since all divine teachings aim to ensure 
mankind's happiness and to establish security and peace in the world.  
3. The international community must define terrorism that targets civilians and 
innocent people who, horrified, see themselves and their property threatened.  
4. Condemnation of occupation, usurpation of rights and property and violation of 
holy places, irrespective of the motives or justifications.  
5. Forceful condemnation of the occupation of Palestinian territories and of all acts 
of aggression committed in Palestine and in other parts of the world and appeal to 
the international community to participate in a responsible and practical manner 
in implementing international resolutions.  
6. The United Nations and the United Nations Security Council should be asked to 
intervene in a practical way to end political crises that lead to cruel wars in all 
countries.  
7. International decision makers should intervene to end massacres of minorities in 
every country of the world in order to establish peace and security and ensure 
peaceful coexistence.  
8. Heads of State should support integrated adjustment and development 
programmes that serve the interests of their citizens and should work to improve 
their quality of life.  
9. Denunciation of discrimination in all its forms, affirmation of the need to respect 
the principles of human rights and call for greater cooperation between religions 
in order to ensure the peaceful coexistence of individuals and communities.348 
It is interesting to note the overlap between the Brussels Declaration and the 
recommendations of this conference.  In both it seems that Orthodox Christian and 
Muslim leaders (as well as Christians from other churches and certain Jewish leaders) 
are making a special effort to show that the acts of extremists do not reflect the values 
and teachings of their respective religions.  They demonstrate the distinction between 
political and religious activism, in order to show how the ideologues have attempted 
to manipulate religion for their own aims.  The outcomes of both gatherings include a 
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plea for increased and sustained inter-religious dialogues in order that Muslims, 
Christians, and those of other world religions may, as the Bahrain Declaration puts it:  
[Heal] the traumatic experiences of the historical past…; dispel prejudices…; 
promote the idea of peace with freedom and social justice…; and emphasize 
religious principles, tolerance and mercy…to enable mankind to achieve 
happiness and to guarantee security, safety, and peaceful coexistence on 
Earth.349 
 
These were lofty goals, and one has to wonder whether the religious leaders who 
gathered at these events will be able in the coming decades to convince their 
communities at home, along with the political and social leaders of their respective 
nations, to join them on this quest.   
 
THE WAR DANCE: SHALL WE DANCE? 
 
In the lead-up to the U.S. led war in Iraq, starting in March 2003, there was a 
great deal of discussion on the potential for war, the possible consequences, and the 
subject of armed conflict generally within the Orthodox Christian and Islamic 
traditions.  The debates within Orthodox circles in many ways reflected the larger 
arguments being developed for and against the war effort (and warfare generally), on 
the relationship between religion and politics, and about what should be the sustained 
response to terrorism in the twenty-first century.  The internal debates among 
Orthodox Christians included two specific questions that were discussed at length in 
chapter four: 1) What was, is, and should be our relationship with Islam? and 2) How 
does our answer to this question determine how we understand who we are and our 
place in this postmodern world?  As Orthodox Christians, particularly in the North 
American context, reacted to the war dance that was building in the larger culture in 
2002–early 2003, these two questions became especially important.   
One of the reactions to these questions was to revive and/or intensify a trend 
that had been developing in the latter part of the twentieth century.  A small but well 
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circulated body of books and articles began to emerge that claimed to take a fresh 
look at the prevailing view of Islam’s treatment of Orthodox Christians over the 
centuries and its reputation for being a tolerant and peaceful religion, especially with 
regard to religious minorities within Islamdom.  Probably the most notable figure in 
this genre is an author who publishes under the name Bat Ye’or.  Though not an 
Orthodox Christian, in fact she is Jewish, her major work, The Decline of Eastern 
Christianity Under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude, found some measure of 
acceptance in certain Orthodox circles.350  Ye’or uses the methodology and 
presuppositions of some Zionist writers who have written disparagingly about Islam’s 
historic treatment of Jews and applies these same tools to construct a ‘new’ historical 
narrative about Islam’s treatment of Eastern Christians.   
As was argued in the previous chapter, the popularity of this type of writing 
among some Orthodox Christians stems from the way it seductively preys on their 
fears and insecurities about Muslims and uses a familiar modern filter to judge the 
history of Islam.   Proponents of this way of thinking find that there is a certain 
finality about the effect of the modern world upon society and their Church that has 
caused them to be reactive, looking for something and someone upon which to place 
blame.  The result has been a certain amount of finger pointing at Muslims, making 
Islam the scapegoat for past and present problems of Eastern Christianity.  As with 
the scholarship of Ye’or, some of those of this persuasion have tended to take a blind 
eye to and/or practice ‘proof-texting’ with the extant sources in order to justify and 
promote a particular bias about Islam and Muslims.   
It would be no surprise that following the tragedy of 9/11, in which the 
perpetrators claimed that their religion (Islam) motivated them to commit the heinous 
acts, there was an intensifying of the kind of thought and methods that formed the 
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basis of Bat Ye’or’s work.  Perhaps the best example of this genre of literature that 
began to appear more readily in the lead up to the U.S. lead war in Iraq was a book 
written by Serge Trifkovic, a journalist and Orthodox Christian.   The Sword of the 
Prophet: Islam, History, Theology, Impact on the World was published in Boston by 
Regina Orthodox Press in the summer of 2002 and became a popular read among 
some clergy and laity, at least in North America, soon after its publication.  It was 
also circulated piecemeal on FrontPageMagazine.com through a series of excerpts 
adapted by Robert Locke.351  It is noteworthy that though Trifkovic only directly 
references Bat Ye’or a few times, his book seems to be largely grounded on several of 
the arguments and examples she used in the 1980s and 1990s.352            
Serge Trifkovic’s book begins by pointing out it was written in part as a 
response to the September 11th attacks.  In the introduction of The Sword of the 
Prophet, Trifkovic says that: 
The tragedy of September 11, 2001, and its aftermath have shown, yet again 
that beliefs have consequences; the centrality of Islam to the attacks is 
impossible to deny.  Our opinion-formers, inflexible in their secular-liberal 
ideological assumptions, deny it nevertheless.  They do not take religion 
seriously…. [Their] supposed distinction between “real Islam” and its violent 
aberrations were crudely ideological, based on their simple conviction that all 
faiths – having equal legal privileges – must in some sense be equally good, 
“true,” and, hence, capable of celebrating all others in the spirit of tolerance.  
Such assertions cannot change reality.  A problem does exist.  Islam is not 
only a religious doctrine; it is also a self-contained world outlook, and way of 
life that claims the primary allegiance of all those calling themselves 
“Muslim.”353 
 
Trifkovic identifies his aim.  He wants to correct the erroneous notion, as he sees it, 
that Islam is a “Religion of Peace and Tolerance,” which he says has been dispensed 
by liberal academics, “Sunday-morning popular entertainers,” and certain politicians.  
He goes on to say that he wrote the book to correct the misrepresentation of Islam, 
which has occurred from the, “trend of public commentary that tends, systematically, 
not to understand Islam but to construct a propagandistic version of it.”354  Trifkovic’s 
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evidence for such claims is severely lacking and, like Bat Ye’or, his methods are 
intellectually dishonest.  Whether it is through ‘proof-texting’ by ripping from their 
contexts sections of the Qur’an, the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, and Islamic 
jurisprudence in order to support a bias against Islam or by reconstructing a historical 
narrative based on distortions of events and figures to justify his claims about 
Muslims generally, Trifkovic creates a fantastical construct of Islam that has little to 
do with the religion or its adherents.  He plays upon people’s fears about what they do 
not understand by perpetuating generalized prejudices about Muslims, academics, 
politicians, and journalists.   
Trifkovic presents himself as an intellectual and visionary who can understand 
the true meaning of Islam and see the only clear path to stop if from achieving its 
destructive goals.  Claiming that Islam cannot tolerate any other religion or 
worldview, he promotes a hard line approach to what he says are two equally 
disturbing forces: 
A new paradigm of Islam, immigration, and Western identity are needed…. 
All will be in vain unless murderous Islamic extremism, manifested on 
September 11, spells the end of another kind of extremism: the stubborn 
insistence of the ruling liberal establishment on treating each and every 
newcomer as equally meltable in the pot.355   
 
He implies that neither Muslims, nor the liberals who befriend them, can be trusted by 
Americans, nor, by extension, any peace-loving peoples of the world.  He apparently 
sees no problem with grouping all Muslims together and presenting Islam, not 
extremism per se, as the ultimate threat to peace across the globe. 
Though Trifkovic apparently has no trouble with the way Samuel Huntington 
presents an essentialist version of Islam in his theory about the coming “clash of 
civilizations,” he cannot tolerate it when Huntington does something similar with 
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Orthodox Christianity (Trifkovic’s own religion).  He seems quite concerned about 
what he perceives to be a Western bias against Orthodox Christianity: 
We are dealing with a prejudice that is not easy to pin down.  Is it the hostility 
toward Orthodox displayed by the “knowledge class” in the modern Western 
world?  Is it the benign and not so benign neglect of Orthodox culture and 
nations by Western political and cultural elites…. [or] the facile treatment of 
Orthodoxy by academia and pluralistic theologians according to their on 
standards and values…. [or] is it even perhaps the mistaken understanding of 
many Orthodox themselves, whether laypeople or clergy, of the true nature 
and purpose of Orthodox? …It is correct to say that all of these attitudes are 
involved at one level or another….356 
 
Though he defends the “true nature and purpose of Orthodoxy” he neglects to 
mention the historic connection between Eastern Christianity and Islam, nor does he 
discuss the ways Orthodox Christians and Muslims, in at least certain parts of the 
Orthodox world, have demonstrated a certain degree of solidarity in the face of 
destructive aspects of modernization and its child Westernization.  The most ironic 
aspect of his criticism is that the method he decries, in term of how Huntington and 
others have treated Orthodoxy, is virtually the same approach he himself uses to 
analyze Islam. 
 Serge Trifkovic’s The Sword of the Prophet, as with Bat Ye’or’s book, was 
popular among some Orthodox Christians possibly because it gave them more fuel 
with which to perpetuate vestiges of hatred toward Islam and Muslims that arose 
primarily during the creation of various ‘Orthodox nation-states’ in the modern period 
and has been passed on from generation to generation since that time.  If this is true, 
then Trifkovic’s book is more useful in terms of what it reveals about how certain 
Orthodox Christians understand themselves (their history, religion, and relations with 
non-Orthodox) in the postmodern age, than anything of value it may say about Islam.         
 Perhaps in reaction to writings such as those of Serve Trifkovic, the tension 
between Christianity and Islam and warfare generally was discussed by Orthodox 
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theologians with much intensity in the period between the September 11th terrorist 
attacks and the start of the U.S.-led war in Iraq.  The topics of war and violence were 
not new ones in the first few years of this century.357  Rather, they were considered 
again in light of the fears and concerns following 9/11 and the debates about the 
proper course of action to deter further terrorist acts of such magnitude in any part of 
the globe.  In the English-speaking Orthodox world, the debate on war even became 
the subject of an entire volume of the St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly in early 
part of 2003.358  The edition was given the subtitle, “Justifiable War?” and was 
anchored around a long article by Fr. Alexander Webster titled, “Justifiable War as a 
‘Lesser Good’ in Eastern Orthodox Moral Tradition.”359   
 The bulk of Fr. Webster’s article was an outline of what he called, “The 
Orthodox Justifiable War Trajectory,” in which he presented evidence from six 
textual sources: Holy Scripture, writings of the Church Fathers, canon law, 
hagiographic literature, devotional literature, and works of modern theologians and 
literary writers.360  His argument is that when warfare is in pursuit of a just cause, it 
should be considered “morally good,” though perhaps a “lesser good.”  In Fr. 
Webster’s view, the sources reveal that the Church had essentially accepted the 
engagement in war as a fact of life in this world and something through which those 
who conduct it properly should be considered “virtuous.”  The practical application of 
this conclusion is that Orthodox Christians of the early twentieth century, or at the 
very least Orthodox ethicists and enlisted men and women who are Orthodox 
Christians, could potentially see their involvement in the ‘engagement’ in Afghanistan 
and (imminently in) Iraq as a fulfillment of the will of God, since war itself could be 
considered something “good,” albeit a “lesser good.”  On the personal level, Fr. 
Webster was no stranger to questions about engaging in and the ethics of war, since 
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he himself had served as a United States military chaplain.  Ironically, perhaps, not 
long after his article was published in the St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly, he 
was deployed to serve in the Middle East. 
 In the various responses to Fr. Webster’s article, as one might expect, the 
authors expressed some agreement on certain points while disagreeing with a number 
of others.  Certain responders were highly critical of Fr. Webster’s methods and 
conclusions.  For example, Jim Forest, Secretary of the Orthodox Peace Fellowship, 
found Webster’s treatment of scripture on the use of violence to be quite narrow and 
questioned whether he really imagined, “Jesus [who failed to side with the Zealot 
opposition] sanctioning war and obliging his followers to take part in it.”361  Forest 
found a similar pattern in the way Fr. Webster drew selectively from the six textual 
sources and has this broader assessment of his conclusions.  In his response, he points 
out that though soldiers themselves can be considered “heroic and patriotic,” that does 
not mean (as he says Fr. Webster asserts) that there is any “moral credit” for “wars for 
the expansion of the empire, wars of national hubris, wars of manifest destiny, wars of 
ethnic cleansing, wars to gain valuable resources,” and so forth.  Forest’s critique 
highlights the complexity of motives that lead to warfare and the perilous moral 
challenges this poses for Christians who, following the example of their Lord, are to 
be peacemakers in this world and are to love their enemies.  His comments call into 
question the moral implications of declaring a “war on terror” and point to some of 
the dilemmas faced by Orthodox Christians in the post-9/11 environment in which the 
brutal acts of the terrorists were being matched primarily by further military 
aggression, continuing the spiral of violence.   
 Another author who took issue with Fr. Alexander Webster’s case that warfare 
should be considered a “lesser good,” is Fr. John Breck, a well-known Orthodox 
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ethicist and former professor at three Orthodox seminaries (on two continents), 
including St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary in New York.  Fr. Breck’s response 
was based primarily on his exegesis of scripture on the topics of violence and 
whether, in his words, “warfare, while at times justifiable, cannot reasonably be 
labeled ‘good.’”362  He did not find Fr. Webster’s arguments compelling because he 
found them to be not well supported in the consensus of Christian scripture.  After 
giving some analysis, he concluded that, “scripture never condones violence as a 
means to pursue social or political goals.”  He stated that warfare could be considered, 
under the best possible circumstances, a “necessary evil,” never a “lesser good,” as Fr. 
Webster suggested.  To explain this, Fr. Breck pointed to the underlying context from 
which the debate on warfare within the Orthodox Church at that time had been 
generated.  For example, he made this comment on the concerns about what Iraq 
might do with its alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs): 
Recent attempts by the Bush administration to create a “just war” aura around 
its aggressive stance toward Iraq offer an instructive illustration of the moral 
ambiguity inherent in any policy of military aggression…. [W]hile the 
secretary of defense vehemently asserts during a news conference that this 
pending war “has nothing to do with oil!,” at virtually the same moment 
another news program airs the equally vehement assertion by a chief oil 
company executive, “Of course it has to do with oil!”  With the lack of clarity 
that marks our motives, there is little chance we will wield our own WMDs in 
a way that is either good or justifiable.363                                                                                                                           
 
Fr. Breck very clearly illustrates the difficulties presented in an age of nuclear bombs 
and other WMDs with not only identifying a morally justifiable motive for engaging 
in war, but also the major problems associated with the methods used to carry out 
such a war.  He urges this fellow clergy and lay leaders to consider the costs upon the 
innocent victims of war, as well as the other political, social, and religious 
consequences. 
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 As the United States government moved closer to its robust military campaign 
in Iraq, the generalized debate about warfare among Orthodox theologians in North 
America gave way to what had been bubbling under the surface – the religious 
implications and consequences of the proposed U.S. invasion, specifically upon 
Muslim-Christian relations.  This was evidenced by a petition sponsored by the North 
American chapter of the Orthodox Peace Fellowship, which had 165 signatories from 
nine nations, including leading hierarchs, clergy, and laity.  The document, titled, ‘A 
Plea for Peace from the Orthodox Peace Fellowship in North America,’ directly 
addressed those who would make the struggles of the day into an epic battle between 
Islam and Christianity or Islam and the West.  It stated: 
An attack on Iraq will be seen by many as an attack on all Arabic and Islamic 
states.  America, despite the rhetoric, is perceived as seeing itself under attack 
by Islam.  America helped install and maintain the despotic Shah of Iran, but 
withdrew its support when Iran became an Islamic republic (itself 
undemocratic in many ways).  Now America is seen as the largely uncritical 
supporter of Israel, against the interests of Palestinians, both Muslim and 
Christian.  Bombing Iraq will confirm these perceptions among Muslims.364 
 
The plea of this large and significant list of Orthodox Christians, which incidentally 
included Fr. John Breck and Jim Forest (but not Fr. Alexander Webster) mentioned 
above, attempted to show that the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq had nothing to 
do with Islam.  It also argued that the ignorance, fears, and distortions of the truth 
about Islam that had been so prevalent in the post-9/11 environment would only be 
perpetuated unless the United States government and the United Nations were “to 
follow diplomatic paths predicated on mercy, honesty, and justice, and to seek 
peacefully negotiated resolutions to the impasse in Iraq.”  Though this plea, along 
with a number of others from Orthodox hierarchs and leaders from around the 
world,365 was not able to stop the war dance that led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it did 
indicate a renewed interest in engagement between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  
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The assertion that Orthodox Christian leaders in general renewed their commitment to 
Muslim-Christian dialogue in the years following the 9/11 attacks and the start of the 
U.S. led war in Iraq is supported by their increased involvement in local, regional, and 
international inter-religious gatherings on common strategies for peace.     
 
ATTEMPTS TO SECURE PEACE 
 
During the period of spring 2003 through the summer of 2006, Orthodox 
Christians from around the world sponsored and/or participated in a number of 
significant inter-religious encounters with Muslims.  Many of these events also 
included participants representing several of the world’s other religious traditions.  A 
number of these gatherings will be outlined in the following section in order to 
illustrate some general themes that emerged throughout the various efforts.   
ON THE U.S.-LED WAR IN IRAQ 
The first of these events took place on 27 and 28 May 2003, when the World 
Conference on Religion and Peace convened a gathering of religious leaders in 
Amman, Jordan in order to promote increased inter-religious understanding in Iraq.  
Conference participants included a number of Orthodox Christians, including Fr. 
Leonid Kishkovsky as Vice Moderator, as well as an Iraqi delegation consisting of 
Shi’i and Sunni Muslims and Syrian Orthodox, Armenian, Roman Catholic, and 
Chaldean Christians.  In a news brief reported the following: 
Conference participants appealed to the occupying powers to take up their 
responsibilities fully in order to provide safety to the Iraqi people.  They 
appealed to the international community as a whole for the necessary 
humanitarian aid…. [The conference] opened new possibilities for 
interreligious understanding in Iraq.  Indeed, all of the Iraqi participants 
strongly supported the formulation of an interreligious council in Iraq.366 
 
The participants seemed to agree that a peaceful resolution in Iraq would best be 
facilitated by a joint effort on the part of Muslims and Christians in the region and 
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throughout the world.  Believing that by joining together in one voice they could 
better appeal to the United States, Britain, Spain, and the other countries engaged in 
the Iraq War effort at that time, the participants hoped they could reduce the 
tremendous suffering of the Iraqi people because of the war.                
 In the autumn of the same year, another gathering between Muslims and 
Christians was convened in Germany at the Aachen International Conference on the 
theme, ‘War and Peace: Faith and Cultures in Dialogue.’367  Illustrative of the 
Orthodox voices at the conference was a lecture presented by Metropolitan Paul 
(Yazigi) of Aleppo in a section that looked at the topic, ‘Muslims and Christians: 
How Can We Live Together?’  Metropolitan Paul wrestled with the question of how a 
person can believe that his religion is the fullest expression of God’s revelation, while 
at the same time accept that those of other religions also possess divine truth and may 
be carrying out the will of God.  He says, for example: 
If Christianity considers itself as the vessel where rested all the plentitude of 
divine truth and revelation, it stands listening carefully to the divine echoes 
and messages from other religions and cultures, since they are potential 
carriers of divine and salutary truths…. [T]he responsibility of religions has 
increased nowadays, much more than before.  Unfortunately, fundamentalism 
has developed these days in many places; problems of public order are being 
discussed with a religious spirit that reflects the refuse of the other…. The 
future of the world greatly depends on the openness of religions after a period 
of seclusion.  An occasion like the one we are experiencing here is indeed a 
good initiative towards clearing any reserve between one another.368 
 
Metropolitan Paul suggests that it is possible, based on their own authentic traditions, 
for Muslims and Christians to see God at work in the religion of the other.  Much like 
the conference participants in Amman earlier in the year, he argues that Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims must work together to conquer the difficult problems of the 
day, in this case fundamentalism.  Perhaps his own experiences as a Christian living 
alongside Muslims in his native Syria led him to these conclusions. 
212 
 
THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND IRAN 
 The idea that Orthodox Christians and Muslims must work together to face the 
significant challenges of the postmodern age had also been a subject of some interest 
in Russia Orthodox Church from the latter part of the twentieth century when a group 
of Orthodox Christians and Muslims met in Moscow in 2004.  However, it would be 
difficult to make the case that Muslim-Christian dialogue was a priority in the 
Russian Church when the “Joint Russian-Iranian Theological Commission on ‘Islam-
Orthodoxy’ Dialogue” convened its fourth of such sessions on 26-29 April 2004.  An 
essay by Basil Cousins, a specialist on Russian Orthodoxy, published the same year as 
the conference, identified a rather ambiguous attitude within Russian Orthodoxy 
towards Islam, and inter-religious dialogue generally.369  On the one hand, he 
acknowledged at least “a ‘tacit agreement’ between Islam and the Russian Orthodox 
Church [from the period] when both were subjected to intense persecution by the anti-
religious forces of atheistic Communism” that “may well have carried over into the 
post-Communist period.”370  On the other hand, he submitted that the Church had not 
openly embraced Islam and dialogue with Muslims, especially when compared with, 
for example, the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. 371  He referenced a 
Geraldine Fagin report from 2001 identifying divergent views between Moscow and 
Constantinople on the subject of religious freedom.  Fagin wrote that, “While 
Moscow is unenthusiastic about [it] and does not regard it as integral to Orthodox 
teaching, the Ecumenical Patriarchate embraces it as the supreme manifestation of a 
divine gift to humanity: free will.”372 
This being said, one cannot deny that there has been a sustained dialogue 
between Russian Orthodoxy and at least certain Muslims from the end of the last 
through the first part of the current century.  It is no secret that ‘high-ranking 
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representatives’ of the Russian Orthodox Church and counterparts in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s religious establishment have been meeting on a regular basis, 
beginning with their inaugural session in 1997 and roughly every couple of years 
thereafter.  Because of the position and prestige of the Russian Orthodox Church as 
the largest of all the national Orthodox Churches worldwide, it would be useful to 
examine these encounters in some detail.  The Moscow Times carried an article titled, 
‘Moslems, Orthodox Find Common Foe,’ when the group held its second meeting in 
1999 and the official website of the Moscow Patriarchate itself heralded the success 
of the third meeting in 2000.373  According to the official description given by the 
Russian Orthodox Church on these exchanges: 
The Commission was set up in the result of the visits exchange between 
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Department 
for External Church Relations, and Aytolla Ali-Tashiri, Chairman of the 
Organization of Islamic Culture and Relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
in 1996 and in 1997. The first meeting of the Commission was held in 1997.374 
 
In addition to getting acquainted with each other and organizing the format for their 
encounters, the topics addressed in these meetings prior to the fourth session included 
peace, justice, and inter-religious dialogue in international relations.   
Alternating locations between Moscow and Tehran, the fourth session in 
Moscow addressed the issue of globalization and its impact on religion.  In this the 
first meeting following the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, along with 
several other significant terrorist incidents on other continents in the ensuing years, 
the Commission discussed the ways in which globalization had directly challenged 
religious morals, culture, and religious beliefs as they have been traditionally 
associated with Orthodox Christianity and Islam.  They were critical not only of 
terrorist acts, but also of any reactions to them that would involve aggression and 
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exploitation, further escalating the cycle of violence and hatred.  A report from the 
session stated:  
Denouncing all kinds of terrorism and illegitimate use of force on the part of 
states as well as all forms of the use of force for the settlement of international 
problems the participants expressed their protest against using one-sided 
approaches to their settlement. The session participants unanimously 
denounced the abuse of religion for the justification of terrorist acts, 
aggression and violence against innocent people. The sides of the Dialogue are 
convinced that to efficiently fight against terrorism it is necessary to overcome 
the phenomena that cause poverty, crime, corruption, animosity and 
intolerance.375 
 
The participants identified some of the key sources of the terrorist acts of recent years 
and, condemning the unilateralist and narrow responses of states to such acts 
(implying the U.S. war in Iraq and Israel’s military incursions into Palestinian 
territories), the participants suggested a more peaceful and multifaceted approach.   
Much as they had in their second session in 1999 during which they reportedly 
identified, “a common enemy: Western liberal secular society, which…aims to 
impose itself upon the rest of the world,”376 the Orthodox Christians and Muslims on 
the Commission pointed to the ill effects of westernization across the globe with 
respect to both of their religious traditions.  They said in a joint statement that: 
[G]lobalism is a process of westernization of the world…. [We] flatly 
denounced the globalism project in terms of its imposing on other nations one 
standard of world outlook, culture and policy shared by an insignificant 
percentage of the world’s population…. [We emphasize] the need for moral 
and spiritual perfecting of mankind, stressing that with the presence in the 
modern world of social and humanitarian problems including murder, 
violence, “the culture of the naked” and debauchery, unjust use of force while 
solving regional and global problems, alcoholism, drug abuse, environment 
pollution, a serious attitude towards morals and spirituality can reduce the 
impact of these vices and install stability, protection of family values, 
children’s, teenagers’ and young people’s rights, and their religious and moral 
upbringing.377 
 
Though in this example and in some of the language from this and previous sessions 
one can perceive a more pronounced moral conservatism than one might find in other 
gatherings of Orthodox Christians and Muslims in recent years, the desire to come 
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together against the forces of modernization is clearly an often repeated and 
increasingly common theme in the post 9/11 period.  As with the dialogue sessions in 
Amman and Aachen, the participants in the Joint Russian-Iranian Theological 
Commission argued that through dialogue at the national, regional and international 
level, Orthodox Christians and Muslims could change the bleak outlook for the future 
because their combined efforts could, “foster mutual understanding, peace, friendship 
and justice” throughout the world. 
 The same commission met for its fifth session on 27 February–4 March 2006 
in Tehran.  Continuing to examine the ways in which the shared spiritual legacy of 
their Orthodox Christian and Islamic traditions might lead to healing in the world, the 
topic of the 2006 gathering was on eschatology.  This session marked what appears to 
be a greater endorsement of Muslim-Christian dialogue, at least in a more public way, 
by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church.  Alexy II, Patriarch of Moscow and all 
Russia gave the opening address to the Commission for the first time since the 
meetings began in 1997.  His address was cautious but supportive of the work:   
It is gratifying to see that religious and state leaders of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran are active supporters of the dialogue between civilizations.  Active 
cooperation between the followers of the two religions is promoted by similar 
understanding of many aspects of relations among religion, state and society 
and important role of religion in social processes, including attainment of civil 
accord on the basis of moral principles in society. We work together to 
consolidate peace and justice, to prevent and overcome interethnic conflicts 
and not to allow exploitation of religious feelings for kindling hatred.  Our 
Church shares the conviction that a global conflict could be prevented and 
local conflicts could be settled only if all nations develop freely and all 
historically formed civilizations have unrestricted influence on the fortunes of 
the world.  Our Church is willing to continue and develop dialogue with the 
Iranian religious leaders.378 
 
Patriarch Alexy seems to be walking a fine line in his statements here to support the 
work of the Commission without scandalizing the more conservative elements in his 
church as described above.  One has to wonder as well whether his words were 
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carefully chosen, with at least some input from government officials, in order not to 
negatively impact Russian’s political balancing of relations with Iran and with the 
international community in the early part of 2006.   
 This public, at least tacit support of Muslim-Christian dialogue in the name of 
peace by the Russian Orthodox Church continued in 2006 when it sponsored an 
international inter-religious encounter on terrorism in Moscow on 3-5 July 2006.  A 
press article on the event stated that the roughly 150 religious leaders from around the 
world (representing 49 countries) had gathered to adopt, “a declaration to serve as a 
reminder to the heads of state of the governments of the G8 at the time of their 
[upcoming] summit in St. Petersburg on 15-17 July,” that “the religions can help to 
stop terrorism, sprung from tensions between civilizations where the ‘religious factor’ 
is not absent.”379  Once again, Patriarch Alexy II played an important roll in the 
encounter by addressing participants in the inaugural session.  He stated in his 
opening remarks that, “without a profound understanding by the nations of their 
[respective] religious traditions, it is not possible to effectively counter conflicts, 
violence, extremism, and terrorism.”  The result was a very strong statement by 
participants to the world community about the inappropriate mixing of religion and 
violence: 
The utilization of religion to incite hatred or as a pretext for crimes against 
individuals, morals, and humanity constitutes one of the principle challenges 
of modern times…. [We declare that there should be] a permanent method for 
assuaging different interests and respecting the moral sensibilities, the way of 
life, and the different legal and political systems of the various national and 
religious traditions.  The world should be multi-polar and pluralistic, to the 
satisfaction of all men and all nations, and not subject to the simplistic and 
lifeless ideological systems [promoted by a few].380 
 
The statement showed not only a common voice among the leaders of a number of the 
world’s religions – including Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Shinto, as well as 
Islam – but also a growing solidarity among the various Orthodox churches in 
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Romania, Georgia, the Czech Lands and Slovakia, the United States, France, 
Armenia, Egypt (Coptic Church), and Ethiopia.   
THE MONOTHEISTIC TRADITIONS & A SHARED VISION FOR A NEW WORLD 
 Other Orthodox Christians looking to engage Muslims and secure peace in 
other parts of the world during the period of spring 2003 through the summer of 2006, 
participated in an inter-religious conference in Athens just before the start of the 2004 
Olympic Games.  The event was titled, ‘Religion – Peace – Olympic Ideal,’ and drew 
a number of important leaders of the Church to Amarousion Attica on 10th August 
2004, including His Beatitude Petros VII, Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria and all 
Africa.  In his message to participants, Patrirach Petros stated that: 
[This] is not only an important spiritual event on account of the inter-religious 
participation of representatives of the Orthodox Churches, other Christian 
doctrines and the great religions, especially the Monotheistic ones, but it 
especially contributes to the preparation for the upcoming start to the Olympic 
Games in 2004 in Greece, where they have their historic beginning…. The 
obvious quest [for all the participants] remains the issue of peace, seeing that it 
is now evident that, through it, the Olympic ideal can extend to its 
proportionate dimensions by way of the contribution of the religious 
communities and their responsible leaders.381 
 
This is an example of an important leader of world Orthodoxy using the ideals of the 
Olympics to foster peace among the nations and the religions, especially between 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.382  Though participation by Orthodox leaders in this 
event - and others preceding or in connection with the Olympic games383 - may not be 
the most notable example of positive engagement with Muslims specifically, their 
presence did send a strong message to the world in the post-9/11 era.  It seems many 
of the leaders of the Orthodox world felt it important to show they were willing to 
reach out in peace and love to those of other religions.  This was an important 
counterbalance to all of the rhetoric about a supposed clash of civilizations and a 
perceived increase in fear and hostility between Christians and Muslims. 
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 In the spring of 2005 there were two noteworthy events in which Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims joined together to affirm their shared commitment to peace 
and to promote dialogue among the world’s faith traditions, particularly Christianity 
and Islam.  The first of these events was a conference that took place in early March 
in Amman, Jordan.  This international conference, sponsored by the Orthodox 
Peoples’ Unity Fund and Jordan’s Orthodox Society, was titled, ‘Prospects of 
Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Today’s World.’  It involved political, religious, and 
public leaders from the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Russia, the Balkans, and Central 
Asia and was held, from the Muslim side, under the auspices of King Abdullah II.  
One of the key themes of the conference was the shared responsibility of Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims to work together not only to build peace, but also to remind 
the world of the essential role of moral and spiritual values in resolving conflict and 
healing the brokenness that had lead to and was caused by terrorism.  For example, 
Valery Alexeyev, president of the Orthodox Peoples’ Unity fund, highlighted, “the 
efforts being made by Middle East Orthodox organizations to maintain and strengthen 
peace (sic) in the region and rally the Orthodox Arabs around the idea of peace (sic), 
tolerance and equality of the followers of Christianity and Islam.”384  Even certain 
political leaders present at the event were stirred by the mood of the conference.  For 
example, the chairman of the Russian Duma’s Committee for Public Associations and 
Religious Organizations, Sergei Popov, stated that, “All major religions denounce 
terrorism and violence.  The recent developments all over the world have proven this.  
However, international efforts should be pooled to bolster the role played by the 
imperishable spiritual values.”385  The conference was significant in that, unlike many 
such events, it brought together leaders in the public, political, and religious domains.  
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In doing so, it opened the possibility of addressing the root causes of terrorism and 
violence in society.            
 The second notable event in the spring of 2005 took place in Albania, where, 
after the fall of communism, the leaders of the key religious communities had been 
meeting and working together to rebuild their country.  The fruit of these efforts came 
on 18 March 2005 when the four traditional religious communities in Albania – the 
Muslim community, the Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania, the Catholic 
Church, and the Bektashi community – issued their ‘Statement of Shared Moral 
Commitment.’  It is quite astonishing that, in just a few years following the almost 50 
years of total prohibition of religious faith, practice, and assembly under the 
oppressive communist regime (arguably the most openly hostile to religion of any in 
the world in the twentieth century), religious life in Albania could be so strong.  What 
is even more inspiring is that, in their weakness, these religious communities had 
enough courage and confidence to reach out to each other to address their shared 
concerns in Albania and in the region.  Celebrating what God had brought them 
through, recognizing the sacrifices of those who had kept faith alive through the 
country’s darkest hour, the cosignatories proclaimed, “the period of repression is 
behind us and religious life can once again blossom in Albania in its various forms 
and retake its hereditary place in a democratic society.”386  They also committed 
themselves to taking a leadership role facing the many challenges associated with 
rebuilding their country.  For example, in the statement they promised the following: 
[We] pledge ourselves to continue the promotion of a “climate of peace” 
within our communities by stressing to our own officials that preaching must 
not cause religious hatred…. We will continue to educate all persons to 
understand and respect our different faith traditions in order to prevent 
ignorance and fear from fueling discrimination and violence.  To this end, we 
must ensure that school curriculum and textbooks treat each religious tradition 
in an equal and open manner.  We will continue to be open to cooperation with 
civic and social organizations to carry out common activities for which we 
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share a common concern.  We will continue to cooperate through reciprocal 
meetings to maintain and promote inter-religious understanding in Albania 
and in the region.  We will continue to pledge ourselves to find the means to 
provide assistance for all those who suffer in our society.387  
 
Albanian religious leaders did not plan to take a passive role behind political leaders 
in addressing the problems in their society.  They pledged to educate on tolerance not 
only within their religious institutions, but also to take the next step to ensure that the 
values of cooperation and pluralism were a standard feature all levels of education in 
Albania.  They even went so far as to promise to provide services to anyone in need, 
regardless of religious affiliation.  This pledge has borne out at least in the work of the 
Orthodox signatory, Anastasios, Archbishop of Tirana, Durres, Elbasan, & all 
Albania.  Archbishop Anastasios’ educational, health, and social services programmes 
have been touted as a living example of interfaith cooperation for the benefit of all in 
Albania and beyond.388 
PEACE AND TOLERANCE II 
 It has been mentioned throughout this chapter, that Bartholomew, Ecumenical 
Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, has played a key role in providing leadership in the 
post-9/11 period.  Archbishop Demitrios, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church 
of America, spoke these words about the Ecumenical Patriarchate: 
Patriarch Bartholomew has been at the forefront of organizing international 
inter-religious conferences to confront the evils of religious fanaticism and 
intolerance.  He was among the first of the major world religious personalities 
to organize a meeting of religious leaders from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim 
faiths very soon after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.389 
 
The reference here is to the meeting in Belgium that produced the aforementioned 
“Brussels Declaration.”  In November of 2005 Patriarch Bartholomew again showed 
his leadership on the international stage by convening the second “Peace and 
Tolerance Conference” (the first having begun in Berne in 1992), this time on the 
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topic of, ‘Dialogue and Understanding in Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, and Central 
Asia.’   
 In a statement that resulted from the deliberations, signed by Rabbi Arthur 
Schneier (Jewish), Sheikhul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazadeh (Muslim), and Walter 
Cardinal Kasper (Catholic), as well as Patriarch Bartholomew, the participants in the 
Peace and Tolerance II Conference reaffirmed their earlier statement that, “A crime 
committed in the name of religion is a crime against religion.”390  They acknowledged 
that though through their efforts and other circumstances certain conflicts had 
diminished, they still had much work ahead of them in support of peace and tolerance 
throughout the world.  Section II of the statement reads: 
While most of the deadly conflicts that raged then have ceased, unfortunately 
there is still distrust, suspicion, the threat of harm, as well as intermittent 
violence in the regions represented.  It is our aim, as religious leaders of our 
countries, to mitigate against those dangerous paths; to heal painful memories; 
and encourage all to exhibit in their actions the spirit of ‘live and let live’…. 
The scourge of international terrorism that defiles the tenets of morality of our 
monotheistic religions, has intensified since 1994.  We condemn those who 
engage in such heinous crimes as lawless murderers and call upon all religious 
leaders to speak out forcefully against them.391 
 
The references to conflicts taking place in the early to mid-1990s were, “the crimes 
against humanity…in Bosnia, in Armenia/Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan.”392  
Patriarch Bartholomew and the other signatories seem to imply that the violence and 
hatred of a regional character at the end of the twentieth century had been replaced by 
international terrorism networks and plots on a global scale at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.  Similar to the inter-religious approach taken in Albania, the 
signatories of the Peace and Tolerance II document asked all people to reach out 
beyond the boundaries of their religious communities to care for all suffering 
individuals with these words: “We ask the religious communities to nurture and assist 
the suffering children, sick and aged, no matter what faith they profess, to help them 
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find spiritual, psychological and physical healing.”  Likewise, they stated that they 
“resolutely reject the use of language that incites people to violence… [and] 
encourage religious leaders to work with the political leadership in their respective 
countries to promote peace, justice, human and religious rights.”  Once again, this is 
an example of the leadership of an Orthodox hierarch, in cooperation with those of 
other religious traditions (nearly always inclusive of Islam), to send a clear message to 
his flock and to the world that Orthodox Christianity is engaged in the problems faced 
by all humanity.  Patriarch Bartholomew, and others like him, seems to be concerned 
that Orthodoxy not be presented as a closed, self-conscious, and insecure religion that 
cannot affirm the work of the Holy Spirit outside the boundaries of the Church.   
ISRAEL’S OFFENSIVE INTO LEBANON 
 Not unlike Patriarch Bartholomew, other Orthodox hierarchs have 
courageously stood for justice in the political mire.  This was certainly the case in the 
summer of 2006, when a group composed of American Middle-Eastern Christians, 
Middle Eastern Christians, Muslim religious leaders from the United States and the 
Middle East, and a representative from the Druze Council of America met on 3 
August 2006 met to address a crisis is Israel-Palestine. (A bombing and ground 
offensive of the Israeli government into Lebanon had killed more than 900 Lebanese, 
over one third of which were children, and displaced close to one million people from 
their homes.393)  Though most of those present were part of the Standing Conference 
of American Middle-Eastern Christian and Muslim Religious Leaders, this special 
session was convened to issue a resolution and express solidarity.  Led by 
Metropolitan Phillip (Saliba), Primate of the Antiochian Orthodox Christian 
Archdiocese of North America, the group called for an “immediate and unconditional 
cease fire,” the “exchange of prisoners between Lebanon and Israel,” an increased 
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role of the international community to give “humanitarian assistance to those who are 
suffering” and “help the hundreds of thousands of displaced Lebanese,” and the 
“implementation of the UN resolutions that address occupied territories in Lebanon 
and the entire region.”394   
Many of the participants had joined with the Middle East Council of Churches 
on previous occasions to address the indiscretions and offenses of the Israeli 
government that had caused so much physical and psychological damage to the 
Muslim and Christian communities in Israel and the surrounding countries.  As with 
previous resolutions, the signatories of this 2006 statement seem to carefully delineate 
between their condemnation of the actions of the Israeli government and their support 
of Israeli Jews.  Lest their words be misinterpreted to mean a disparaging comment on 
Judaism generally or Israeli Jews in particular, the participants declared that they, 
“[deplore] the killing of any human being, and reiterate that all killing is against our 
[Christian, Muslim, and Jewish] religious beliefs.”395  Though Israel did eventually 
cease the incursions into Lebanon, it is difficult to say the degree to which this 
resolution may have influenced the decision of Israeli leaders to withdraw.   
 
GREECE: A CASE STUDY IN OPPOSING VOICES IN THE CHURCH  
 
While many Orthodox Christians were increasingly joining with Muslims to 
promote mutual understanding and to work together toward peace, there was also a 
renewal of a call among other Orthodox Christians for the cessation of ecumenical 
and inter-religious dialogue altogether.  There has for centuries been a natural tension 
within the worldwide Orthodox community between those who are generous towards 
other religions, acknowledging the role of the Holy Spirit wherever it may or may not 
be seen, and those concerned about carefully defining and protecting the boundaries 
of the Church.  This natural tension, which on its surface and when kept in balance 
224 
 
could be considered something healthy for the Church, has at times throughout the 
centuries become problematic and destructive.  It could be argued that the tragic 
events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath, which spilled over in a variety of 
ways into many parts of the world, led to one of those periods of unhealthy imbalance 
and polarization between these two long-standing perspectives within the Church.  To 
be sure, there had been steady opposition to the participation of Orthodox Christians 
in ecumenical and inter-religious activities many years prior to 9/11, as discussed in 
the previous chapter.  However, 9/11 in the broadest sense seemed to set aflame latent 
attitudes and fears about Islam and Muslims that had been smoldering in the hearts of 
individuals and communities.  It seems that, for certain people within the Church, it 
did not take much convincing that the more cautious narrow perspective of Orthodoxy 
would be the only way to assure a secure future for themselves and their Orthodox 
Church.  Others within the Orthodox world are still struggling with what to make of 
9/11 and, by extension, Islam.  Suffice it to say that 9/11 has sparked a number of 
debates which, because of fear of the perceived or real threat of international 
terrorism, have had a polarizing affect among Orthodox Christians (both with each 
other and with those outside the Church).      
 The two poles of this debate seem to be particularly evident within the 
Orthodox Church of Greece.  At both the grassroots level and in the upper echelon of 
church leadership one can find those who strongly support engagement in ecumenism 
and inter-religious dialogue, as well as those who are passionately against it.  Though 
much of this chapter thus far has focused on the former trend, it would be useful also 
to examine the latter, which has been on the rise in recent years.  Perhaps the strongest 
evidence supporting the assertion that there is a growing trend of anti-ecumenism (for 
lack of a better term, and inclusive here of opposition to inter-religious dialogue) 
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within the Orthodox Church of Greece is a significant conference that took place in 
Thessaloniki from 20-24 September 2004.  Though sponsored and organized by the 
School of Pastoral Theology at The Aristotelian University, the conference was inter-
Orthodox and international, meaning its participants (around 65 in all) came from 
other Orthodox Churches, as well as the Church of Greece, and included 
metropolitans, bishops, priests, theologians, monks, and interested laypersons of all 
sorts.  Though only one conference, the event showed just how far a particular 
perspective had spread throughout the Church of Greece, and to some extent (if the 
handful of non-Greek participants is any indication), in Eastern Europe, Africa, and 
North America.  
The conference organizers created a summary with “findings” from the 
proceedings and titled the document, ‘Conclusions of the Inter-Orthodox Theological 
Conference: “Ecumenism: Origins – Expectations – Disenchantment.”’  The 
document was translated into English by Fr. Peter Heers and posted on-line.396  There 
were no signatories to these statements, making it is difficult to determine to what 
degree one can consider them the consensus of those in attendance, as opposed to the 
views of the organizers or editors themselves.  However, it can be assumed that the 
general attitudes conveyed in them were shared by many of the participants.  The 
overall conclusion to the event is stated quite clearly at the end of the document: 
[O]ut of love we reject ecumenism, for we wish to offer to the heterodox and 
to non-Christians that which the Lord has so richly granted to all of us within 
His Holy Orthodox Church: namely the possibility of becoming and being 
members of His Body.397 
 
The message is that ecumenism is at best unhelpful to the Orthodox cause and at 
worst a heresy.  The body of the document reveals an even stronger, more negative 
tone from the participants, and gives a fuller appreciation of their perspective on the 
non-Orthodox and those in the Church who would engage them in dialogue.  Perhaps 
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the harshest language appears in relation to what they refer to as “inter-religious 
syncretism:”   
Ecumenism, after the success it has realized in inter-Christian dialogues…has 
moved on to the next objective of the “New Age”: inter-religious unity.  Here 
one encounters promotions of the truly demonic idea that Christ is not the only 
path to salvation, the life, light and truth…. Inter-religious gatherings and 
dialogues, more frequently and widely supported by Christian leaders, 
including some Orthodox, have lead to an intolerable syncretism; they 
constitute a negation of the Gospel and an insult to the Holy Martyrs and 
Confessors of the faith….398 
 
This is a clear contrast from the notion presented by Metropolitan Georges (Khodr) – 
a figure mentioned numerous times in preceding chapters - and proposed similarly by 
others, that Orthodox Christians should endeavor to, “follow the tracks of Christ 
perceptible in the shadows of other religions.”399  Simply put, these anti-ecumenists 
find inter-religious efforts quite objectionable and with only one end – the obscuration 
of the truth about Christ and the one, true (Orthodox) Church.  They suggest as a 
solution to the “heresies” (which is the term used repeatedly in the document) of 
ecumenism and inter-religious dialogue, among other things are two key proposals: 1) 
complete withdrawal of the Orthodox churches from the World Council of Churches 
and 2) excommunication for those Orthodox Christians (especially church leaders) 
who will not desist from involvement in ecumenism and dialogue with non-
Christians.  The document says this on the latter subject:   
[We propose] in the event that they continue to participate in, and lend support 
to, the pan-heresy of Ecumenism – both inter-christian and inter-religious – 
the obligatory salvific, canonical and patristic course for the faithful, clergy 
and laity, is excommunication: in other words, ceasing to commemorate 
bishops, who are co-responsible for, and co-communicants with, heresy and 
delusion.400 
  
In other words, those who know the truth about ecumenism must out of love for those 
engaged in “heresy and delusion” and for the sake of the Church excommunicate their 
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brothers and sisters in Christ if they will not listen to reason and change their ways.  
They argue here that the Church itself gives them no other choice.   
 If one accepts that the 2004 conference in Thessaloniki against ecumenism 
and inter-religious dialogue is representative of one pole in the debate about Islam 
within the Church of Greece, the other pole could best be symbolized by Volos, a city 
about 215 km south of Thessaloniki situated on the Pagasetic Gulf.  Volos and the 
entire Diocese of Dimitrias has become a self-proclaimed “international meeting point 
of encounter and dialogue.”  The Academy of Theological Studies has offered a 
summer seminar and a winter programme of lectures every year since 2000.401  
Presented as “cutting-edge scholarly conferences,” the Academy has put together an 
impressive and international list of presenters over its relatively short lifespan.  It has 
also covered a wide array of topics through the conferences, which are generally 
accompanied by parallel events such as seminars, workshops, congresses, and round 
tables.   
 Among the activities associated with Volos in recent years, two are 
particularly germane to the question of relations between Orthodox Christianity and 
Islam.  The first was a round table in conjunction with the theme for the academic 
year 2000-2001, “Orthodoxy and Modernity.”  The round table took place on 12 
November 2001 and addressed the topic, “Islam and Fundamentalism – Orthodoxy 
and Globalization.”402  Participants included the Metropolitan of Demetrias, the (now) 
Minister of Culture and Acting Foreign Minister of Lebanon, a member of Parliament 
in Greece, academics from several well-known universities, and an editor of a 
regional newspaper who coordinated the event.  The lectures were published in 2004 
in a volume titled, Islam & Fundamentalism – Orthodox Christianity and 
Globalization.403  This collection represents a comparative, but also introspective 
228 
 
analysis on how Orthodox Christians and Muslims have been on both very similar and 
parallel tracks in their encounter with modernity, with which they still have a number 
of unresolved issues.404  In addition to the anchor article by Metropolitan Ignatius 
(from which the volume itself received its title), Marios Begzos outlines the rise of 
political Islam within the Muslim community and Nick Mouzele (London School of 
Economics) looks at urbanization and the issues it presents for Orthodoxy. (Also 
included are articles by Tarek Mitri, Andreas Andrianopoulos, Pantelis Kalaitzidi 
[Director of Volos Academy for Theological Studies], Giorgou Karampelia, and 
Demitri Mpekriake.)   
The round table set the stage for a much more significant event in Volos 
several years later.  The entire winter lecture series at the Academy of Theological 
Studies in Volos for the academic year 2006-2007 was devoted to the topic, 
“Orthodox Christianity and Islam – Islam in Europe.”405  The following statement 
from the opening comments in the programme book for that year show the degree to 
which Volos represents the opposite pole from that of the aforementioned anti-
ecumenism conference: 
The knowledge of Islam can well assist us in reaching a mutual understanding 
of, and a respect for, cultural and religious otherness, in all amounting to a 
level of spiritual maturity on the basis of which the Church is called to carry 
out her work and her mission.  It is our duty therefore to overcome past 
confrontations, so as to enable ourselves to work for a brighter future for both 
sides, a future marked by understanding and mutual acceptance.  Such a noble 
aim presupposes, of course, a sincere commitment to serious and sober 
scholarly dialogue, far from defensive apologies and self-righteous rhetoric.406 
 
Clearly the organizers of this academic programme did not fear engaging with 
Muslims through dialogue, nor were they concerned that such interaction might in 
some way weaken or diminish the Church.  By contrast, they assert that the journey 
toward mutual understanding and a greater respect for the ‘religious other’ is not only 
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a worthwhile endeavor, but also a sign of the spiritual maturity of those willing to 
embark upon the quest. 
 The conference organizers set up a series of lectures and events involving an 
international grouping of Muslim and Orthodox Christian scholars and religious 
leaders.  The basic aim in these sessions was to explore a series of questions that the 
Academy had identified as being critical to dialogue between Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims at this juncture in history.  The questions were as follows: 
What were the relations and contacts between Orthodox Christianity and 
Islam, Hesychasm and Sufism?  What is the place of hermeneutics in these 
two great spiritual traditions?  What were their mutual osmoses and the 
interactions?  How can we heal the memories of past conflicts and how can we 
change into a wealth and a blessing of God the given present co-existence of 
Christians and Muslims? Also, are we to assume that Orthodox Christianity 
and Islam are only entitled to a pre-modern past or can they perhaps make 
serious claims for a modern and post-modern present and future?  What could 
be the advisable treatment of fundamentalisms at both sides?  Does Europe, 
finally, constitute a closed Christian club or should it be properly envisioned 
as a multicultural and multireligious political entity?407 
 
Building upon the foundation laid by the round table several years before, this 
programme established a compelling framework for serious dialogue on some of the 
key issues faced by Orthodox Christians and Muslims today.  For example, the 
previous chapter of this writing delved into the problems both communities face in 
terms of finding their identity in this postmodern age.  Several of the seminars in 
Volos got to the heart of this question of identity by attempting to build a bridge for 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims between their respective narratives of the past and a 
common vision for their future.      
 In many ways, the Academy’s year of programming on the topic of “Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam – Islam in Europe” seemed to be presented as a remedy to 
much of the misinformation and damaging attacks on Islam presented by the opposing 
side in the battle for the hearts and minds of their compatriots with regard to Muslims.  
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The organizers of the events point out that Orthodox Christians and Muslims must 
remember that their historical trajectory together has been filled with “a mixture of 
mutual confrontations and understanding.”  They make the following plea to those 
who may be uncertain about Islam: 
In a world where the trumpets of war, terrorism and conflicts are usually 
covered with dangerous and self-serving religious rhetoric, which in turn 
erects religious and metaphysical walls among peoples, there also emerges 
from the critical conscience of the alert and informed faithful the need to build 
venues of inter-religious communication and understanding, especially among 
those who declare, and want to be, “children of Abraham”.  In contrast to 
those who make an ideology out of the Conflict of religions and cultures, and 
most certainly against politicians with militant proclivities eager to declare 
new crusades, theology owes to insist unwaveringly on the need for increased 
dialogue based on love, respect and the acceptance of religious and cultural 
otherness, through serious and honest theological discussion.408 
 
Here we see a compelling illustration of the way religion is so often eclipsed by or 
used as an external mask for ideology.  It is interesting to think about how even the 
notion of such theories as the “clash of civilizations” can easily become an ideology 
and that those who live by it think and act in much the same way as the very 
“fundamentalists” they are so fond of criticizing.   
  
2007 AND BEYOND: RENEWED COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE 
AND THE SYNAXIS OF THE PRIMATES OF THE ORTHODOX 
CHURCHES 
 
In the fall of 2006, many Muslims throughout the world were outraged by 
statements made by Pope Benedict XVI in a speech he presented at the University of 
Regensburg.  The Pope quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who had labeled 
some key actions of the Prophet Muhammad as “evil and inhuman.”  The subtle 
implication of his remarks was that he too believed this about Islam’s revered Prophet 
and, by extension, questioned the basic foundation of the religion.  Though he later 
apologized and attempted to clarify the intended meaning of his statements, the 
damage had been done.  Several Muslims were so outraged that they called for the 
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death of the Pope, as was the case with a Somali imam.  In a direct response to this 
threatening language, Archbishop Christodoulos, head of the Orthodox Church of 
Greece, sparked more fury in the Muslim world with his own inflammatory 
statements about Islam.  In one of his sermons he said, “Many Christians on the Black 
Continent (Africa) suffer from fanatic Islamists.  The example of Roman Catholic 
monks who were slaughtered last year…because they wore the cross and believed in 
our crucified Lord is still recent.”409  In light of these comments from Pope Benedict 
and Archbishop Christodoulos, as well as a few others (such as Lord Carey, the 
former Archbishop of Canterbury), the fall of 2006 was a trying moment in the recent 
history of relations between Christianity and Islam.   
With terrorist attacks continuing (showing the resilience of the ever increasing 
global extremist networks), armed conflicts persisting in the Middle East, and the war 
of words escalating between certain Christian and Muslim leaders, the progress that 
had been made toward peace over the previous few years seemed to be slipping away.  
Still, there were those from both Christian and the Muslim communities who refused 
to stand by and let this happen.  One of the strongest examples of this among 
Orthodox Christian leaders was His Beatitude Ignatius IV (Hazim), Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch of Antioch and all the East.  Patriarch Ignatius had been for many years at 
the forefront of the efforts to improve relations between the Catholic Church and the 
Orthodox Churches.  He and the previous Pope, John Paul II, had taken great strides 
together to increase their bond of friendship and to remove some of the barriers that 
had divided the Christian Church for centuries.  Perhaps emboldened by this elevated 
level of trust that had been built up with Rome, the Patriarch spoke quite pointedly to 
Pope Benedict about his poor choice of words about Islam.  He expressed concern 
about the potential consequences and admonished the Pope by saying: 
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We have followed with extreme anxiety your statements and the angry 
reactions that accompanied them over the course of the last days…. [Eastern 
Christians] have knowledge, experience and understanding of Christianity and 
Islam together, for they have been in a state of coexistence, cooperation and 
harmony from the beginning of the Islamic mission until now.  We have 
established the best of relationships, built on respect for religions and for 
everyone’s freedom to practice rites as he wishes and according to his belief in 
the teachings of his religion and the principles of his divine law…. We are 
hoping that you may take part in raising the essence of religions from the field 
of dialogues, intellectual efforts and citations that have been effaced by time, 
and that there may be a complete rapprochement of these doctrinal fixed 
points of the religions from a contemporary perspective, and not from the 
perspective of the Middle Ages.  We assert that religion is not so much for the 
practice of intellectual and philosophical refinement as it is for living and 
coexisting in love, so far as this harmonizes with beliefs, divine laws, and 
rites.410 
 
There are three noteworthy points in this quotation.  First, Patriarch Ignatius reminds 
the Pope that from the rise of Islam to the present day there has been an unbroken 
bond of tolerance and respect between most Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the 
lands that gave birth to both of these great religions.  Second, he asserts that the 
polemics that marked much of the extant Byzantine literature on Islam from the 
Middle Ages do not in any way diminish the potential for more positive and 
constructive interaction between Christians and Muslims today.  Finally, the Patriarch 
challenges the Pope to think of religion not as something to divide human beings, but 
rather that power, which beyond all logical explanation enables persons and 
communities to forgive past mistakes, live at peace in the present, and envision a 
harmonious future together in the fullness of the Divine love. 
 Among Muslims, there were also those who refused to let peace and love 
between Muslims and Christians slip away into the cloud of anger that seemed to be 
growing in both communities following the Pope Benedict’s now infamous speech.  
In October of 2006, 36 Muslim scholars wrote what they called an “Open Letter to the 
Pope” to address his controversial remarks.   One year later on the occasion of Eid al-
Fitr, 138 Muslim scholars and leaders sent another ‘Open Letter,’ this time to all of 
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the world’s major Christian leaders, who were addressed by name, and a statement 
that they called, “A Common Word Between Us and You.”411  This document, which 
was distributed in hard copy as well as through an interactive website, was facilitated 
through Jordan’s Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought and was intended to 
highlight key areas of commonality and possibilities for rapprochement between the 
two religions.412   
The institute’s website also created a website to provide Muslims the 
opportunity to express their agreement with the statement and for Christian leaders to 
post their replies.  Since October 2007, a number of Orthodox hierarchs have taken 
advantage of this opportunity, responding to Muslims and identifying what they 
envision as the most fruitful path forward for Muslim-Christian relations.  Below are 
just a few of the more prominent examples.  His Holiness Aram I, Catholicos of 
Cilicia, Armenian Orthodox Church stated that: 
[A] strong commitment to living together would help us to destroy the walls of 
prejudice, reassert each religion’s integrity, and generate mutual accountability 
and common responsibility.  What sort of community shall we build together?  
In addition to their theological teachings our two religions have the rich 
experience and inner potential to transform mere coexistence into a broader 
community of shared values, interactive diversity, common participation and 
mutual trust.413 
 
In many ways Catholicos Aram’s words echo those of Patriarch Ignatius, except that 
he challenges Muslims and Christians alike to go beyond coexistence so that they can 
reshape their societies.   
 Of equal significance was the statement of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and 
All Russia.  Among the number of items he addressed in his response was the 
assertion by some that engaging in inter-religious dialogue can weaken one’s own 
religious tradition.  He wrote: 
Some people among both Christians and Muslims have expressed fears that 
the development of interreligious dialogue may lead to the religious 
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syncretism, a review of the doctrines and obliterated borders between religious 
traditions. Time has shown however that a reasonable system of cooperation 
between religions helps to preserve and emphasize the unique nature and 
identity of each of them. 
 
This was a significant comment for Patriarch Alexy to make in such a public way in 
that it identified one of the key challenges to interreligious dialogue in world 
Orthodoxy.  Apparently, some fear that Orthodoxy’s fidelity to the “true faith” might 
in some way be tarnished or that its liturgical rites might be corrupted through 
interaction with Muslims.  This concern was addressed directly by the late Patriarch 
Alexy, who led the world’s largest (national) Orthodox church for many years.  As 
has been the case in the Orthodox Church of Greece, Russian Orthodoxy also has 
within it those who are passionately opposed to ecumenism or inter-religious 
dialogue.414  The Patriarch was interested in taking bold steps to combat such attitudes 
within his church. 
 One final example worth mentioning from the reactions of Orthodox 
Christians to the Muslim Open Letter, came from Archbishop Chrisostomos of 
Cyprus.  Despite the intense, now long-standing, battle with Turkey over the island of 
Cyprus itself, which has contributed to the common prejudice of many Cypriots 
toward Muslims, the Archbishop spoke optimistically about the potential of Muslim-
Christian relations.  He said: 
The long, for centuries, coexistence of Eastern Christianity with Islam has 
created among others, a common cultural ground and the study and rise of it is 
possible to lead to a common effort for peace.  We mention indicatively the 
fields of architecture, music, adoration and monasticism.415 
 
Archbishop Chrisostomos identified four specific areas here that could lead to 
promising results for Muslims and Christians interested in dialogue and improving 
their relations with each other.  These, he argued, are of special significance for 
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Orthodox Christians and part of the “common cultural ground” and historical legacy 
of both Orthodox Christians and Muslims. 
 The positive responses expressed by Catholicos Aram, Patriarch Alexy, 
Archbishop Chrisostomos, and others to the Open Letter from Muslims were met as 
well with action by Orthodox Christians during 2007-2008.  This was particularly the 
case in the Middle East, where existing contacts and networks between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims were ever strengthening and increasing their scope, and was 
perhaps most evident among the youth.  For example, the Middle East region of the 
World Christian Student Federation – which included representatives from Orthodox 
Youth Movements in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon – had already been holding 
an annual Muslim-Christian dialogue conference.  In May of 2007, however, they 
combined their efforts with the Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies, the Jordanian 
Interfaith Coexistence Research Center, and the World Conference on Religions for 
Peace to produce a youth consultation on the topic of, “Pluralism and Fanaticism.”  
Fifty young people from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan participated 
in the event.416   
 A second example of action by Orthodox Christians to improve relations with 
Muslims and to better work with them on joint concerns took place in Amman during 
June of 2008.  Though actually a gathering of Christians, which included 130 
representatives from six continents, the items discussed promised to potentially be of 
great significance in the lives of both Muslims and Christians in Palestine and Israel, 
as well as Israeli Jews.  This international conference called, “Churches Together for 
Peace and Justice in the Middle East,” was convened by the World Council of 
Churches with the goal of taking stock of the “prospects for peace in Israel and 
Palestine.”417  The conference was also intended as a means to launch a new “inter-
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church advocacy initiative,” known as the Palestine Israel Ecumenical Forum, which 
was created to help Christians, “cooperate more closely in advocacy for peace and 
justice in the Middle East.”   
The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories for over 40 years, along with 
the violence and hatred that had emerged as a result, was identified as one of the key 
reasons for the decline of a Christian presence in the region.  Though Rev. Dr. Samuel 
Kobia, General Secretary for the WCC, noted at the event that it is important for 
Christians to address the “real concerns about growing anti-Semitism,” one of the key 
goals of the advocacy forum was to work toward ending the occupation.418  On this 
point one of the key Orthodox participants, Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem 
and All Palestine Theophilos III, emphasized the importance of dialogue, not only 
among Christian denominations, but also between Christians and those of other 
faiths.419  Though he acknowledged that the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
had caused severe “violence, aggression, hatred and bigotry, which produce unrest 
and insecurity,” he also suggested that “the conflict and hatred can be turned into 
durable and just peace.”  While he emphasized the potential role of the churches in 
this through the new advocacy initiative, Patriarch Theophilos seemed to be implying 
as well that strengthening Muslim-Christian relations in the region would also 
strengthen the Muslim and Christian communities in the face of Israeli occupation.  
Though Patriarch Theophilos and other Christian leaders in the region find promise in 
a multilateral approach between Jews, Christians, and Muslims, the subtle theme 
throughout the conference and the advocacy initiative seemed to be that the shared 
experiences and conditions in which Christians and Muslims find themselves in Israel 
and Palestine point to a natural affinity between them and the potential for greater 
results through dialogue and united action.                    
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 One final example during 2007-2008 to indicate that Orthodox Christians in 
the Middle East had strengthened their resolve to build upon and increase the scope of 
existing networks between themselves and their Muslim neighbors was a series of 
meetings held in Syria during April 2008.  In the face of increased pressures 
following 9/11 and the influx of refugees from Lebanon during the 2006 war, 
Christian and Islamic leaders in Syria had worked so well together that an 
international delegation of Christians had come to the country to learn from them.  
Summarizing some of the reasons for Syria’s long history of Christians and Muslims 
living together in peace and advising delegates on what they could do to promote this 
in their own countries, Patriarch Ignatius IV (Hazim) said the following: 
Islam cannot be studied like grammar…. We have to see the real people and 
share with them.  Muslims are sharing with you by living in your countries.  
Why do you ignore them? …I believe in acts of love.  Receiving people with 
love will not solve all problems immediately.  But the next generation will 
harvest the fruits of loving.420 
 
Here, once again, Patriarch Ignatius was in the forefront of those who would promote 
dialogue and cooperation between Christians and Muslims.  Despite some of the 
setbacks caused by the events of 9/11, further attacks by terrorists in other parts of the 
world, and increased militarization in the Middle East, the patriarch seemed not to be 
deterred from his goal to bring greater peace and fellowship to Christians and 
Muslims.  With his experience in living with Muslims and being a strong advocate for 
dialogue for several decades, Patriarch Ignatius had the wisdom and the ability to 
view progress from the perspective of the long term.  As he said, it is important to 
plant seeds of love now so that the fruits may actually be realized in the years to 
come.  Patriarch Ignatius’ long-range vision and personal example of engagement 
with Muslims are truly extraordinary and have yielded much fruit during his own 
lifetime.  Countless persons, both Muslim and Christian, have been influenced, 
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inspired, and encouraged by Patriarch Ignatius to pursue the challenging and 
sometimes troublesome road of dialogue and interfaith encounter.   
 There have been a number of signs indicating that Orthodox Christians have 
renewed their efforts to dialogue with Muslims over the past few years.  The positive 
responses to the “Open Letter” from Muslim leaders as well as various actions 
through involvement in shared concerns with Muslims are just some of the examples 
of this throughout the Orthodox world.  However, there was a watershed moment 
within the Orthodox Church in 2008 in terms of its commitment to interreligious 
dialogue and common action with those of other faiths.  On 9 October of that year, 
Patriarch Bartholomew convened a four-day meeting at the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
with 14 Orthodox primates and their representatives from around the world to discuss 
a number of pressing issues, reestablish a common set of principles and goals for the 
twenty-first century, and promote greater unity within the Church and via à vis the 
Church and the outside world.  This event, which marked the fifth time that such a 
Synaxis had taken place since 1990, was an opportunity for Orthodox leaders to show 
their unity as a Church and was part of the efforts over the course of many years 
leading to a forthcoming Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, discussed 
at some length in chapter two.  Among the issues discussed at this synaxis of 
Orthodox primates was their agreement on the need “to strengthen by means of 
further theological support the decisions taken on a Pan-Orthodox level regarding 
participation of the Orthodox Church in theological dialogues with the non-Orthodox 
[i.e. with other Christian confessions and those of other religions].”421  Interreligious 
dialogue - and relations generally - between Orthodox Christians and those of other 
religions were, therefore, identified as justifications, among other things, for the 2008 
Synaxis itself.   
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 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew took great care in his opening remarks to 
model the spirit of unity that was to pervade the entire gathering.  With regard to 
interreligious relations, he spoke the following to his brother bishops: 
Orthodox theology cannot today be developed or expounded without dialogue 
with modern currents of philosophical thought and social dynamics, as well as 
with various forms of art and culture of our times.  In this regard, the message 
and overall word of Orthodoxy cannot be aggressive, as it often unfortunately 
is; for this is of no benefit at all.  Rather, it must be dialectical, dialogical and 
reconciliatory.  We must first understand other people and discern their deeper 
concerns; for, even behind disbelief, there lies concealed the search for the 
true God…. The Church cannot – indeed, it must not – in any way nurture 
religious fanaticism, whether consciously or subconsciously.  When zeal 
becomes fanaticism, it deviates from the nature of the Church.  By contrast, 
we must develop initiatives of reconciliation wherever conflicts among people 
either loom or erupt.  Inter-Christian and inter-religious dialogue is the very 
least of our obligations; and it is one that we must surely fulfill.422 
 
In other words, the engagement of the Church in inter-Christian and interreligious 
dialogue should be seen as a starting point, or an opening to the broader opportunities 
Orthodox Christians may have to be “dialectical, dialogical, and reconciliatory” with 
those around them, be they friend or foe.  He encouraged participants to enter the 
Synaxis with this spirit of openness and charity. 
Apparently, this admonition struck a cord with all of the other Orthodox 
patriarchs at the Synaxis.  After their several days of discussion on all of the matters 
before them, in their final statement from the event, they made these conclusions with 
regard what Orthodoxy’s relationship should be with other religions: 
As Primates and Representatives of the Most Holy Orthodox Churches…we 
proclaim from the See of the First-throne among the Churches and we re-
affirm…our desire to continue, despite any difficulties, the theological 
dialogues with other Christians, as well as the interreligious dialogues, 
especially with Judaism and Islam, given that dialogue constitutes the only 
way of solving differences among people, especially in a time like today, 
when every kind of division, including those in the name of religion, threaten 
people’s peace and unity.423 
 
Through these words, the leaders of the world’s Orthodox Churches reaffirmed the 
importance of theological dialogues with those of other religions, particularly Judaism 
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and Islam.  They encouraged all Orthodox Christians not to give in to those forces 
within their “autocephalous churches” that would try to keep them from joining with 
Jews and Muslims in dialogue, but to face head-on the issues between them, as well 
as those that they collectively face in an age when peace, unity, and religion itself (i.e. 
all world religions) are being threatened.    
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 Though the statements on interreligious dialogue from the October 2008 
Synaxis of the Heads of all Orthodox Churches may have reflected the most up-to-
date “Orthodox position” on Islam and Muslim-Christian dialogue, it remains to be 
seen whether and when a Holy and Great Council will occur and if the participants 
will more fully express the “mind of the Church” on this matter.  However, if the 
evidence presented in this chapter is any indication, Orthodox Christians, in the main, 
will continue to engage in dialogue and common action with Muslims and those of 
other religions.  It does not seem that the tragedies of 9/11, or similar ones occurring 
since 2001, have proved to be an impediment to these efforts.  In fact, it appears that 
the terrorist attacks have had the positive effect of increasing the dialogue within the 
Church about its engagement generally with the outside world.  Whereas in the pre-
9/11 period, much of the dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims 
occurred in the context of the World Council of Churches and certain local and 
regional partnerships, in the years after the September 11th terrorist attacks dialogue 
efforts expanded into numerous other international and local contexts.  Events such as 
the one leading to the “Brussels Declaration,” where Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims were prominent participants, drew the attention of key world leaders.  There 
are also the examples of the interfaith conference prior to the start of the 2004 
Olympic Games in Athens, the ‘Peace and Tolerance’ event of 2005, and the 2006 
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conference in Jordan on the ‘Prospects of Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Today’s 
World.’        
The question remains, however, whether September 11th actually changed 
relations and dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  The increased 
number of dialogues between them (which were sometimes expanded to include those 
of other religions, most commonly Judaism) and their general efforts to foster and 
restore peace could be seen as a natural and temporary reaction to terrorism on a 
grand (and truly international) scale.  Did these events in any way shift or 
fundamentally change the views of Orthodox Christians toward Muslims or have any 
impact on the dialogue between them?  In terms of the views of Orthodox Christians 
towards Islam, 9/11 seems to have had little impact among those individuals who 
have been leaders in dialogue efforts with Muslims over the last few decades.  In fact, 
it only seems to have strengthened their resolve to look beyond the religious 
differences and reach out to Muslims as fellow human persons of faith in the one true 
God.  As was mentioned in this chapter, on two occasions during the post-9/11 period 
Patriarch Ignatius IV (Hazim) – a pioneer in the field of Muslim-Christian dialogue – 
made just this point by speaking of the responsibility of Christians to reach out in love 
to their Muslim neighbors.  He spoke of Orthodox Christians and Muslims “living and 
coexisting in love” and encouraged them to “receive each other in love” in order that 
“the next generation will harvest the fruits of loving.”  This is consistent with his 
earlier writings, as well as the thought of others mentioned in this study who have 
been actively engaged over the long term in Muslim-Christian dialogue (such as 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Metropolitan Georges [Khodr], and Archbishop 
Anastasios [Yannoulatos]).   
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In comparing the statements about Islam and the content of the dialogues that 
took place in the post-9/11 period with those covered in previous chapters of this 
study, it could be argued that there has been a subtle shift among Orthodox Christians 
in terms of their focus.  It seems that there may be a greater emphasis and awareness 
of the dangers of religious fundamentalism not only outside of their own tradition 
(such as the thought and acts of Islamic terrorists or similar extremists from any other 
of the great world religions), but also among their fellow Orthodox Christians.  One 
can detect, in the years following the 9/11 attacks, an increasingly self-critical tone in 
the comments of some Orthodox theologians who speak of any tendency toward 
religious extremism within their church.  An example of this can be found in the 
speech by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew quoted toward the end of this chapter 
in which he encourages his fellow bishops to root out “religious fanaticism [within the 
Church], whether consciously or subconsciously” and to consider inter-Christian and 
inter-religious dialogue as “the very least of [their] obligations.”   Similarly, the 2005 
‘Statement of Shared Moral Commitment,’ penned by Archbishop Anastasios’ and 
other leaders of the religious traditions in Albania, reveals a sincere desire to eradicate 
religious hatred and discrimination propagated through religious education programs 
and curricula, as well as through preaching from the pulpits and minbars of churches 
and mosques throughout the country.   
The Orthodox Christians mentioned in the preceding pages have also included 
with increasing frequency an appeal to peace in their speeches and writings.  With 
few exceptions, notably Fr. Webster’s discussion of what he called “The Orthodox 
Justifiable War Trajectory” and the 2004 theological conference in Thessaloniki on 
“Ecumenism: Origins – Expectations – Disenchantment,” the theme of establishing 
(or reestablishing) peace in their societies and throughout the world seems to be 
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present in nearly all of the representative materials from the post-9/11 period 
regarding relations between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  Perhaps in this sense 
one can say that, in reaction to 9/11, the Orthodox theologians and leaders engaged in 
dialogue with Muslims have articulated themselves and their convictions in a slightly 
different manner in order to show to themselves, their partners in dialogue, and the 
world that they support efforts towards peace, not war.  As a matter of survival and 
what might be expected from world religious leaders during times of crisis, war, and 
increased religious fanaticism, key Orthodox hierarchs and theologians continued to 
acknowledge that the future of their Church may in some measure depend upon their 
ability to live in peace with their Muslim neighbors and to work with them to alleviate 
suffering and despair across the globe. 
Outside of the points mentioned above, the thought and action of Orthodox 
Christians during the post-9/11 period does not appear to be a departure from the 
basic notions found in earlier writings from Orthodox theologians on Islam and 
Orthodox Christian-Muslim dialogue.  After several decades in dialogue with 
Muslims and with more and more Orthodox leaders participating in such efforts, there 
seems to be less of an overt need to continually justify why Orthodox Christians 
should engage in common work with Muslims and even less how Islam, in its historic 
and current manifestations, functions in relation to the divine economy and the 
salvation of the world.  In this sense, one rarely finds in the literature since 9/11 the 
kind of elaborate theological arguments on Christology and Pneumatology vis à vis 
Islam that were presented in the 70s and 80s from individuals like Metropolitan 
Georges and Archbishop Anastasios (see chapter three).  The points made then seem 
to be taken for granted today by those who are engaged in interfaith dialogue and 
shared action with those of other religions, especially Muslims. 
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One final observation of the post-9/11 period is an increase in the prominence 
of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, both inside and outside of the Church.  It is 
not clear whether his influence has in any way increased as a result of the events and 
aftermath of 9/11.  However, each year he furthers with greater degrees of success his 
long-recognized goal of increased dialogue and mutual cooperation between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims (as well as those of other religions).  This can be 
seen in his leadership among inter-religious and inter-Christian groups, before 
European and international organizations, and, most notably, in relation to the 
worldwide Orthodox Christian community.  Bringing the primates and representatives 
of the Orthodox Churches together at the 2008 Synaxis, Patriarch Bartholomew, along 
with the other participants, reaffirmed the conviction that the participation of 
Orthodox Christians in dialogue with Muslims (and others) must continue because 
this “constitutes the only way of solving differences among people.”  
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Conclusion  
 
 
In the present age, it is essential for Orthodox Christians to nurture positive 
relationships with Muslims.  Though the task may not be effortless, the fruit of 
friendship between the two religions can lead to favorable outcomes for Orthodox 
Christians, Muslims, and the rest of the world.  Propitious relations between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims are possible, necessary, and beneficial.  The preceding 
chapters demonstrate that in recent years Orthodox Christians have taken strides to 
rediscover and assert the positive role that their relationship with Muslims has played 
over the years, as well as its significance in particular for the Orthodox Church in the 
years to come.  Chapter one outlined the ways in which relations between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims have become increasingly complex over the past few 
centuries because of the consequences of modernization.  Internal and external forces 
have presented new challenges to their ability to understand each other and live in 
peace as neighbors and friends.  Chapter two showed, however, that there remains a 
strong theological basis in the Orthodox tradition for a positive assessment of Islam 
and engagement in interreligious dialogue with Muslims in this postmodern age.  Key 
Orthodox theologians have been rediscovering the open attitudes towards other 
religions held by great theologians of earlier centuries and have been expanding the 
scope of the saving work of Christ and the active presence of the Holy Spirit to 
include Islam and their Muslim neighbors.  Chapter three identified numerous 
declarations and dialogues through which Orthodox Christians have demonstrated 
through word and deed their commitment to this aspect of their theology and the 
underlying religious principles upon which it depends.  It was noted that, especially 
through their efforts in the World Council of Churches and the partnership between 
the Aal al-Bayt Institute and the Orthodox Center for the Ecumenical Patriarch, 
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Orthodox Christians have presented Islam as part of the divine economy for salvation.  
They have also seen their Muslim neighbors not just as friends but as teachers through 
which, by the Holy Spirit, divine wisdom can be obtained.  Chapter four examined the 
ways in which Orthodox Christians have been reevaluating the place of their religious 
heritage in their identity amidst the challenges and potentials of the postmodern 
world.  It showed as well that Muslims have experienced many of the same issues 
relating to identity and have responded in similar ways with comparable results.  It 
further demonstrated how an honest assessment of past and present relations with 
Muslims could be beneficial for Orthodox Christians on the question of identity for 
today and for future generations.  Finally, chapter five considered the potential impact 
of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and their effect on Orthodox Christian-
Muslim relations and Orthodox views on Islam and dialogue.  The evidence suggested 
there has been an increase in the quantity and quality of participation of Orthodox 
Christians in dialogue with Muslims during the post-9/11 period.  Another 
observation was that there seem to be a growing number of Orthodox theologians who 
speak of their Church with a self-critical eye in terms of any tendency among their co-
religionists to give into the temptation of religious fundamentalism, with its numerous 
destructive consequences.   
Through an analysis of the wide range of statements on Islam by various 
authors and leaders within the Church, these chapters have shown that it is possible to 
speak of an Orthodox ‘position’ on Islam and relations with Muslims.  Though these 
seem poised to be on the agenda for the much anticipated, though for decades elusive, 
Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, there is a detectable and growing 
consensus on the issues associated with relations between Orthodoxy and other 
religions.  Specifically, by creatively applying traditional concepts of christology and 
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pneumatology, key Orthodox theologians have posited Islam as part of the divine 
economy for salvation and have publicly endorsed (and even directly participated in) 
Muslim-Christian dialogue over the past three decades.  It is important to note that 
these – that is, the tradition Christian views on the Trinity and the two natures of 
Christ (divine and human) – are paradoxically the key area of thought which, at least 
from the Muslim perspective, have divided Christians and Muslims over the centuries.  
This specific (and ever-expanding) group of Orthodox theologians have reconfigured 
theological reflection on Islam and re-established an historical account of Orthodox 
Christian-Muslim relations that more accurately represents the nature and character of 
past historical encounters, present engagements, and future possibilities.  By doing so, 
they are not only righting the wrongs of some of their more recent ancestors, but are 
also asserting that Orthodoxy is engaged in the problems faced by all humanity and 
that it is an open, self-aware, and secure religion that can affirm the work of the Holy 
Spirit outside the boundaries of the Church.  The evidence indicates it is likely that 
this trend will continue and even increase in the years ahead, despite the fact that there 
remain voices within the Church that speak against such an open exchange with those 
of other traditions.  For a growing number of Orthodox theologians the journey 
toward mutual understanding and greater respect for the ‘religious other’ is 
considered to be not only a worthwhile endeavor, but also a sign of the spiritual 
maturity of those willing to embark upon the quest. 
The research throughout this work, therefore, shows two significant themes 
that emerge repeatedly for those involved in the area of Orthodox Christian-Muslim 
dialogue.  The first is Islam’s generally positive treatment of the “people of the book” 
– especially Orthodox Christians, who as close neighbors and friends of Muslims 
from the beginning, can most appropriately fall under the Qur’anic epithet of those 
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“nearest in affection” (Sura 5.82) – from the rise of Islam to the present day in several 
Muslim majority countries.   Though there were certainly examples throughout the 
centuries when the reality did not live up to the ideal, Orthodox Christians enjoyed 
relatively peaceful and prosperous lives under Muslim rule.  Only as a consequence of 
and reaction to modernity did some Orthodox Christians begin to view this history 
differently.  Some Orthodox Christians even began to take on the kind of Crusading 
ethos and mentality that had often plagued relations between Western Christians and 
Muslims since the Middle Ages.424  Responding to this trend, several Orthodox 
theologians mentioned in this study have urged their faithful to avoid theories such as 
Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” which can (and have so often in the 
West) become ideologies unto themselves, much in the same way that those who 
espouse them have criticized “fundamentalists” of turning religion into ideology.  The 
second common theme, related to the first, is the assertion that a positive relationship 
with Muslims (and Islam in a general sense) is an essential aspect of the Orthodox 
Christians’ historical past, present identity, and future aspirations.  Orthodox 
Christians have for too long listened to those who would turn historical relations 
between their ancestors and Muslims into a caricature of hatred, competition, and 
intolerance.  In order to fully come to terms with who they are in the present, they 
must rediscover a more accurate and positive conception of the relationship between 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam.  As Patriarch Bartholomew has said, Orthodox 
Christians “must be dialectical, dialogical, and reconciliatory” so their “zeal” does not 
become “fanaticism,” which deviates from the true “nature of the Church.”425  This is 
essential if they (alongside Muslims and those of other faiths) have any hope of 
solving their many identity issues in an age that is increasingly hostile toward religion 
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and profound and traditional forms of spirituality that have fed the human soul for a 
millennium.   
It is important to note at this point the possibility of making some distinctions 
between the nature of the interactions between Orthodox Christians and Sunni 
Muslims and those between Orthodox Christians and Shi’i Muslims.  Since current 
estimates indicate that Sunnis comprise 85-87% of all Muslims, it is not surprising 
that the majority of the Orthodox Christian-Muslim encounters examined in this work 
have involved Sunni Muslims.  The common issues faced by questions of authority 
within the Sunni and Eastern Orthodox world, as well as a few of this author’s own 
conclusions in these areas, should be understood within this context.  This study also 
examined, however, the distinctive character of recent dialogues between the Russian 
Orthodox Church and religious leaders from Iran, which represents the vast majority 
of the world’s entire Shi’ite population today and the center of Twelver Shi’ism (aka 
the Imamis).  Within the nation-states of Russian and Iran, one could argue that there 
are significant parallels between the way the official religious establishments are 
connected to the centralized political power-structures within each country, able to 
influence change within key social and political institutions, perceived by their 
respective religious communities, and representative of more traditional views on a 
number of social issues (along with an active agenda for change in these areas), at 
least when compared to certain other regions of the world where Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims have lived side-by-side, historically and/or in the present day.    
Though this is noteworthy and may warrant further research, it is important 
not to make too much of the Sunni-Shi’i distinctions with regard to their relations 
with Orthodox Christians in recent years.  One thinks, for example, of the well-
respected and internationally acclaimed scholar of Islam, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who 
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along with his contributions in a number of areas has figured prominently in Orthodox 
Christian-Muslim encounters in recent years.  Though Nasr is himself a Shi’ite 
(originally from Iran, though now in the U.S.) and part of his scholarship has focused 
on Shi’ite thought, one would have to conclude based on the analysis of his works in 
this study that his contributions are significant to Orthodox Christian-Muslim 
dialogue in general terms than with anything relating specifically to Shi’i Muslim-
Orthodox Christian relations.  One does not see the preoccupation with themes 
reflected in certain conservative social agendas, which have at times characterized the 
official dialogues between the Russian Orthodox Church and high-ranking religious 
leaders from Iran.  There is one area of his inquiry that one could argue is motivated 
by a historically Shi’ite tendency toward mysticism and that is the parallels between 
Sufism (the Islamic mystical tradition) and hesychasm (Orthodox Christianity’s most 
well know form of mysticism).  Though an essential aspect of the Sunni tradition as 
well, Sufism has undergone a number of attacks from a variety of sources during the 
modern age and only within the past few decades seems to be re-establishing its role 
within the broader Islamic experience (notwithstanding continuous and serious 
challenges to its existence).  This study has identified the theme of mysticism in 
Nasr’s articles on Orthodox Christian-Muslim relations more than once between the 
years 1986-2002.  It is surprising, perhaps, that in light of the profound heritage of the 
mystical tradition within their respective countries and religions (for example, the 
hesychast revival in Russia in the 19th century and the sheer vastness of Sufi masters 
and poets who came out of Persia from early to modern times), the official dialogues 
between Russia and Iran, unlike Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s work, have paid little 
attention thus far to the topic.   
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This investigation into Orthodox Christian thought has revealed that 
modernity can properly be understood as both friend and foe.  A theme developed 
throughout each chapter, the latter two in particular, is that modernity, the rise of the 
West, and modernization across the globe introduced a new strain upon the traditional 
relationships between Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  For example, the imposition 
of the nation-state as the new and now only acceptable form of socio-political 
organization led to some significant consequences for both religious communities.  
The rise of Orthodox nations has challenged the pan-Orthodoxy sentiment, confused 
catholicity with patriotism, and tempted some into hatred and violence toward any 
non-Orthodox minorities in their midst.  Similar trends can be detected in Muslim 
communities across the globe.  This has led not only to elevated tensions between 
Islam and the West, but also increasingly complicated relations between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims and between Orthodox Christians and the West.   
Despite these challenges, modernity has also provided Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims an unprecedented opportunity to understand what the relationship 
between them was, is, and can become.  The postmodern age, in fact, presents a way 
to transcend the pitfalls, fallacies, errors, etc. of the modern period, so that Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims can rediscover and build upon the highpoints of their shared 
past in order to imagine a better future for themselves and all mankind.  For their 
continued success, this will need to be at the center of any future dialogue between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims.  Modernity and modernization have left such an 
imprint upon Christians in the West that they have often responded to modern life 
either through “non-worldly transcendence” or “unbounded, materialistic 
secularism.”426 These characteristic and extreme responses can be seen in numerous 
theological writings, in the debates on various “issues” of modern life that have 
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caused deep divisions in the Catholic Church and several Protestant denominations, 
and in Muslim-Christian dialogue in which Roman Catholics and/or Protestants have 
been the Christians partners.  Certainly, Orthodoxy has not been immune to such 
extreme responses and it too has its forms of fundamentalism.  As this study has 
shown, however, that Orthodox Christian-Muslim dialogue has taken a somewhat 
different path and form.  Because of their shared history in the pre-modern period and 
similar experiences and responses to modernization during the modern and post-
modern periods, Orthodox Christians and Muslims have been in a somewhat unique 
position and will continue to be for the foreseeable future.  If the Orthodox partners in 
the dialogue can continue to appreciate Islam’s vision for a ‘just society’ for all 
people (through authentic and peaceful Islamic rule [i.e. the ‘Medinan ideal’ 
discussed in chapter four]) and the Muslim partners can strive to better understand 
how the Christian notion of Trinity is not tritheism and work out better protections for 
religious minorities in Muslim majority countries, they can greatly benefit the wider 
relations between the two faiths.427  Together, through dialogue and collaboration, 
they have the potential to, in the words of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, 
“overcome modernity ‘from the inside’” to present a new paradigm of secularism that 
respects God and man and does a better job of ensuring justice, freedom, and 
pluralism around the world.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Coming to terms with their past has helped many Orthodox Christians have a 
better understanding of the role of their Church in the modern and postmodern 
periods.  It has also given them the opportunity to better understand the reactions of 
their fellow Orthodox Christians to modernity and the many changes in the day-to-day 
rhythm of their lives over the past several decades.  One area of concern among 
Orthodox theologians and leaders relates to the troubling trend within their churches 
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that is similar to what is termed “fundamentalism” in Western Christianity.  While 
this label has been applied as well (and quite awkwardly at times) to Islam by 
Western journalists and writers, there has, to date, been no adequate study devoted 
specifically to the theme of Orthodox fundamentalism.  This work has identified 
evidence of the trend of fundamentalism within the Orthodox Church, and the 
possible reasons for its growing appeal in certain circles.  It was noted that the 
increased dialogue with Muslims by some Orthodox Christians over the past few 
decades may have inadvertently elevated anxiety levels for other Orthodox Christians, 
pushing the latter toward a similar ideology to that held by so many fundamentalists 
around the globe and across many of the world’s religions.  This does not mean, 
however, that Orthodox Christian-Muslim dialogue should be brought to an end.  
Rather, it shows the need for future research on Orthodox fundamentalism – its 
triggers, how it functions within the community, the consequence, and so forth.  Such 
research could examine the ways in which the words, actions, and motivations of 
those Orthodox Christians who wage frequent intellectual (and sometimes physical) 
attacks on Muslims and their religion have been misguided and have left these 
individuals far short of their intended goals.   
Another interesting follow-up to this work would be to investigate thematic 
areas in which some of the solutions brought forward from Orthodox Christian-
Muslim dialogue might help Western Christians resolve some key questions that have 
occupied their theological inquiry, as well as improve relations between Eastern and 
Western Christians and between Muslims and the West.  Numerous Western 
theologians have pointed to the spiritual crisis of modern man and have embarked on 
a frenetic search to find from their own sources (and to some extent those of others) 
something to fill the void in the hearts of many men and women today, even 
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congregants of their own churches.  Perhaps Orthodox Christians and Muslims could 
share something useful in this regard from their collective and communal experiences.  
One thinks especially of the inquiries of some into the shared history and potential of 
their mystical traditions, respectively Hesychasm and Sufism, to bring about spiritual 
renewal to modern man and serve as a basis for fruitful dialogue between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims.428  This deserves further investigation in the coming years, 
both from the point of view of scholars and practitioners of these traditions.  What 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims have considered together through dialogue on the 
topics of globalization, secularism, Church-state relations, pluralism, and mission 
could also yield some fresh perspectives on a number of the theological and moral 
dilemmas with which Western Christians have struggled in recent years, as well as in 
the general area of Muslim-Christian relations.   
Finally, since this study has given a comprehensive treatment of Orthodox 
Christian-Muslim relations in recent years, it points to the need for further research 
into relations between Muslims and other Eastern Christians communities – such as 
the Oriental Orthodox Churches (the Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopian, and Syrian 
Orthodox), the Church of the East, and the Eastern Catholic Church.  Such 
scholarship would not only yield some very useful information, but might augment 
and/or serve as a corrective to the general thesis and various arguments presented in 
this study.  Even within the Orthodox Christian churches, there may well be important 
regional and even local peculiarities with regard to relations between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims and dialogue between them.   
The potential for further development in the area of Orthodox Christian-
Muslim relations - as well as positive outcomes from continued dialogue between the 
practitioners of the two religions - is endless.  There is every indication that those 
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Orthodox Christians already involved in this work will continue and even increase 
their efforts in the years ahead.  Their success, however, will in large part depend on 
their ability to persuade others within their Church that Islam is not the enemy and 
that engaged and healthy relations with Muslims will deeply enrich their experience 
as Orthodox Christians.   
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